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PREFACE

In his Cry, the Beloved Country Alan Paton commented that
"the world has never let South Africa alone."

The present study is

one more of a great many works which have been written in recent years
on topics related to South Africa; these works give continuing proof
to the truth of Paton's statement.

In the course of preparing this

dissertation I had the very good fortune to receive an appointment
to lecture in American history at the University of Natal in Durban,
South Africa, for six months.

For this I am deeply indebted to

K. H. C. McIntyre, the Chairman of the Department of History and
Political Science at the University of Natal.

Jeffrey Horton, Bill

Guest, Andrew Duminy, Michael Spencer, and Tony Lumbey of the same
Department assisted me in gaining a better understanding of South
African history and were most hospitable to an American family very
far from home,

I am likewise indebted to many other South Africans

for what they revealed to me about their society.

South Africa is

still a relatively small country, and it was possible for me to meet
Prime Minister B. J. Vorster and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, and to see
and hear other prominent political figures.

Many South Africans were

more than willing to tell me as much as they could about their country.'
1
Newsmen discussed their activities and gave me access to the clippings
files of their newspaper.

A Xhosa tribesman who lived in Idutywa

described landholding and tribal authority to me in the Transkei. A
ii

student took me to visit the Cato Manor magistrate's court so that I
could learn more ahout the administration of justice in South Africa.
A retired Afrikaner psychologist gave me a personal tour of the
Voortrekker Monument.

These and many other acts of kindness contri

buted directly and indirectly to this study and made me understand why
Paton called it the beloved country.
I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of John
Preston Moore with whom I began this study, David H. Culbert who
assumed the responsibility for advising me after the retirement of
Professor Moore, and John Loos, Chairman of the History Department
of Louisiana State University.

Appreciation must be expressed, too,

for the cooperation given me by officials at various pro- and antiSouth Africa organizations including the South Africa Foundation, the
South African Information Service, the American-African Affairs
Association, the American Committee on Africa, the Southern Africa
Committee, and the Council for Christian Social Action of the United
Church of Christ,

Some of these officials were understandably re

luctant to reveal their activities to an inquisitive researcher of
unknown political views, but they did provide valuable information
which I have acknowledged in greater detail in my footnotes. I have
also acknowledged in the footnotes the assistance of a number of
newspapers which sent me, in response to my request, copies of the
editorials they printed at the time of the Sharpeville crisis in South
Africa in i960.
The pursuit of my topic took me to several libraries where
librarians were helpful in finding materials relating to South Africa.
iii

These included the libraries at Louisiana State University, Luke
University, the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill), North
Carolina Central University, and the University of Natal, the
Philadelphia Free Library, and the New York City Public Library.
Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Kay, for
her patience, assistance, and typing, and to my son, Patrick, who
showed consideration and understanding to a busy father.

iv
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ABSTRACT

Since the Nationalist Party gained political control in South
Africa in 19^8, the South African government has been criticized for
its policy of apartheid (or separate development) by nearly every
country in the world.

Many countries have endorsed the use of

economic sanctions or other measures against South Africa.

Except for

implementing an arms embargo, the United States has opposed the use
of collective measures to bring about change in South Africa.

It is

the purpose of this study to develop the reasons why some Americans
in the 1960s came to believe that the United States should take strong
action against South Africa, to discuss the views of other Americans
who opposed such actions, and to examine various factors affecting
American views on South Africa.

Source material for this study in

cluded news magazines, journals of opinion and reportage, newspapers,
books, Congressional hearings, brochures and pamphlets of organizations
both hostile and favorable to South Africa, publications of the South
African government, and personal interviews.
After an introduction which suggests an analytical approach
to the study of views on, or images of, other countries, this disser
tation is divided into two parts.

Part I begins by describing Ameri

can criticism of apartheid and the Nationalist government primarily in
the period from 19^8 to i960. Although the American press was very
unfavorable to South Africa in this period, few American citizens or
vil

publications advocated changes in American policy on South Africa
prior to i960.

The remainder of Part I discusses the developments

that led to a movement in the United States for measures against
South Africa.

Problems in American race relations in the late 1950s

and early 1960s led some Americans to believe that the United States
had to prove its opposition to racism and segregation by denouncing
apartheid or by taking stronger action against South' Africa.

The

coming to Independence of numerous African countries around i960
increased this belief.

The killing of a number of Africans at

Sharpeville, South Africa, in i960 intensified American fear of a
racial war in southern Africa and precipitated a movement for strong
measures against South Africa.

This movement went through several

phases that began with calls for governmental policy changes and
turned finally to putting pressure on American corporations to
"disengage" from South Africa.
Part II of this dissertation describes the efforts of a num
ber of groups to improve South Africa’s image in the United States
and focuses upon the activities of the South African government, the
South Africa Foundation, and the United States-South Africa Leader
Exchange Program.

It then discusses the views of Americans more

favorable to, or less critical of, South Africa than those discussed
in Part I,
groups:
men.

These Americans were to be found particularly among three

anti-Communist conservatives, white Southerners, and business

The conclusion suggests that the "climate of opinion" in the

United States became more favorable to South Africa in the late 1960s
because of the Viet Nam War, a conservative reaction to American race
viii

problems, disillusionment over the record of the first decade of
African independence, and the work of the opinion influencing groups.
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate an interrelationship
between American perceptions of South Africa and views on policy
towards South Africa.

Evidence is not yet available to show that the

factors which played a role in shaping the views of members of the
public on South Africa were the same factors that influenced the views
of policy makers.

The study does, however, provide a perspective on

the South African policy of the United States through analysis of
many different American views on South Africa, and it describes the
efforts of various groups to influence those views.

INTRODUCTION

South Africa is a land of controversy.

Virtually every gov

ernment on earth has strongly condemned its government and racial
policies.

A majority of the countries of the United Nations have en

dorsed the use of strong collective measures against South Africa to
"bring an end to those policies.

The opposition of the United States

and several countries of Western Europe for more than a decade has
prevented the implementation of measures which could lead to massive
social change in South Africa.

Because of its own racial difficulties,

the question of policy on South Africa has had a special significance
for the United States.

The question of South Africa has created an

additional international dimension to a domestic problem.

Although

relatively few Americans have concerned themselves actively with South
Africa, the views that have been expressed by Americans on South Africa
are of interest for what they reveal about certain aspects of American
society and about an element of the policy-making process.

1

It is the

purpose of this study to develop the reasons why some Americans in the
^American views on South Africa have not appeared very impor
tant to many Americans but they have been quite important to South
Africans. As an Afrikaans paper, Die Burger, once commented: "In
[South Africa's] information battle the American front is the chief
line in the West." Quoted in Eschel Rhoodie, The Paper Curtain
(Johannesburg, 1969), 1^* This spirited attack on American (and
other) criticism of South Africa is of considerable interest because
Rhoodie has since become Secretary of Information for South Africa
and thus has the responsibility for improving foreign opinion of
South Africa,
1

1960s came to believe the United States should take strong actions
against South Africa, to discuss the views of other Americans who
opposed such actions, and to examine various factors affecting Ameri
can perceptions of South Africa.
For the reader whose familiarity with South Africa is limited,
it will

perhaps he helpful to begin with a

brief descriptionof the

features of South Africa which are pertinent to the present study and
to clarify some of the terminology which will be employed.

A wealth

of material is available in English on South Africa to the reader who
wishes to explore its recent or more distant history in greater detail.
Much

of it is, however, strongly polemical

in

O

character.

As its name suggests, South Africa is located at the southern
tip of the African continent, a fact which has given it strategic
significance from the days when the Dutch used it as a way station to
the East Indies to the present.

Without taking into consideration

South West Africa (renamed Namibia by the United Nations), South Africa
is about the same size as the combined area of Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Arkansas.

The country has long had a repu

tation for wealth which has been based primarily on its extensive
mineral resources, notably diamonds, gold, platinum and other precious
metals.

The South African economy also has a very modern manufacturing

o
For an excellent introduction to the historiography of South
Africa, see Leonard M. Thompson, "South Africa," in Robin Winks, ed, ,
The Historiography of the British Empire and Commonwealth (Durham, North
Carolina, 19o6i, 212-36, See also Monica Wilson and Leonard M.
Thompson, eds., The Oxford History of South Africa (2 vols.j New York
and Oxford, 1969-71)', I, ^7-72, II," 529-5^; and "Comprehensive Bibli
ography on South Africa Since i960," In Heribert Adam, ed., South
Africa; Sociological Perspectives (New York, 1971), 301-332.

3

sector.

3

The range of manufacturing activity has increased considera

bly since the mid-1930s; diversification has been stimulated by economic
conditions and by government encouragement to the point that the coun
try is virtually capable of self-sufficiency.
South Africa's population of over tventy-one million people is
one of the most racially and culturally diverse of any country,**

The

different groups have been classified in a variety of ways and thus
many terms are used in this study in reference to different elements
of the population.

These terms should be explained in order to avoid

confusion.
Slightly less than one-fifth of the total population is of
European extraction.

Generally referred to as Europeans in South

Africa, they are often spoken of simply as the whites in American pub
lications.

They are subdivided by language, history, and self-identi

fication into two groups, Afrikaners and English-speaking South
Africans.
The Afrikaners predominate numerically over the Englishspeaking and politically over all other racial groups.
65 per

Approximately

cent of the whites are Afrikaners which means they speak

3]D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy (2nd ed. ; Cape
Town, 1967), 118-37. On the interaction of politics and economic
development in South Africa, see Ralph Horwitz, The Political Economy
of South Africa (.London, 19^7), 12, 380, A fact often overlooked by
foreign observers is that conditions for agriculture and livestock are
generally quite poor throughout South Africa. David L. Niddrie, South
Africa; Mation or Nations? (Princeton, 1968), 20.
On the population groups of South Africa, see Leo Marquard,
The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (Uth ed.; London, 1969)*
28-81. Wrquaxd’V bodk is probably the best single volume available
on South Africa.

primarily the Afrikaans language and have a consciousness of being
Afrikaners.^

The Afrikaans language is derived from the Dutch of the

early white settlers of South Africa, once known as the Boers tfarmers).
A group consciousness has arisen from generations of struggle with the
South African frontier, African tribes, British imperialism, and, more
recently, hostile world opinion,

Afrikaners overwhelmingly form the

constituency of the Nationalist Party, the party which has had control
of the South African Parliament since 19^8.
The English-speaking South Africans came to South Africa some*what later than the Afrikaners, but they have played a greater role in
the development of the South African economy.

They have tended to be

more "liberal" on questions of race policies than the Afrikaners and
have primarily belonged to the United Party or the smaller Progressive
Party,

However, their sense of group identification has not been so

strong as Afrikaner nationalism.

Both groups of whites enjoy a stan

dard of living equal to that of most Americans.

Conflict between them

has persisted from the bloody Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 to the
present.
The largest racial group in South Africa consists of more than
g
fifteen million Africans.
Officially called the Bantu, they will

^Several recent works of particular note on the Afrikaners are
Sheila Patterson, The Last Trek; A Study of the Boer People and the
Afrikaner Nation (London, 1957); William Henry Vatcher, White Laager;
The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (New York, 1965); and T. Dunbar
Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion" (unpub
lished Ph,D, dissertation, Harvard University, 197l).
^African political development is treated in Edward Feit,
South Afrlcat The Dynamics of the African National Congress (London,
1962), and Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South
Africa (London, 1970).

usually “be referred to here as Africans or as "blacks, the latter
especially when it would be clumsy to refer to the African South
Africans.

Use of the term Africans should not obscure the fact that

the group is actually made up of a number of diverse subgroups.

There

are four distinct African language groups and within these principal
language stocks there are various language clusters and tribal
groupings.

Some of the African nations have fought each other just

as bitterly as Afrikaners have contended with the English-speaking,
and today they are united only in their domination by the whites.

The

Africans' claim to being the indigenous inhabitants of South Africa
is not much better than the Afrikaners'; both groups were preceded by
•7

the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) and the San (Bushmen).

Many Africans

still engage in the subsistence agriculture of their ancestors while
others are partially or fully integrated into the industrial economy
of South Africa.
The Coloureds are another distinct racial group in South
Africa.

A catch-all classification that includes all who are known

to be of "mixed" race, it is an old saw that the Coloureds came into
existence nine months after the landing of the first whites in South
Q
Africa.
More than two million South Africans are so classified, and
7
"The date of the African migration across the Limpopo River
into present South Africa remains obscure and controversial. Recent
scholarship suggests that it was about 1300 A.D. John Cope, South
Africa (2nd ed.; New York, 1967), 67; Wilson and Thompson, Oxford
History, 38-39. Successive waves of African migration drove earlier
Africans from their areas of settlement,
Q
On the history of the Coloureds, see J. 3. Marais, The Cape
Coloured People.1652-1937 (London, 1939).

most are culturally similar to the whites, though having lower status
and standard of living.
Finally, there are ahcrut 700,000 South Africans termed Asiatics
or Indians.

Most are of Indian origin, brought to South Africa by the

British to perform labor tasks for which African labor was not avail
able.

Despite their relatively limited numbers, Asiatics have played

a prominent role in non-white (or non-European) opposition to white
domination.

Not only have they been more advanced educationally and

economically than the Africans, they have had the support of Indian
spokesmen at the United Nations since 19^5.
Although this dissertation will discuss many American opinions
on South Africa's peoples and policies, it does not purport to be a
study of American "public opinion" of South Africa within the meaning
that this term has acquired.

While historians have studied American

opinions on other societies for generations, the works of many of
these historians have been severely criticized for mistaking editorial
opinion for public opinion and for attributing to such opinions a
policy influencing or determining role which could not be demonstrated.

9

The development of scientific techniques of public opinion polling has
^Melvin Small, "Historians Look at Public Opinion," in Melvin
Small, ed., Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Studies
(Detroit, 1970), 13; Paul F. Lazarfeld, The Historian and the Pollster,"
and Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historian's Concept of Public Opinion," in
Mirra Komarovsky, ed,, Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe,
Illinois, 1957), 2U2-62, 263-68; Ernest R. May/ "An American Tradition
in Foreign Policy: The Role of Public Opinion," in William H. Nelson,
ed., Theory and Practice in American Politics (Chicago, 196k), 101-122;
Floyd H. Allport, "Toward a Science of Public Opinion," Public Opinion
Quarterly, I (January, 1937), 7-23.

been thus far of relatively limited usefulness to historians.

First,

accurate polling data concerning public opinion on foreign policy
issues is available only for a limited number of topics.

After in

vestigation and various inquiries to public opinion research centers,
the author was unable to locate any American opinion polls that may
have been conducted directly pertaining to South Africa.

Secondly,

most social scientists agree that only a small percentage of Americans
keep informed on foreign affairs, and the foreign policy public is
unlikely to be representative of the general populace.^

The ex

pressions discussed in this study, although diverse, are not necessarily
representative of the sentiments of all Americans on matters pertaining
to race and foreign policy.

Finally, foreign policy decisions remain

primarily in the control of small groups of individuals in the execu
tive branch of the government.

Even with access to their papers, and

assuming that the papers would accurately reflect the decision-making
process, it seems most doubtful that anyone can make a direct correla
tion between public opinion on a country and policy decisions on the
country.'*'^

The author cannot claim to make any such correlation aside

from subjective judgment.
James N. Eosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy
(Princeton, 1963), 2-3; Alfred 0. Hero, Americans in World Affairs
(Boston, 1959), 6; Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy
(Princeton, 1963), 254; V. 0. Key. Public Opinion and American Democracy
(New York, 1961), 353; Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and
Foreign Policy (New York, i960), 80-84.
11

Bernard Cohen, after studying the rimountainous" literature
on public opinion and foreign policy, has commented: "We are left . . .
with the unsatisfactory conclusion that public opinion is important
in the policy making process, though we cannot say with confidence how,
why, or when." Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy
(Boston, 1973}, 7.

Despite these problems it is believed that study of views of
members of the American public on foreign countries and foreign policy
can be of use to the historian, and can contribute to a better under
standing of American society and the development of foreign policy.
Other historians who have reached the same conclusion have been groping
for a rationale and method for studying this aspect of American his
tory.

Their efforts have pointed to a "diplomatic" history which

makes use of the techniques of intellectual history.

Peter G. Filene,

in his Americans and the Soviet Experiment. 1917-1933. employed many
traditional sources of American opinions in developing the early
history of American attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

12

He stated

that the study of these attitudes would "indirectly describe Americans’
conceptions of democracy, of capitalism, and of themselves as a society
and n a t i o n . U t i l i z i n g sources of a similar nature, Ernest H. May
studied American views on colonialism to gain insight into American
foreign policy decisions in the late l890s.'*'^

Akira Iriye likewise

focused on what he termed "mutual perceptions" between Americans and
East Asians to show "how policy makers and thinking people in America,
China, and Japan have viewed each other, the world and their common
problems.— how, in short, they have tried to define their respective
realities." 15

These are only a few of a number of recent studies which

1O

Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917J.933 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 19^7), 1-3.
13Ibid., 3.
lit

Ernest B, May, American Mperlalismt
CUew York, 1968), especially 23-39.

A Speculative Essay

1'’Akira Iriye, Across the Wide Pacific t An Inner History of
' American-East Asian Belations (Hew York, 1967), xvi.

9

have made use of public expressions on foreign countries for the per
spective they can give on a society and its foreign policies."*"^
The present study borrows from the works of Filene, May, and
other historians, but the author has also found helpful the approaches
to the study of "images" offered by several social scientists, in
particular William A. Scott, H. C. Kelman, and Kenneth Boulding.

17

They have provided a framework for analysis of American expressions
on South Africa.

As used here, the term "image" includes within its

meaning the whole range of concepts about and feelings towards another
country which might be designated attitudes, opinions, beliefs, senti
ments, or views.

The term "views" is more often used in this study

because it suggests expressions by individuals which are less complete
than a fully structured image, or, to put it another way, a view
suggests an articulation of a part of an image of a country held by
a person.

As explained by Scott, an image can be described as

For examples, see Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa:
British Ideas and Action, 1780-1850 (Madison, Wisconsin, 196k);
Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Tmages of China
and India (Hew York, 1958); William Welch, American Images of Soviet
Foreign Policy; An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic
Community (New Haven, Connecticut and London, 1970); Felix H. Okoye,
The American Image of Africa; Myth and Reality (Buffalo, New York,
1971), A. T. Steele, The American People and China (New York, 1966).
17

Kenneth Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society
(Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1956), and, by the same author, "National Images
and International Systems," Journal of Conflict Resolution, III (1959),
120-31; Herbert C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the
Study of International Relations," and William A. Scott, "Psychological
and Social Correlates of International Images," both in Herbert C,
Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Approach
(New York, 19^51, 3-39, 71-103. See also, Daniel Katz, "The
Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion
Quarterly. XXIV (Summer, i960), 1&3-76.

consisting of three analytically distinct aspects:
First and primary is the set of cognitive attributes by which
the person understands the object in an intellectual way.
This is his view of its "inherent" characteristics, which he
regards as independent of his own response to them. Second,
the image may contain an affective component, representing a
liking or disliking for the focal object. This is usually
associated with perceived attributes that the person either
approves or disapproves. Finally, the image may carry an
action component, consisting of a set of responses to the
object that the person deems appropriate in the light of its
perceived attributes.1®
In analyzing the views or images of South Africa held by
Americans, the author has attempted to focus on the elements dis
cussed by Scott. With regard to the cognitive, the effort has been
to determine the sources of information that contributed to American
knowledge of South Africa, the content of those sources, and American
perceptions of the characteristics of South Africa’s political and
racial order based on those sources.

As to the affective element, the

author has attempted to show how Americans have felt about South
Africa and what factors have influenced their feelings.

Finally,

with reference to the action component, the author has described the
various policies that Americans have advocated on the basis of their
perceptions of South Africa and their views on related issues of
domestic and foreign problems.
Reflecting the above approach, the first part of this study
describes critical American information on, and views of, South
African politics and race policies in the period freon the Nationalist
victory in 19^8 to the early 1960s; it then traces the growth of a
movement for sanctions against South Africa and the developments in
-|Q

Scott, "Psychological, and Social Correlates of International
Images," 72 (emphasis in original).

the United States and abroad that contributed to the growth of such
a movement.

The second portion of the study discusses the conserva

tive response to the criticisms of South Africa and the policy mea
sures advocated by the critics.

The conclusion notes the changed

climate of opinion on South Africa that appeared at the end of the
1960s and suggests reasons for the change.
This study has sought to draw upon as broad and diverse a
range of sources as possible.

With the tremendous amount of informa

tion published today on world affairs, it has not been possible to
examine everything available that might be relevant to the subject.
This is particularly true of newspapers which remain the basic source
of news for most Americans.

In the late 19^0s and early 1950s when

the Implementation of South Africa's racial policies was beginning to
make news, there were over seventeen hundred morning and evening
newspapers in the United States. 19

It would be an impossible task

to examine even a small number of these papers for material on South
Africa over the quarter century covered by this study.

However, it

was possible to gain some insight into what went into American news
papers by examining the report of a South African government commis
sion which investigated press activities in South Africa.
Soon after the Nationalists were elected in South Africa in
19I+8 , the new government undertook a lengthy study of press operations.
A Commission of Inquiry into the Press was appointed with Jacobus W.
van Zijl as its chairman.

The Commission's Keport, published in

1961*, provides a great amount of data on the news flowing to the
"^International Press Institute, The Flow of the News (Zurich,
Switzerlandi 1953), 15•

American press from South Africa in the periods from May 1950 to July
1955 s and from February to April i960.

It also reprints many of

the cables sent by newsmen.
Throughout the period covered by this dissertation, most
American newspapers, and some American periodicals, received nearly
all of their foreign news from two American news agencies, the
Associated Press and the United Press (United Press International
after its merger with International News Service in 1958).

As the

van Zijl Report reveals, most of the news on South Africa transmitted
by these services was supplied by stringers and sub-stringers serving
on the English-language press in South Africa, that is, by journalists
employed full-time by the English-language newspapers and serving the
American agencies only on a secondary basis. 22

Reflecting the long

standing divisions between Afrikaners and English-speaking South
Africans, the English-language papers have moderately to sharply
opposed the Nationalist government and its policies.

Thus most of

the news stories sent to the United States on political and racial
matters in South Africa were written by, or based on the reporting of,
newsmen whose language group and newspapers were in opposition to the
20

Jacobus W. van Zijl, Commission chairman, Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Press (Pretoria, I96U), hereafter van
Zijl Report. The author made use of a copy of this Report in the
University of Natal Library, Durban, South Africa.
21

International Press Institute, The Flow of the News, 16.

nn
The Associated Press and the United Press received 87 per
cent and 8l per cent respectively of their news cabled in the 1951 to
1955 period from stringers and sub-stringers serving on the Englishlanguage press. Van Zijl Report, 1029, 105U. Most of the remaining
amount was cabled by correspondents sent to South Africa to cover
particular stories.

government.

Although several American newspapers and the Luce publi

cations (Time, Life) sent their own correspondents to South Africa in
the periods covered by the van Zijl Report, these correspondents
apparently worked closely with the English language press while in
South Africa and had few contacts with the Afrikaans press.
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The result of this situation was that the great bulk of daily
news flowing from South Africa to the United States was critical of
the government and its policies.

A correspondent of the Chicago

Tribune, Arthur Veysey, commented on this in a cable to his paper in
1952:
The flare-up [racial friction] is being magnified abroad
largely through the activity of Britons [English-speaking
South Africans] who want to get the republic-speaking
Nationalists out of power. News reports going out from South
Africa are compiled by Britons or by opposition party adher
ents. The Nationalist politicians hinder their own cause by
foolish barriers which they erect between themselves and
foreign visitors and thus tend to throw visitors into the
sole hands of their political opponent s . ^
As will be seen later, some newspapers in the United States receiving
and printing critical articles on South Africa could still take an
editorial position favorable to South Africa; and readers, too, could
react favorably to South Africa despite critical news stories.

Never

theless, it does help-to understand American criticism of South
Africa to know that much of the news had something of a slant to it
from the beginning.

For American views expressed in newspapers,

^Ibid., 1338. The newspapers which sent correspondents to
South Africa for brief periods between 1951 and 1955 were the Chicago
Tribune, the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times, and the
New York Herald Tribune.
“^Cable of Arthur Veysey from Cape Town, May 16, 1952, in
van Zijl Report, Annexure XX, 15^3-HU.

1U

the author has also consulted the New York Times over most of the
period covered by this study and other newspapers for more limited
periods, in particular for editorial opinion at the time of the
Sharpeville crisis in South Africa in 19^0.
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Other sources consulted by the author have included periodi
cals , a variety of books, publications of the United States and South
African governments, the clippings files of a South African news
paper, the materials distributed by a number of groups attempting to
influence American opinion, special business reports, personal inter
views, and several unpublished papers.

Particular attention has been

paid to periodicals because, unlike newspapers, they generally have
had a national audience, and they are quite useful for noting changes
in viewpoint over a period of time.

The author doubts that there

is any truly scientific approach to the study of ideas through the
use of such materials; the reader has to rely on the informed judg
ment and the honesty of the historian.
Race has been an agonizing domestic problem; it is difficult
to assess the role it has played in international affairs.

It is

hoped that this study will shed same light on a complex and sensitive
issue in American foreign policy and can contribute to a better
25

On the use of newspapers, see William H. Taft, Newspapers
as Too I b for Historians (Columbia, Missouri, 1970); see also on the
New York Times, Gay Talese, The Kingdom and the Power (New York,
1970).
^The author has made use of periodical indexes and citations
in other materials to locate articles touching upon South Africa or
related topics. Of use in judging some of the periodicals utilized
have been John H. Schacht, The Journals of Opinion and Reportage (New
York, 1966) and W. A. Swanberg. Luce and His Empire (New York, 1972).

understanding of how peoples of different countries interact.
Americans' views of South Africa have been closely related to their
views of their own society, and for many Americans the problem of
South Africa has simply been an extension of a domestic problem.
If same Americans have not understood the problem of South Africa,
it has been because they have not understood fully their own society.

CHAPTER I
SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS AND POLICIES:
SYMBOL OF OPPRESSION

When the voters went to the polls throughout South Africa on
May 26 , 19^8, it had been expected that Prime Minister Jan Christiaan
Smuts and his party would have no problem in retaining control of
Parliament.

Much to the dismay of Smuts’s United Party, however, the

Nationalist Party succeeded in taking twenty-five seats from them.
This gave the Nationalists five more votes than could be mustered by
the United Party.

The Nationalists thus were able to gain effective

control of the House of Assembly and to make their leader, Daniel F.
Malan, Prime Minister.

A watershed in recent South African history was

marked by this election.^- The Nationalist Party, composed predominant
ly of Afrikaners, has had control of the government from that date to
the present.

Any consideration of American policy in South Africa

since 19^8 has had to depend upon some assessment of the South African
political system.

The arguments advanced in the 1960s by Americans for

a strong policy against South Africa were based in part on views estab
lished in the 19U0s and 1950s on the Nationalist Party (as personified
by its leaders), on the possibility of change through the white polit
ical structure, and on the racial policies implemented in South Africa

■^Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality:
Since 19U8 (New York, 1958), 37.
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South Africa

in those years.

By the 1960s, South Africa’s political system was, as

Time magazine declared, the world's "Symbol of Oppression."

By the

1960s the Afrikaans word apartheid had become in all languages, as an
American official told the United Nations, "a stigma, symbolic of the
whole range of the discriminatory racial legislation and practices of
the Union of South Africa."
The reaction of the American press to the Nationalist victory
of 19^8 was immediate hostility.^

The reason for this was not so much

that the Nationalists were about to implement a purportedly new racial
policy with the ugly-sounding name of apartheid (pronounced aparthate), although this was a factor.

Rather, the reasons go back to

Afrikaner opposition to South African participation in World War II.
The Nationalists in their victory were burdened by a "pro-Nazi" reputa
tion they had acquired during the war against Germany, a burden they
have carried to the present.

To understand this, and why it has been

something of a distortion, it is necessary to go back briefly to World
War II.
When Britain decided in September 1939 to go to war with Ger
many after the German invasion of Poland, the question arose whether
^"South Africa:
1966, p. 18.

The Great White Laager," Time, August 26,

^Francis T. Plimpton, in Department of State Bulletin, April
2U, 1961, p. 600.
A South African newspaper surveyed the reactions of the Ameri
can press to the election. It quoted at length from various news
papers and periodicals and stated: "The result of the Union’s general
election, and particularly the defeat of General Smuts, has evoked un
usually widespread press comment in the United States. This comment
varies from excited alarm at the alleged possibility of civil war to
the view that the result was symptomatic of the world-wide clash of
color." Cape Town Cape Times, June 7, 19^8, p. 1.
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Britain's action committed other members of the Empire and Common
wealth to war as well.

The resolution of the question produced a

crisis in South Africa where an important segment of the population
deeply resented the Commonwealth connection.

Prime Minister J. B. M.

Hertzog strongly favored neutrality and announced this as the govern
ment's policy.

Deputy Prime Minister Jan Smuts refused to accept

Hertzog's decision and carried six other Cabinet ministers with him.
When Hertzog and Smuts put their rival policies before Parliament,
that body sided with Smuts by a vote of eighty to sixty-seven.

Smuts

became Prime Minister and declared war against Germany.*’
There were Afrikaners who favored South African participation
in the war, but others felt the war was Britain's war and was of little
concern to South Africa.

These others believed that participation in

the war signified continuing subservience to a foreign power whose
interests did not coincide with the interests of most Afrikaners.

They

remembered that Germany had shown them sympathy when British imperial
ism had begun its attacks on the Afrikaners in 1895-

Like the Germans,

the Afrikaners had known defeat at the hands of the British.

Some

Afrikaners thought that a German victory would allow South Africa to
become a republic entirely independent of Great Britain.^

It is not

surprising then that Prime Minister Smuts found himself faced with
strong opposition to the war.
After the war began, it was Daniel F. Malan who led the
^Eric A. Walker, History of Southern Africa (3rd ed.; London,
1957), 693,
^See D. W. Kruger, The Age of the Generals; A Short Political
History of the Dnion of South'Africa, 1910-19^8 CJohannesburg, 1961),
197, 203-20h.
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parliamentary opponents of the war,

Outside Parliament an organiza

tion called the Ossewahrandwag (the OB) took the lead in representing
Afrikaner hostility to the war.

The OB had begun as a cultural group

in 1938, but soon it became clear that its leaders had been influenced
by the ideas of German National-Socialism.

T

For a brief period the

OB and Malan's party cooperated in opposing the war.

However, the

agreement fell apart in August 19^1 because the Nationalists remained
committed to a form of parliamentary democracy while the OB reflected
a totalitarian spirit. Malan broke the back of the OB by banning
O

participation in OB activities for all Nationalist Party members.
Despite Malan's rejection of the ideology and tactics of the
firebrands of the OB, the legend grew up in World War II that the
Nationalists, and the Afrikaners generally, were working for a Nazi
victory.

During the war American publications took a very favorable

view of Prime Minister Smuts, depicting him as struggling desperately
against a Nazi movement which was strong among the Afrikaners.

The

New Republic praised Smuts in 19^1, and noted the odds against which
he was struggling.

It asserted its belief that the leaders of the

Nationalist Party had formed
a full-fledged Nazi movement aimed at the creation of a
dictatorship by the Afrikaners in the Union. . . . If Britain
should be defeated, it seems certain that the Union of South
Africa would be a Nazi state, anti-American in spirit and
j
T. Dunbar Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil
Religion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1971),
218.
Q

Michael Roberts and A. E. G, Trollip, The South African
Opposition. 1939-19^5 (.London, 191*7 )» 119-21*; Kruger. Age of the
Generals, 205.
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run largely from Berlin.9
Newsweek, after South Africa's 19^3 election, similarly portrayed
Smuts as defeating Nazism in southern Africa.

Smuts was called the

"grand old man of South Africa"; his foe, Malan, was described by the
magazine as a "determined implacable Dutchman who seldom jokes or
laughs yet can sway a crowd by his fanatical oratory" and who was the
head of a political party supported by the Axis powers.

Reviewing

the course of the war in South Africa under the headline "Nazis Find
'0u Baas' Smuts as Tough at Home as Abroad," Newsweek said that Hitler
had looked to South Africa as the most inviting place to stir dissension within the Empire.

But, it continued,

scheming Adolf reckoned

with Slim [shrewd] Jannie" who had rallied the Parliament behind him
and built an army "despite the fact that South Africa was for a time
overrun with spies, fifth columnists, and Nazi propagandists,"'*'^
After Smuts*s government was secured in power in the 19^3
election and after the war turned against Germany, little more was
heard of the Afrikaner dissidents who had opposed the war.

South

Africa was not a major theater of the war and it attracted little
American attention.

However, when editors and journalists of the

American press looked through their files in 19^8 for background in
formation on the new Prime Minister and the party he represented,
they found clippings and stories similar to those which have been
9"jFascism in South Africa," New Republic, June 16 , 19^1,
P. 809,
^"Nazis Find 'Ou Baas' Smuts as Tough at Hoane as Abroad,"
Newsweek. July 19, 19^3, pp. 28, 31, See also "General Smuts,"
Nation. August lU, 19^3» p. 171J "South Africa: Smashing Mandate,"
Time, July 19, l9*+3, p. 39. The New York Times, July 29, 19^3, p. 9,
and July 30, 19^3, p. 1^ was more restrained.
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cited; these seemed to put the election results in perspective.

The

Afrikaner leaders who had opposed Smuts and the war were elected to
office, and to the American press it appeared that they were embarking
on the Nazi program that the earlier news stories had reported.
In response to the Nationalist victory the New Republic edi
torialized that South Africa had turned backward and claimed that
"out-and-out Nazis in the ranks of the Dutch Nationalists who run
South Africa are beginning to throw their weight around."^
Nationalism a "brand of extreme Nazi-type reaction."

It called

To Time, the

election meant that South Africa "had suddenly embarked on a per
verse, isolationist, acutely race-conscious road," under a party
tainted with anti-Semitism and pro-Nazism.

12

The Nation said that

the Nationalists who came into office "are not easily distinguished
from Nazis," and headed a subsequent story with the question "Will
South Africa Go Fascist?""^
Some developments in South Africa appeared to confirm the
worst suspicions of these periodicals.

Prime Minister Malan released

from prison Afrikaners who had been put there for opposing the war.
A ban which Smuts had placed on manbership of government officials and
employees in the Broederbond, a secret organization of Afrikaner
leaders, and the Ossewabrandwag was lifted.

A new race policy was

announced which sounded to many like Nazi theories.

Thus the "pro-

11,,South Africa Turns Backward," New Bepubllc, July 5, 19^8,
p. 9.
■^"These Things Happen," Time, June 7, 19^8, p. 3^.
^"Political Power in South Africa," Nation, June 5, 19^8,
pp. 6l7-l8; "Will South Africa Go Fascist?" Nation, November 6 , 19^8,
p. 516.
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Nazi” label which had originated during the war seemed most appropriate.
The Nation was able to answer its own question about South Africa's
lli

going Fascist with an editorial on "South African Hitlerism.”
In spite of the existence of a factual basis for the "pro-Nazi”
label, its use in the postwar period and repeated application to
Nationalist leaders seriously distorted the realities of South African
politics.

In the context of the war, the charge of "pro-Nazi” largely

signified opposition to participation in the war.

There clearly were

Afrikaners who hoped for a German victory, but their sympathy was
prompted by their own long struggle with Great Britain.

They had

long wanted to be independent of the British; having to fight for the
British seemed to deny their independence.

Germany was very far away,

and the Afrikaners had heard British horror stories about German bar
barism in the First World War.
The revelations after World War II of the savagery of Nazi
rule and the hideous atrocities against the Jews gave the label "proNazi” intensity and connotations it had lacked in the first years of
the war.

Use of the term after the war suggested that those to whom

it was applied had themselves favored concentration camps and were
strongly anti-Semitic.

If the Nazis were anti-Semitic and the

Nationalists were "pro-Nazi," then it followed that the Nationalists
were also very anti-Semitic.

Thus to complete the "pro-Nazi" image,

American publications exaggerated anti-Semitism in South Africa.

■^"South African Hitlerism," Nation, June 7, 1952, p. 338.
15

The American ambassador to South Africa during part of World
War II recognized this; see Lincoln MacVeagh to F. D. Roosevelt,
Thanksgiving Bay, 19^2, in Munger Africans Library Notes, XII (March,
1972), lit.
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To be sure there have been some indications of anti-Semitism
among some Afrikaners.

Examples could be found in 19^8 in campaign

references to the stock figure of Hoggenheimer and British-JewishCapitalist-Imperialism.

But the American press greatly magnified the

extent of such sentiments.

Time, for example, said that when "Prime

Minister Daniel Malan's Nazi-aping Nationalist government came into
power last spring, it promptly launched an anti-Negro, anti-semitic
propaganda campaign of which Goebbels himself would have been proud.
Later Time went so far as to claim that Malan's victory had "sent
Boer hooligans on a looting spree directed at Jewish stores.

Simi

larly, a report in the Nation asserted that the Nationalists were "to
the last man virulent anti-semites"; no direct actions had been taken
against South African Jews, it said, because the Nationalists were
1Q
"too weak at this stage to attack the Jews openly,"
Despite
signs of anti-Semitism, American publications continued for years to
link the "pro-Nazi" past of Nationalist leaders with an alleged antiSemitism which might manifest itself in strong measures against South

-*-^"How to Advance Communism," Time, December 6 , 19^8, p. 32.
^ " O f God and Hate," Time, May 5, 1952, p. 37. This report is
probably derived from an earlier report in "To Relieve the People,"
Time. June 28, 19^+8, p. 21. The author doubts the authenticity of
this story after checking relevant issues of the Cape Town Cape Times
and the clippings file of the Natal Daily News (Durban, South Africa),
and after asking several South African political scientists and
historians about such incidents, Brian Bunting, who discusses antiSemitism in South Africa in his highly critical The Rise of the South
African Reich (London, 196M, 6U-65, makes no mention of such inci
dents. W. A, Swanberg in Luce and His Empire (New York, 1972), 26l,
has noted that Time "was famous for its ability to find unidentified
politicians or bystanders who would make statements on news events
providing the very point of view Time sought to promote." It seems
possible Time made up an event in this instance.
1®R, K, Cope, "White Skin in Dark Continent," Nation, October
8 , 19^9, p. 3U8.

2k
African Jews.19
Frequently American publications mixed the elements of proNazism and anti-Semitism with descriptions of the Nationalist leaders
that made them appear crude, even comical.

Declaring that anyone who

understood Nazism could also understand South Africa, a writer for the
American Mercury said that both the Nazis and the Nationalist leaders
were low-comedy figures through whom history had chosen to work its
evil:
[Tjhe melancholy truth is that the Broederbunders [sic] are
lower-case rascals, creatures endowed with, at best, a secondrate social and political concupiscence. No Machiavellis here.
Misplaced farceurs rather. President Malan for instance—
superficially, a most unwholesome figure, a pretender to firstclass political venality. But the fellow Is flawed, daubed
with the irrevocable stain of comedy, having been born . . .
on a farm called Alles Verloren. . . . Malan's principal aides
are even less prepossessing. His right bower, Mr. Johannes
Strijdora, for all his noisy, mainly anti-semitic, demogogy,
is forever cursed by the fact that he was at one time an
unsuccessful ostrich farmer. Then there is Doctor Verwoerd,
who as director of Broederbund [sic] propaganda, must be
^
must be accorded first place among these racist comedians.
When Time put Prime Minister Malan on its cover in 1952 and
printed a feature story on South Africa, it similarly linked unattrac
tive personal characteristics with political, religious, and racial
extremism.

Malan's chief political attributes were said by Time to be

his religious zeal and his ability to provide scapegoats for the

^E.g., Thomas Karis, "South Africa," in Gwendolen M. Carter,
ed., Five African StateB: Responses to Diversity (Ithaca, New York,
1963), 528; "Escape A r t i s t s Time, August 30, 1963, p. 25; see also
William Henry Vatcher, White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism
(New York, 1965), 60-61.
20
Robert de Koch, "Foreign Intelligence: Night Over South
Africa," American Mercury. LXXII (February, 1951), -199. Robert de
Koch, said the magazine's editor, was a pseudonym of a well-known
South African Journalist who used the name out of fear of reprisal.
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Afrikaners' depression troubles— Jews and Africans.

According to

Time's report, Malan was sin "aging, ailing, absent-minded" religious
fanatic who relied on his wife for political advice and to "wipe his
head when he sweated over his meals.

..21

Malan's successor, JohanneB G. Stri^dom was described in simi
larly unflattering terms.

An article in the Nation reported that Malan

was resigning because of his health and queried, "Could anyone be worse
than 'the world's most hated man'?"
worse.

It asserted that Strljdom was

Malan's followers had been deeply attached to a parliamentary

system of government, but the men behind Strijdom, said the report,
no

were "in ideology the heirs of the Goebbels Ministry of Propaganda."
Life called the new Prime Minister "a steel-hard, super-fanatical white
supremacist," while its sister publication, Time, more strongly de
clared that the Nationalists had elevated "a man with the racist prin
ciples of Adolf Hitler and some of the Nazi leader's frenzy . . .

a

fanatic apostle of racial segregation who represents the extreme antiBritish, anti-Negro, anti-Jewish wing of the party,"

23

As suggested earlier, some of the intensity of the hostility
of the American press to South Africa's political leadership is attri
butable to the fact that the news of South Africa came primarily from
the English-speaking press in South Africa, and to the role some
Afrikaners played in opposing South African participation in World War
21"0f God and Hate," Time, 32-38,
22

R. K. Chase, "Time Against Race;
Plan," Nation. April 9, 1955, pp. 306-308.

South Africa's 100 Year

^ " A Hard Man Takes Over in South Africa," Life, December 20,
1951*, p. 21; "Hot Talk and Cool Choice," Time, November 30, 1953,
p. Uo.
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II.

However, much American criticism also arose from hostility to the

Nationalist implementation of apartheid, a policy directly at variance
with American ideals, if not practice.

It was that policy which led

to the virtually universal condemnation of South Africa.
In the view of many white South Africans, the apartheid policy
is an attempt to reconcile the white desire fox continued control over
political and economic matters affecting their lives with the need to
hold out some promise for the present and future fulfillment of Afri
can aspirations for self-determination.

According to the South African

sociologists N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, who have set forth most
thoroughly the rationale of apartheid, the concept of apartheid has as
its ideal "the comparatively permanent and complete separation of White
and Black in South Africa."
own homelands.

ok

Ultimately each race is to live in its

The idea of physical separation of the races apparently

did not originate with the Nationalists; however, they did make apart
heid a key element in their 19^+8 campaign, and they were the first to
enact a systematic policy of race relations for all South Africa.

pq

pli

c N. J. Rhoodie and H. J, Venter, Apartheid: A Socio-historical
Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid Idea (Cape
Town and Pretoria, I960), 22. For a collection of essays by South
Africans of all races on the subject of apartheid, see N. J. Rhoodie,
ed., South African Dialogue (Johannesburg, 1972). For several Afri
can perspectives on apartheid, see Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go
(London, 1962); Ezekiel Mphahlele, The African Image (New York, 1962);
and Jordan K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid (New York, 1963).
2*5
-'See F. R. Tomlinson, Chairman, Summary of the Report of the
Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas
(Pretoria, 1955), 101 (hereafter Tomlinson Report Summary); andLeonard
M. Thompson, "The Political Implications of the Tomlinson Report,"
Race Relations Journal, XXIII (October, 1956), 9-12. See also, L. E.
Neame, The History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South
'
Africa (London, 1962).
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Americans generally found the apartheid policy abhorrent in practice;
they viewed its ideal as undesirable and unattainable.
As a body of legislation, apartheid consists of dozens of
individual acts, most of which have been passed or amended since
26
19I+8.

These regulate virtually all relations between whites and non

whites and many other aspects of life in South Africa.

The bulk of

these laws makes it rather difficult to discuss them adequately in a
brief space.

Conceptually, it is helpful to observe the useful dis

tinction that the sociologist Pierre L. van den Berghe has made between
three types of segregation which are embodied in the acts.

He uses

the term micro-segregation to describe segregation in public and pri
vate facilities, meso-segregation to refer to physical separation into
racially homogenous residential areas within multiracial urban areas,
and macro-segregation to identify legislative measures aimed at achieving total separation. 27

Others often refer to micro-segregation as

petty apartheid and macro-segregation as grand, total, or ideal apart
heid.

To give the reader some appreciation of the content of these

laws and the intensity of American criticism of their implementation,
the principal features of the major acts will be noted together with
representative comments that appeared in regard to them in American
26
A useful summary is Muriel Horrell, Legislation and Race
Relations; A Summary of the Main South African Laws Which Affect Race
Relations (rev, ed.; Johannesburg, 1971), which is published by the
South African Institute of Race Relations. The Institute also pub
lishes an annual Survey of Race Relations which gives fuller accounts
of legislation ancT developments’within South Africa.
27
Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Racial Segregation in South Africa;
Degrees and Kinds," Cahiers d*Etudes Africaines, VI (1966), 1*08-^09;
also in Herlbert Adam, ed., South Africa: Sociological Perspectives
(New York, 1971), 37.
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publications ,2®
Among the first of the apartheid acts were the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act of 19^9 and the Immorality Amendment Act of 1950,
Together these acts prohibited marriages and illicit intercourse between
white and non-white individuals.

Time declared that South Africa's

banning such racial mixture was contrary to the law of God,2^

Anne

Bauer, a free lance writer who toured South Africa shortly after the
Nationalists began to enact apartheid, likewise criticized South Africa's
new racial order.

Race discrimination was not new in South Africa, she

noted, but the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts struck her as a
rigid enforcement of caste and were "legislation for which no precedent
can be found in the twentieth century, with the possible exception of
Hitlerian G e r m a n y , O t h e r s too claimed the acts were unparalleled,
despite the fact that at the time similar legislation could be found
in the statute books of some thirty-one American jurisdictions
pQ
^Although it never mentioned apartheid, Alan Paton's novel
Cry, the Beloved Country undoubtedly influenced many American views on
South Africa's race policies. See below, p. 79, n. 73. The author has
also seen or read accounts of television shows dealing with South
Africa and apartheid. The author has been unable to go into television
treatment of South Africa in any depth, but it can be said that those
programs which have come to his attention generally presented a very
harsh picture of apartheid. For example, In late 195k Edward R. Murrow
and Fred Friendly did a two-part program on South Africa on the highlyacclaimed "See It Now" series. Jack Gould, who reviewed it for the
New York Times. said it was "not unlike a return visit to darkest
Nazism." New York Times, December 19, 195*+, Sec. 2, p. 13.
29"Marriage in Africa," Time, April 2k, 1950, p. 85.
^Anne Bauer, "South Africa’s New Racial Order," American
Scholar. XXI Cwinter, 1951-52), 33.
^Pauli Murray, ed., State Laws on Race and Color (Cincinnati,
1950), 18, These laws continued to be enforced In some of the states,
and miscegenation statutes were not declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court until Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

The Population Registration Act of 1950 was even more closely
akin to caste legislation.

It systemized the classification of the

entire population of South Africa into race groups more thoroughly
than had any previous act in South Africa.

A complete register of

the population was to be compiled and each person was to be issued
an identity card.

The criteria for classification were appearance,

general acceptance, and repute.

Grown men suffered the humiliation of

having combs passed through their hair to determine their "color" and
thereby their legal, political, and economic rights.

Brothers, noted

one publication, could be separated if the comb tangled in the hair of
one and not the other and their lives entirely c h a n g e d , A n o t h e r
periodical said that the act was to "add precision to the barbarism of
apartheid."

It cited the example of a seventy-two year old woman who

was reclassified to Coloured after her white husband died; the reOQ
classification meant her pension was cut in half.
A writer in the
Hew Republic called the Population Registration Act "the most virulent
and arbitrary racism since Hitler . . . .
The Group Areas Act of 1950 is an example of what van den
Berghe ha® referred to as meso-segregation. It created a Group Areas

However, the Court had invalidated an act similar to South Africa's
Immorality Act in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 18U (196H). For the
view that the Immorality Act has served to prevent the exploitation
of non-white women, see Stanislav Andreski, "Reflections on the South
African Social Order from a Comparative Viewpoint," in Adam, ed., South
Africa; Sociological Perspectives, 28.
32"South Africa's Tragedy in Colors," Time, August 29, 1955, p.
25J "Hair Test for Negroes," Ebony, XI (April, 1956), 27-28.
^"Scruth Africa's 'Stud Book,'" America, July 23, 1966, p. 85.
Alexander Kendrick, "South Africa's Day of Mourning," New
Republic, March 19, 1956, p. 13.
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Board through which separate areas In urban centers could be marked
off for the residence, occupation, and trade of the different racial
groups.

Once an area was designated for a particular group, members

of other groups could not own or occupy places within the area except
by permit.

Typical of the American reaction to this was an editorial

in the Catholic magazine America which declared:

"No more hellish plan

for dealing humanity out in neat little piles according to pigmentation
has ever been concocted."
strongly criticized.
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Even its more positive aspects were

When Africans were moved from shacks to govern

ment-built houses under the Group Areas Act, Life and the New York
Times condemned the tactics employed and the motivation for the slum
clearance
Among the most notorious of the apartheid measures was the socalled pass law, ironically entitled the Abolition of Kisses Act.

It

has been used to control the movement of Africans between trival areas
and urban areas by requiring them to carry reference books showing
their authority for being in a place.

Chester Bowles, a former governor

of Connecticut and ambassador to India, wrote in 1957 that the pass law
was the cruelest of the apartheid regulations. 37

Others said the pass

system was "a hangover from slavery days" and "symbolical to the Africans of their helot status.

In the year of the passage of the Act,

^"Other Victims of Apartheid," America, April 23, I960, p. 9^.
"African Resettlement," Life, March 7, 1955* PP* 57-60; New
York Times, February 11, 1955, p. 22.
0*7

Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1957), 21.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, CCV (June, i960), 21.
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1952, the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor de
nounced the Malan government for adhering to "a Hitlerite racial policy
without regard for basic human values or the devastating consequences
of such a reprehensible course." 39
Still another piece of legislation which met with widespread
criticism in the American press was the Bantu Education Act of 1953.
The Act transferred responsibility for African education from the
central government and terminated government subsidies to mission-run
schools.

Under the Act, African education was to conform to the policy

that Africans could rise only to a certain level in the white community
but to any level in the African homelands.

As interpreted by Life,

the government had "limited the education of black Africans to schools
where the curriculum is designed to convince them that they are inferior."

UO

America claimed the Bantu Education Act was "designed to

prevent the Negro people of South Africa from even aspiring to rise
above their present state of subjection.

„In

Finally, the most important legislative measures of the apart
heid program in terms of giving it a unifying concept and a theoretical
justification have been the acts designed to provide for African selfgovernment in African homelands (Bantustans), or macro-segregation.
Before the Nationalists began their program, previous South African
governments had designated the lands which were to be reserves for

^Quoted in New York Times, September 15, 1952, p. ^3.
^"Locked Door to Learning," Life, September 12, 1955, pp.

81-82.
^"Sfonica Whately, "Educating the Bantu for Serfdom," America,
September 2U, 1955, p. 6l8; "Apartheid Hits the Schools," America,
February 25, 1955, pp. ^98-99*

African occupation.

In 1951 the Nationalists passed the Bantu

Authorities Act which provided for the establishment of tribal,
regional, and territorial authorities for the governance of Africans
in these regions.

Certain executive and administrative powers were

to be delegated gradually to the various authorities; the powers of
chiefs, headmen, and tribal councillors were enhanced by the Act.

The

Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 and subsequent legisla
tion vent further in setting up national self-government units for
different African groups and in granting limited autonomy to such
units.
Although ideal apartheid might, as Rhoodie and Venter suggest,
be regarded as "an enlightened and comprehensive programme, for up
lifting the Bantu so that they may become an independent national en
tity," not many Americans have so viewed it . ^

Very few Americans com

menting on the South African plan for macro-segregation have thought
the policy moral, desirable, feasible, or practical.

Homer A. Jack,

a prominent American religious leader, called a South African Bureau
of Racial Affairs (SABRA) pamphlet on the concept "SABRA's Mein Kamf."
Nobody, he said, "can take this SABRA plan seriously, yet nobody took
1^3
Hitler seriously either."
Other American observers criticized the
policy strongly on the ground that under it the overwhelming majority
of the country's population would be allotted only 13 per cent of the
land, the poorest land at that.

The implementation of the plan for

^%hoodie and Venter, Apartheid, 17.
Ii3
Hamer A. Jack, "What is this Apartheid?" Christian Century.
September 2k t 1952, pp. 1092-91*.

African homelands was seen as an attempt to keep the Africans in a
tribal state, both to keep them from advancing and to prevent them
from becoming a cohesive political force.

It was also interpreted as

an attempt to rationalize old-style white domination (baasskap) in an
effort to pacify world opinion.

1+i.

One of the most widespread and strongest criticisms of the
idea of total apartheid was that the white dependence on black labor
was too great to permit complete separation.

The New York Times re

garded the idea as unworkable, editorializing:

"Prime Minister Malan

preaches segregation while every economic force in the country has
made and makes for ever-growing interdependence between white and
1^5
black."
An Atlantic report on conditions in South Africa regarded
plans for complete segregation as "nonsensical double talk"; it com
mented that in "its complete divorce from any observable or possible
facts, the talk of total separation reveals a dreary imperviousness to
reality."

k6

Similarly, America thought that the efforts to bring out

complete segregation were futile; it stated:
the sea, and as the sea rises they flay it."

"They pass laws against
U7

Others who thought a

thriving economy and apartheid inconsistent said that South Africa
had to choose one or the other; they doubted that white South Africa
would make the economic sacrifices required to accomplish full
E.g., Carter, Politics of Inequality, 92; Anthony Sampson,
Mew York Times Magazine, May 22, I960, p. 77; Union of South Africa:
The Great Separation," Newsweek, April 9, 1956, p. 56.
^ N e w York Times, August 21, 195^, P* l6.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, 18.
^"Lament," America, May 1, 1953, p. 89.
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separation.
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The sociologists George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger

took this view in their textbook on race relations.

They stated:

South Africa is undertaking extensive industrialization. There
is need for skilled workers, rationally organized into produc
tive enterprises, and sufficiently well-paid to be able to
afford the products of their own making. The whites of South
Africa, therefore, face a dilemma: They can have apartheid or
they can have an expanding, modern industrial society; they
cannot have both. Having chosen the former, the government now
faces serious obstacles to the achievement of the latter. 9
In the late 1960s this view was transformed from a criticism of South
African policy to a justification for the continuation of American
economic involvement in South Africa.
Although this brief discussion of apartheid has been able to
cover only a few of the thousands of reports that appeared on National
ist race policy after 19^8, it does suggest that Americans had very
good reasons for criticizing South Africa.

The restrictions on non

whites have been very severe and incidents of injustice and cruelty
have often occurred.

Many white South Africans have been myopic or

insensitive about the harshness of the administration of the govern
ment's policies.

But has the apartheid program been so ignoble and

devoid of merit as American criticism of it would indicate?

There are

many decent whites in South Africa who have supported apartheid, and
they have not understood why they have been presented abroad, in the
words of the influential Afrikaans newspaper Die Vaderland, as "blood
thirsty oppressors when we only wish to uphold apartheid from a
k®"Fateful Move in South Africa," America, September 15, 1956,
p. 557J Anne Bauer, "South Africa's New Racial Order," 37-38; Wolfgang
Langewiesche, "Will the Boers Take Over South Africa?" Saturday Evening
Post. May 10, 1952, p. ikk.
George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural
Minorities (3rd ed.; New York, 1965), 188.

Christian standpoint.

Even scone of South Africa's severest critics

have agreed that at least part of the criticism of South Africa was
unfair and mistaken.

Some exaggeration and distortion resulted from

the fact that Americans' views of South Africa were strongly condi
tioned hy their views of race relations in the United States.
From the 1930s through the 1960s American studies on race
relations were generated and sustained by a melioristic interest in im
proving relations between racial groups, primarily between white and
black groups.

As sociologist Pierre van den Berghe has observed,

"specialists in race relations became the vanguard of liberal intellec
tuals eager to expose the folly and crimes of the past."'*1

In exposing

the "folly and crimes" their work demonstrated less a concern with an
understanding of race relations than with stigmatizing certain race
attitudes and beliefs and the practice of racial segregation.

A

pattern of public attitudes on race matters resulted from their publi
cations which found expression in the national media.^

I. A. Newby,

a historian who is no friend of the segregationists, commented on the
general attitudes of American organs of news and opinion on race

Die Vaderland, December 12, 1957, translated in Thought; A
Journal of Afrikaans Thinking for the English-Speaking,.II, No 7 U, p. 5•
As T. Dunbar Moodie has observed: "Separate development [apartheid]
is to the Afrikaner believer what their 'errand into the wilderness'
was to the New England Puritans; it is his mission and calling, his
salvation and his justification." Moodie, "Power, Apartheid, and
the Afrikaner Civil Religion," 350*
■*'1Pierre L. van den Berghe, Race and Racism:
Perspective (New York, 1967), 2.

A Comparative

' The author is relying to a considerable extent on Herbert
Blumer, "United States of America," in UNESCO, Research in Race Rela
tions (New York, 1966), 87-133; van den Berghe, Race and Racism, 1-31;
and Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: South Africa's
Political Dynamics (Berkeley ,1971), l'(>-20.
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questions in one of his works:
In their zeal to further the Negro's cause, the national press,
the communications media, and other molders of mass opinion
invariably present segregationists in the worst possible light,
and more often than not select irrational persons with a Ku
Klux Klan mentality to present the anti-Negro point of view.
The result is to ridicule segregationists to the amusement and
satisfaction of integrationists, but not to help Americans
understand the appeal of racist ideas.53
The predominant view in the United States as South Africa be
gan its apartheid policies was that segregation had very detrimental
effects, both material and psychological, on the group which was segre
gated.

There was a widespread public belief that discrimination or

segregation of any sort was harmful.

The United States Supreme Court

in 1954 held unanimously that separate schools for black and white
children were inherently unequal.
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Presumably segregated facilities

of any sort were likewise unequal, and subsequent cases so held.

Some

writers took the view that integration could only prove beneficial to
all concerned.

Thus, an editorial in the Nation chided the ignorance

of the whites of both the United States and South Africa who continued
to act as though they were being dragged into the future cater
wauling, haggling, grimacing, hemming and hawing, bargaining,
resisting, hedging and rolling their eyes. Their attitude
is only the more curious in that the evidence is now clear
that integration is good for the nation, good for business,
good for the arts, for religion, for sports, for labor, for
education, for government; good also for our immortal souls.55
Americans' views on apartheid were also shaped by their ex
planations of the reasons for segregation; they thought segregation to
be the result of racism or prejudice among the dominant group.

A. Newby, Challenge to the Court (Baton Rouge, 1967), viii.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
^"The 'Whites," Nation, August 10, 1963, p. 6l.

American social scientists treated racism as an ideology and sought
to dispel the underlying scientific, philosophical, or religious
rationale for i t.^

When racism maintained that black people are

genetically inferior in intellect, social scientists used scientific
data to argue that members of all races have essentially the same
intellectual and social capacities.

When master or chosen race

philosophies were put forth, supporters of integration attempted to
demonstrate the irrationality of such doctrines or the lack of a
scriptural basis for them.

Racism, in fact, came to be seen not only

as an indication of ignorance but also as a sin against God.

At its

meeting in Evanston, Illinois in 195^, the World Council of Churches
declared:
Any form of segregation based on race, color or ethnic origin
is contrary to the Gospel and is incompatible with the Christian
doctrine of man and with the nature of the church of Christ.
Whenever and wherever any of us Christians deny this by action
or inaction, we betray Christ and the fellowship which bears his
name.57
Examples of this attitude often appeared in religious periodicals in

the 1950s and 1960s , and the attitude in part explains why religious
groups were in the vanguard of the movement against South Africa as
well as in the civil rights movement in the United States.

It also

explains the zeal, the fervor, the moral self-righteousness with which
some attacked South Africa, urging a holy war, as it were, against the
infidels.
^bSee, for example, I. A. Newby’s "dialogue" with racists in
his The Development of Segregationist Thought (Homewood, Illinois,
19^8), passim.
5T

Quoted in Harold E. Fey, "Reconciliation in Rochester,"
Christian Century» September 18, 1963, p. 1126.
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The other explanation given for segregation, prejudice, was
viewed by social scientists as a psychological phenomenon arising from
basic personality characteristics.

It was treated as an outgrowth of,

or compensation for, a personality deficiency.

In the view of social

scientists who took this approach, prejudice was pathological; the
prejudiced individual was seen as insecure, disillusioned, and pro
jecting hate toward another group to compensate for suppressed drives.
The attitude which developed from a focus on prejudice was the view
that members of the discriminating group were sick people, even
vicious and brutal.

The Christian Century, a periodical which fre

quently criticized apartheid, gave an example of this attitude when
it commented on segregationists:
What affects these mixed-up, hag-ridden people is a virulent
species of mental and emotional illness: an addiction of the
spirit born of a deep illness in the body politic, that iB
_
no less powerful than the addiction to alcohol or marijuana.
American views on race and prejudice were reflected in their
interpretations of the factors giving rise to apartheid in South
Africa.

One frequently asserted explanation was that apartheid was

the implementation of a Herrenvolk (master race) philosophy.

Apartheid,

some Americans concluded, grew out of a white conviction of an Innate
white biological superiority.

The ideology of apartheid, under this

interpretation, came from a benighted Afrikaner culture or was borrowed
from Nazi Germany, or it arose out of a combination of the two.
Although he made numerous comparisons between South Africa and
Germany, John Gunther attributed apartheid to Afrikaner institutions

■^"Behind Dixie's Gentler Standpats," Christian Century,
October 2k , 1962, p. 1290.
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and culture.

Gunther, the ubiquitous Journalist who was well-known

in the 19^0s and 1950s for his InBide series on various parts of the
world, went Inside Africa in 1953.

Describing the South African govern

ment as the ugliest he had ever encountered in the free world, Gunther
found its highest officials to be "prisoners of an ideology that must
seem demented to most outsiders, and several are wildly vociferous
fanatics."

59

The backwardness of the government Gunther believed, was

due to the sinister influence of the secret Broederbond of Afrikaner
leaders and the Dutch Reformed Church.

Only Nazi Germany had ever

had an organization which exerted the sort of influence that the
Broederbond did, he claimed.

The Dutch Reformed Church's role in

society he compared to that of the Catholic Church in medieval Spain,
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Gunther did not foresee any improvement for South Africa after Malan
stepped down because Strijdom, who Gunther said believed frankly in a
master-slave relationship between races, was even more a fanatic than
Malan:

"The difference between the two is almost that between

Hindenburg and Hitler.
Several other American journalists who visited South Africa
at about the same time as Gunther reached similar conclusions.

One

of these, Oden Meeker, asserted that Malan's belief in white superiori
ty stemmed from the theological doctrine of "election" by God.

He

noted that the Dutch Reformed Church was against equality, free
speech, the fox trot, two piece bathing suits, drinking, Christmas
^John Gunther, Inside Africa CNew York, 1955), ^8l, I1U9 .
6°Ibid,. U59, ^70.
6lIbld., 1+U9.

parties, smoking, and many other aspects of modern life, and said that
the Afrikaner's "messianic, Fundamentalist" approach to problems could
not easily be modified.

On the theory of apartheid he commented:

The religion of segregation is nourished by a vigorous school
of apologetics, and places like the University of Stellenbosch
are full of men, many of them perfectly sincere men, expatiating
on the racial-mystical philosophy of apartheid and proving by
every device of scholarship that 61§gk Africans are twice as
happy with apartheid as without it.
The other journalist mentioned was Robert St. John, who similarly
asserted that "the heavy hand of the Calvinists [of the Dutch Reformed
go
ChurchJ has written much of the country's legislation."
St. John
thought Afrikaans was like "baby talk" and described the Afrikaner as
"an eighteenth century man in a twentieth century world who has some
of the psychological problems of a nude man walking down Fifth Avenue,
Mew York, wanting other people to accept him as one of them, though
not possessing any clothes."

6k

Similarly blaming religious ignorance for apartheid, Newsweek
claimed that Prime Minister Strijdom was "convinced that Negroes are
sons of the scriptural Ham, accursed of God and ordained to be hewers
of wood and drawers of w a t e r . C h e s t e r Bowles, who later became
Under Secretary of State in the Kennedy administration, said that
apartheid was based on the assumption "that any white man is superior
^Oden Meeker, Report on Africa (New York, 195^)» 63.

69-70.

^Robert St. John, Through Malan's Africa (New York, 1 9 5 M ,
See also, "Down with Santa,” Time, May it, 1951, p* 39.
6k
St. John, Through Malan's Africa, 73-7^.
gc
"African Showdown," Newsweek, July 2, 1956, p. 33.
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to any non-white."^

Another writer, w *o later hecarae the American

ambassador to Burundi, described apartheid as "a political-theological
doctrine postulating God-given superiority for the white man."
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As previously indicated, many reports on South Africa traced
the "pro-Nazi" paBt of the Afrikaner leaders.

When Nazi influence on

Nationalist policies was not asserted expressly, it was at least
implied.

This interpretation of apartheid was made most explicit and

thoroughly by William Henry Vatcher in his study of the development of
Afrikaner nationalism.

Vatcher stated:

Nazi ideas undoubtedly influenced the conception of the proposed
apartheid policy that helped Malan into power in 19^8. The
Herrenvolk (master race) philosophy of Hitler Justified control
by the European (baasskap) and more especially by the Afrikaner,
since, in the Afrikaner view, English-speaking South Africans
could not be trusted to carry out such a scheme. Hitler's
philosophy certainly stiffened Afrikaner pride of race, and the
Nazi ideas of nationalism corresponded^amazingly to the
Afrikaner's own unorganized thinking.
This thesis is dubious and lacks firm evidentiary support. ^

Indeed,

more recent scholarship traces the origin of the apartheid concept
^Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America, U8, 66 .
67
Thomas Patrick Melady, Faces of Africa (New York, 196I1),
163-6I1.
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William Henry Vatcher, White Laager:
Nationalism (New York, 1965), 60.

The Rise of Afrikaner

^Heribert Adam has called the numerous references that have
been made to Nazi Germany regarding South Africa "ahistorical and rather
useless." Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination, 52. Edwin S. Munger
has similarly referred to the Nazi label as an "anachronistic epithet."
Edwin S, Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism; South African
Parallels and Parameters (London, 1967). 6k. Bee al&o Pierre L. van
Berghe, South Africa? A Study in Conflict (Middleton, Connecticut,
1965), 79; "The Ideology' of apartheid is more a brand of nineteenth
century colonial paternalism than a form of modern Fascism." Van
den Berghe does, however, use the term Herrenvolk-democxacy to
describe South Africa's political order.

b2
back to English colonial policy in the province of Natal in the nine
teenth century."^

Nevertheless, the view adopted by Vatcher and others

was influential.
If Afrikaner culture and nationalism were the sole reason for
apartheid, it could be argued that Americans might look to the Englishspeaking minority, acting in cooperation with dissident Afrikaners,
to bring about change in policy through the electoral process.
a few years after the 19^8 election this did appear possible.

For
The

United Party criticized the Nationalists strongly, and vigorous
protests against repressive legislation were raised by organizations
formed to work for the defeat of the Nationalist Party and its poli
cies. ^

However, even before the strength of the opposition to the

Nationalists was tested in 1953, American observers doubted that a
challenge could be successful.

A report in the New Republic just

before the election stated that the controversy between the white
parties was "not dictatorship versus democracy, but whether political
supremacy shall be vested in the whole white community or in the
Nationalist section only."7^

A similarly jaundiced view was taken

by Life which observed that Malan's opposition "feared not so much a

7®David Welsh, The Roots of Segregation: Native Policy in
Colonial Natal. 18U5-1910 (Cape Town, 1971). 318-22. The author believes that apartheid can also be traced in part to American segrega
tion, see below pp. 75-77.
71"1 sailor' Malan's Revolt," Life, June 25, 1951, p. ^5j
Andrew Boyle,"The Torch Commandos," Commonweal, July 18, 1952, p.
362; "South Africa: White Supremacy," Newsweek, March 31, 1952, p.
h2,

72C. M. W. Gell, "The Choice Before South Africa," New Repub
lic , February 9, 1953, p. 1^.
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loss of dark men's rights but their own.

Several, more scholarly

analyses reached virtually the same conclusion.

7I4

After the 1953 election, in which the Nationalists increased
their seats in Parliament, Newsweek commented that the victory had
"knocked the guts out" of all the opposition.

The United Party, which

non-whites had seen as their only hope, was shattered said Newsweek;
South Africa had rejected the "middle way."^^

Similarly, Basil

Davidson, a journalist and historian writing in the Nation, observed
that the defeated opposition had simply been the "moderate racialists,"
and they had suffered a smashing defeat. Both the white and the non
whites, he commented, had shifted ground with the election, and there
was little middle ground where they could join.
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Thereafter, politi

cal reports on South Africa were generally on the theme of white
against black, not "good" white versus "bad" white.
The interpretation of apartheid as the product of Afrikaner
culture was then inadequate.

Others were advanced which complemented

the Afrikaner Herrenvolk interpretation.

One of these was the view

that apartheid was the white response to their fear of the over
whelming numerical superiority of the Africans.

This interpretation

73"One Fifth of a Nation Celebrates," Life, April 21, 1952,
p. 27.

7^ H. R. Isaacs, >•The Dismal Annals of South African Intoler
ance," Reporter, January 6, 1953, p- 38; Eugene P. Dvorin, Racial
Separation in South Africa (Chicago, 1952), 191-93.
^"South Africa:
1953, p. 56.

Mandate for Malan," Newsweek, April 27,

^Basil Davidson, "Malan's Opposition: Old Wine in New
Bottles," Nation, November lU, 1953, pp. 39^-96.

can be called the "White Laager" thesis.
In frontier days in South Africa, the Boer pioneers would draw
their ox-wagons into a circle called a laager for protection against
attack by African tribesmen.

American observers in the 1950s and 1960s

increasingly came to the view that all the whites of South Africa were
drawing into a political laager.

Professor Gwendolen M. Carter

apparently reached this conclusion in her Politics of Inequality;
South Africa Since 19^8, one of the most thorough and well-respected
studies of South African politics in recent history.

Although Carter

noted important differences between the United Party and the National
ists, she found more significant the increasing polarization of senti
ment between white and non-white.

She suggested that their polariza

tion "could all too easily bring South Africa into the situation of
an armed camp in which all non-Europeans are so antagonistic to all
whites that the latter feel forced to stand together on all counts
as the only hope of self-preservation."*^

William Henry "Vatcher, in

his study entitled White Laager, likewise saw all whites in South
Africa coming closer as non-whites increasingly resisted Nationalist
race policies, although he did find the origins of apartheid in
Afrikaner nationalism.
There were two types of fear responsible for apartheid which
were suggested in American publications, personal fear for physical
safety, and the fear of being "swamped" politically and culturally.
^Carter, Politics of Inequality, 4l8,
^^yatcher, White Laager. 1^9. See also Albion Ross, "South
African Whites Close Ranks," New York Times, February l1*, 195^, Sec.
U, p. 6 $ "South Africa; The Great White Laager," Time, August 26 ,
1966, pp, 18-25,
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The belief that personal fear prompted much of apartheid was asserted

in an important article in Time in 1951 entitled "City in Terror:
Report from Johannesburg."

A

The Time correspondent presented a grim

picture of conditions in the city, describing increasing terror and
murder in the streets.

Apartheid resulted from the fact that the

blacks had suddenly become a major internal foe; the whites were
frightened.

Blacks were being separated, the article said, so that

the Nationalists would know where to bomb if there was trouble.
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The idea of personal fear being widespread among the whites of South
Africa was also played up in the repeated statements in the press
that South Africans slept with guns under their pillows and by the
printing of pictures showing white women in South Africa taking pistol
lessons.

The Journalist Robert St. John felt that it was this same

fear that made the whites smoke and drink at an abnormal rate:
The excesses seem to be outward manifestation of the nervous
ness and fear which hang over South Africa. Many South
Africans do not realize it themselves. Yet fear is here,
like a London fog, everywhere.

^Alexander Campbell, "City in Terror: A Report from Johannes
burg," Time, September 3, 1951* pp. 32-33. Originally from Scotland,
Campbell moved to South Africa and became a Journalist. He was respon
sible for many of the critical reports that appeared in the Luce
publications in the early 1950s. Later he became managing editor of
the New Republic. Apparently, while he was sending highly critical
material to Time and Life, he was also working for the South African
Tourist Bureau and writing highly laudatory material on South Africa.
Cable of Arthur Veysey from Cape Town [to Chicago Tribune], May 21,
1952, in J. W. van Zijl, Commission chairman, Report of the Commission
of Inquiry into the Press (Pretoria, 1961+), Annexure XX, 15^1; Meeker,
Report on Africa, 227.
fin
St. John, Through Malan's Africa, 23. Peter Bird Martin,
"Cities of the World: Johannesburg," Saturday ^Evening Post, November
26, 1955, p. 88; picture, Newsweek, May 29, 1961, p. V5; "I Dreamt
I Was in Jo'burg," Time, February 12, 19^5, p. 77; John Hughes, The
New Face of Africa CNew York, 1961), 207.

Most white South Africans would probably deny that this sort
of fear has existed or they would say that the press reports have been
greatly exaggerated.

But they would not deny that the second type of

fear has been the major basis of, and justification for, apartheid.
Their claim has been that to give the African political rights in
his present socio-economic position would result in the downfall of
Q-i

civilization, as the whites know it, in South Africa.
Some American publications grudgingly conceded that conditions
prevailing in South Africa might require temporary restrictions on
human rights and a gradual process of liberalization.

However,most

Americans writing on South Africa denied that there was any real basis
for white fear over the granting of political rights to the Africans.
A writer in Atlantic said that the whites were clinging to a dream of
domination, "more frightened of the common daylight than they are of
Qp
the horrors they have themselves evoked."
An article expressing a
similar idea appeared in Christian Century under the title "South
African Racists Fear the Light." J

A white fear of being swamped

0*1

N. J. Rhoodie has stated that "on account of the Bantu’s
numerical superiority, the White-Black polarisation of interests is
intimately tied up with White self-preservation, and the Whites will
continue to fear for their survival as long as the numerical disparity
obtains in the land of their birth," N. J. Rhoodie, Apartheid and
Racial Partnership in Southern Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town, 19^9),
31. See also Rhoodie and Venter, Apartheid, 29-30; Tomlinson Report
SurmnR.T'yt 101-108; J. D. L. Kruger, Bantustan: A Study in Practical
Apartheid (Queenstown, South Africa, 1951). 12-1U'. For empirical
data on the nature of South African attitudes, see William Hudson,
G. F. Jacobs, and Simon Biesheuvel, Anatomy of South Afr1ca; A
Scientific Study of Present Day Attitudes (Johannesburg, 1966), 115.
^"South Africa," Atlantic, 21,
^"South African Racists Fear the Light," Christian Century,
May 30, 1962, p. 682, See also, George M. Houser, "Treason in South
Africa," Christian Century, March 6, 1957* P- 288.

was generally regarded by Americans as being irrational, no more than
"paranoid suspicions and repressions" in the words of the historian
David Brion Davis.

8U

This view was reinforced by the publication in

the American press of interviews with or writings of African leaders
from South Africa such as A. B. Xuma, Z, K, Matthews, and Nobel Prize
winner Albert J. Luthuli, leaders who were articulate, educated, and
reasonable, leaders who asserted that they favored a progressive nonQp

racial democracy for South Africa.

Gwendolen Carter in her Politics

of Inequality took the position that South African whites had nothing
to fear from the Africans, stating:
In South Africa, in contrast [to the Mau Mau in KenyaJ, nonEuropean political organizations seek changes within the
existing system, not its overthrow. They want a share in
political power, not to oust the Europeans. They want a fuller
return for their contribution to the economy, not to change,,,
its character. They want to become more Western, not less.
The significance of this view was that if white fear was un
founded, then the primary justification for apartheid was invalid.
Thus, when a witness before a Congressional hearing on American policy
on South Africa asserted restrictions on the Africans were necessary
for white survival, Congressman Donald Fraser quickly rejected the
argument. He stated that
the non-Europeans in South Africa don't seek to drive out
the whites, they seek a multiracial society. They are not
Rh
David Brion Davis, The Slave Power Conspiracy and the
Paranoid Style (Baton Rouge, 1969), 50.
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E.g., Z, K. Matthews, "The African Response to Racial laws,"
Foreign Affairs, XXX (October, 1951), 91-102; Albert Luthuli, "If I
Were Prime Minister," Atlantic. CCIX (March, 1962), 6l-61*.
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Carter, Politics of Inequality, 379.
Africa," 507.

See also, Karis, "South

1*8
Imprisoned, as the vhites are "by their fear.
Finally, same Americans "viewed apartheid as a vast scheme for
rationalizing the economic exploitation of the Africans.

It was ob

vious to those looking at South Africa that Africans made up the great
majority of the labor force, and it seemed that the apartheid legis
lation simply facilitated a continuation of this fact.

A writer in the

Nation declared that the government's race legislation was "a blueprint
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for turning South Africa into one vast slave labor camp.”

George

Shepherd, Jr., one of the first of the anti-South African activists,
declared that "exploitation of cheap labor is the taproot of the evil
system of racism."^

Similarly, Sidney Lens, the director of a Chicago

AFL-CIO local union, wrote that there was strong suspicion "that the
total enforcement of pass-book laws is aimed at recruiting slave
labor for white landowners."

90

The theme of economic exploitation did not contradict the
Herrenvolk Interpretation, but rather reinforced it for some observers.
For example, America combined the two, stating that under apartheid
the "Bantu are to remain a race of helots upon whose backs the favored

^ U . S . , Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United
States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, P * 3^*1 (hereafter United StateBSouth African Relations).
K. Cope, "South Africa: Racist Caldron," Nation, July
lU, 1951, p. 32.
go
George Shepherd, Jr., "Our Forgotten Trust: South West
Africa," Christian Century, January 22, 1958* P* 99^°Sidney Lens, "Passbook Revolution." Christian Century, April,
6, i960, p. i*07. For similar discussions by other labor union repre
sentatives see United States-South African Relations, 131-6U,
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of God can build a prosperous economy.

However, the views were

contradictory in that a person who believed that economic exploitation
was the mainspring of apartheid could not believe that white South
Africans genuinely intended to bring about complete territorial
separation of the races.
By the late 1950s, the image of South Africa as a benighted
land was fairly well entrenched.

Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd had re

placed Strijdom in 1958 but he was regarded as being in the same mold
as his predecessors, despite his brilliance and more affable nature. 92
South African politics seemed to have settled into a pattern.

Pro-

Nazi Prime Minister followed pro-Nazi Prime Minister, and repressive
measure after repressive measure was ’'jammed" or "railroaded" through
Parliament.

English-speaking whites timidly offered superficial, in

effective opposition to the harsher pieces of legislation, secure in
the knowledge that the Nationalists would not be diverted from their
course.

South African, policies were viewed as abhorrent, and Americans

doubted that change could come about from within the existing political
system.
Despite the fact that most people writing on South Africa con
demned apartheid, few Americans called for their government to do any
thing about South African oppression.

South Africa was wicked, Ameri

cans agreed, but this did not mean the United States should take

^"Easter and Apartheid," America, April l6, I960, pp. 58-59.
^2"God,s Man," Time, September 15, 1958, p. 30. See also
"Unanimity," Nation, November 2, 1963, p. 270: "To talk of South
Africa, under the Verwoerd regime, as barbarous, is to slander
barbarians,"

action to oppose it.

In the term "used in the introduction to this

study, the American image of South Africa lacked an "action compo
nent."

The factors in the United States and abroad that gave the

image an action component in the 1960s will be taken up next.

These

factors caused South Africa to be perceived as threatening American
interests.

CHAPTER II

SOUTH AFRICA, UNITED STATES RACE RELATIONS,
AND THE AMERICAN IMAGE ABROAD

Until it became a republic in 1961, the official name of
South Africa was the Union of South Africa.

Americans looking at

South Africa noted from time to time that there was another U.S.A. in
the world.

In many respects the two U.S.A.'s were similar.

They had

a frontier tradition, gold rushes, and boom towns in the wilderness.
Both had fought British imperialism.

And both had a "color" problem.

In fact, they were the only two countries in the world in which
significant numbers of blacks and whites lived together within the
same country and in which there was a political problem of segrega
tion.

This last point could not help but be noted, and it inevitably

drew comparisons between the two countries.

For many years Americans

and South Africans, white and black alike, have examined each others'
societies for relevant ideas on race relations; it is the author's
belief that the two countries have influenced one another on race
policies.

Others in the world, too, have noted similarities between

the race problems of the United States and South Africa.

The need

to convince the world that the United States was not like South Africa
became a reason for the United States to denounce apartheid or to
take further action against South Africa.
51
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After the Nationalists assumed power in 19^8, South Africa and
its policies were in the news, and people began to observe that what
the Nationalists called apartheid was similar to racial segregation
in the American South.

Thomas Sancton, a journalist who had long

covered Southern politics, discovered in 19^9 the existence of "South
Africa's Dixiecrats."

What drew his attention to the "fundamental

parallelism" between the American South and South Africa was a debate
then underway at the United Nations.

The Nationalist victory, he

said, was "roughly analagous to the rise of the Dixiecrat movement."1
In the debates at the United Nations the position of the South Afri
can spokesman was based, in Sancton's view, on the same systematic
political racism that the Dixiecrats were using to kill the Truman
legislative programs.

"Like our own political racists," wrote

Sancton,
the white South African leaders subvert every process of law
and every principle of patriotic honor and civilization to
the stulifying task of perpetuating human injustice. Point
by point Mr. Louw {the South African representative] repeated
the spurious arguments for injustice— using at times the same
phrasing— which were offered recently by Senators [Richard]
Russell, [Walter] George, [Allen] Ellender, and others who
were active in the filibuster.^
Living conditions among African miners in South Africa were almost
indistinguishable from those of the poorer American Negroes in
Southern cities.
Disconcerting similarities did exist, but for Sancton as for
others in the early 1950s, the similarities were at the same time

Thomas Sancton^ "South Africa's Dixiecrats," Nation, May 28,
19^9, p. 602.
2Ibid.

reassuring.

Although the United States still had a blemished record,

the federal government had embarked on a different course from that
taken by South Africa.

Despite the similarities it was clear that

the American race problem was only a Southern problem, one that other
Americans were working to solve.

By comparison with South Africa,

conditions for black Americans were not too bad and were improving.
Sancton stated that the standard of living for Southern blacks had
"risen substantially in the past decade as a result of their employ
ment in war industries.

The living conditions of natives in South
3
Africa remain a disgrace to the modern world."
The existence of South Africa's race policies gave proof to
the belief that the American government was making progress in dealing
with the race problem.

Roderick Peattie, an American geographer whose

work with the Office of War Information took him to South Africa in
World War II, said that his first reaction to Richard Wright's Black
Boy was to cry "For shame, America!"

But then he thought of South

Africa, and it gave him a "grand and glorious" sensation.
could not be published there.

Such a book

He viewed race problems as only an

"infection on the body corporate" in America, while race hatred was
a "congenital disease" in South Africa.

Another visitor to South

Africa, Pulitzer Prize novelist Martin Flavin, found many similarities
in the race problems of the two countries; many aspects of the South
African color line were painfully reminiscent to him of those at home.
But, like Sancton, Flavin concluded that "there is one important
3Ibid.
^Roderick Peattie, Struggle on the Veld (New York, 19^7), ISO51, 151*.

fundamental difference:

every step the black man is able to take for

ward in America has the support of the law— of national law at least;
in South Africa every step he takes is in violation and defiance of
i t . E v e n a publication such as the New Republic which found Ameri
can progress in race relations very limited could not help but note
that the "United States is losing its grim distinction as the country
where racial discrimination is worst.

The Union of South Africa now

seems to be the number one p l a c e . T h e New York Times similarly
editorialized that "the racial situation in South Africa makes the
relationship between our own white and colored races seem simple and
hopeful indeed.
Ifot only was there a feeling that the federal government was
bringing about progress, there was also an assurance that the South
itself was changing.

Reporting that while the Klan may have freshened

up its sheets and the Dixiecrats were successfully filibustering in
Congress, a writer for Harpers magazine concluded that, nonetheless,
in the South "there is a transformation going on, on the surface and
Q
deep down."
White supremacy, she said, was being attacked on all
sides and was suffering badly.

Christian Century, which only a few

years earlier had printed articles equating the South with Nazi Germany,
similarly declared:
^Martin Flavin, "The Durban Deep," Harpers. CXCVIII (April,
19U9), 67.
^"Jim Crow to the Hilt," New Republic, June 12, 1950,jp. 8 .
T
New York Times. December 3, 195**, P* 26.
O
Mary Heaton Vorse, "The South Has Changed," Harpers, CXCIX
(July, 19^9), 31.
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Racial "barriers are falling throughout America and nowhere more
noticably than in the south. . . . The progress of the Negro
in the eighty-five years since the end of the war between the
states has hardly been equaled in history.°
Within a short time after the 19^8 election, the Dixiecrat
movement died away, and it seemed to some that by 1952 white supremacy
was a dead letter in the South.

Life said editorially that there had

been no Northern liberal-Southern Bourbon schism at the Democratic
convention of 1952 because the issue of civil rights had become
"unreal."

Up until twelve, eight, even four years before, Life ob

served, the question of Negro rights had united all Southern whites.
But no longer was this true for "the majority of Southerners now know
it [white supremacy]

to be a lost cause. The Bourbons themselves are

adjusting to the new

emancipation of the Negro as fast as they have to.

That means pretty fast."1®

Now the majority of Southerners and the

majority of Northerners thought alike on the issue, and the black
mein was gaining his rights.

As a result, concluded Life, white supre

macy had "lost its political importance, and the Democratic convention
of 1952 proved it."11
The nagging doubts that remained in some minds seemed to be
dispelled in 195^ by
Education.12

the Supreme Court'sdecision in Brown v. Board of

Once and for all the question of civil rights for black

Americans had been ended, at least as a matter of public law and
policy.

In the spirit of self-congratulation that surrounded the

^"The Walls are Tumbling," Christian Century, September 27,
1950, pp. 1128-29.
1(^"White Supremacy," Life, August U, 1952, p. 30.
11Ibid.
123*0 U.S. U83 (195*0.
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decision, Time hailed Brown as part of "one of the greatest success
stories the world has ever known:
from slavery.

the American Negro's 90-year rise

,.13

In light of the widespread feeling that the United States had
made tremendous strides in securing the rights of "black Americans,
South Africa could not help "but seem "backward by comparison.

Americans

writing about South Africa or about the American South grew more posi
tive about the progress in race relations in the United States and
noted that the two countries appeared to be moving in opposite direc
tions .
Americans, said the Catholic magazine Commonweal, enjoyed some
satisfaction viewing the difficulties with segregation In Africa,
particularly in South Africa, "for here was one matter on which our
own record was comparatively good."

1^

It said the reelection of Malan's

government had meant a further reduction in the rights of the "natives"
and a strengthening of apartheid.

Commonweal found that it was all too

easy "to contrast this folly of the Boers with the strides we are making
in this country," although it might be premature "to judge from these
advances-~and from the contrasting directions in the United States and
South Africa on racial matters— that all is well in the matter of
interracial justice in this country."

15

The magazine said there had

been marked change within the United States since World War II; there

-^"To All on Equal Terms," Time, May 2k , 195^, p. 21.
"^"Contrasts in Segregation," Commonweal, May 15, 1953, p. 137.
^ Ibid. See also "Retrospect," Christian Century, December 29,
1951*, pp, 1575-77; and Relnhold Niebuhr, review of Trevor Huddleston's
Naught for Your Comfort, in New Republic, May 28, 1956, pp. 20-21,

had been notable advances for black Americans in employment, housing,
health, and education.
The belief in American progress in race relations caused some
to feel that the United States could serve as a model for South Africa
and could thereby encourage liberalization of South Africa's policies
by America's good example.

The contrast itself suggested that progress

in race relations was possible and that South Africa might be deserving
of some sympathy.

Noting the "astounding progress" of the United

States against racial injustice, the editors of America expressed the
belief that this progress could be the basis for encouraging the
Christian-minded in South Africa.

They made the same point a few

weeks later after the Urban League issued a report showing that more
blacks were working in firms which had not previously employed blacks;
at about the same time Tuskegee Institute announced that it was dis
continuing its lynching report.

Commenting on these announcements,

America observed that while the color bar was preventing Africans from
getting skilled jobs in South Africa, "precisely the opposite situation
is coming to prevail in the employment field in this country.

The

professor at South Africa's Stellenbosch University who had recently
said a change in his government's race policies was necessary should
look to the United States as a model to be emulated; the magazine
stated that a "study of the practical benefits American business and
industry find in fair employment practice may indicate to him what
^ " U N Report on South Africa," America, November 1^, 1953, p.
167.
17 "Tuskegee and Urban League Reports," America, January 16,
195k, P. 390.
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direction such a change in policy should take."-*-®

The editors of

America later quoted favorably South African Bishop Denis E. Hurley's
statement that "America's magnificent show against segregation . . .
is bound to affect South Africa as well.-*"^
C. Vann Woodward, one of the most thoughtful and sensitive
students of Southern history, made what was probably the most signifi
cant statement of the contrast between the differing directions of the
20

American South and South Africa in his Strange Career of Jim Crow.

The third of the four chapters of the book was entitled "The Man on the
Cliff," a phrase taken from the writings of Alan Paton.

Woodward

showed that the American South and South Africa were identified by
observers as being very similar in the early part of the twentieth
century.

The two regions had seemed to be following essentially the

same policies.

Now, however, the similarities were coming to an end

and they could no longer be identified together; the two were travel
ing along different paths

into the future:

At some point along their parallel ways it is now clear that
the paths of the South and of South Africa diverged. At the
time of the First World War it had seemed that both regions
were going roughly the same way. But by the time the Second
World War was over it was very plain that they were no longer
traveling together. Indeed, as the tragic destination of
South Africa became more and more apparent, and as more hope
ful events transpired on the other side of the Atlantic, it
began to seem as if the two great regions might be traveling
in opposite directions .^-*-

l8Ibid., 391.
"Archbishop Hurley Speaks," America, January 19, 1957, p.
*+55.
pn

C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York,

1955).
21Ibld., 108.

Woodward suggested that the South might glance back at South Africa,
the country with which the South had once identified itself and had
seemed to see eye to eye, and perhaps it would observe South Africa
with more pity and less reproachfulness than others:
The South no longer identifies herself with South Africa and
no longer has reason to fear the madness of self destruction.
The South somewhere along the way took a different path. It
has joined the spectators who are watching the tragic dilemma
of the mem on the cliff.^2
If all of America's race problems had not been solved, it at
least appeared that the great steps necessary for their solution had
been taken and the future was quite bright. The course that South
Africa was following proved it.

To be sure, there were some dissenters

in the early and mid-1950s, some who were highly critical of the
American record on questions involving race.

But they could be dis

missed, as Life magazine did, as "opportunistic liberals" trying to
make political capital by turning civil rights into a moral issue.

23

Foreign criticisms were acknowledged to have some validity, but
editorialists and writers asserted that Communist propaganda was wildly
distorting the facts to serve its own purposes.

Of course the United

States had problems but what country did not; the Communists were
exaggerating the few incidents of racial injustice all out of propor
tion.

Or so it seemed.
The events of the latter part of the 1950s began to undermine

the earlier confidence and optimism that many Americans had felt about
race relations in the United States.
22Ibid., 152.
23"White Supremacy," Life, 30.

The growth of the civil rights

movement and the national trauma of the process of desegregation are
immense subjects in themselves and cannot be treated adequately in
a study such as this.

However, one component of this bears strongly

on the present subject and must be emphasized; that is the important
role that the awareness of foreign opinion played in the American
realization of a need for reform.
Americans, reputedly isolationist, have throughout their
history been acutely conscious that they were but one country among
many others, and that people in those other countries were observing
and passing judgment on them.

Americans have often equated power with

virtue and moral integrity; because of this and their desire to find
abroad reassurance of their own essential goodness, they have always
wanted to have foreign approval of their institutions and their way
of life.

The words of John Winthrop written aboard the Arbella were

but the first of many over the centuries which demonstrated this
American sensitivity to the opinions of people in other countries:
"wee must Consider that wee shall be a Citty vpon a Hill, the eies of
all people are vppon vs; soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our
god in this worke wee haue vndertaken and soe cause him to withdrawe
his present help from vs, wee shall be made a story and a byword
2k
through the world . . . ."

One of the convictions that sustained

Abraham Lincoln through the Civil War was his faith that the war was
to vindicate democracy in the sight of all mankind, as he so eloquently
indicated in the Gettysburg Address.

25

Woodrow Wilson in his appeal

pli
John Winthrop, "A Modell of Christian Charity," in Loren
Baritz, ed., Sources of the American Mind (New York, 1966), I, 11.

25see Allen Nevins, The Statesmanship of the Civil War (rev.
ed.; New York, 1962), 137-
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to the voters to return a Democratic Congress in 1918 told the American
people that he sought their support not for the sake of a political
party, "but for the sake of the nation itself in order that its inp/T

ward duty of purpose may be evident to all the world."
In light of this tradition of wanting foreigners to believe
that the United States was upholding the democratic principles that
it professed, it is not surprising that one of the key arguments of the
Department of Justice in its brief to the Supreme Court on the question
of school segregation was that it was hurting the American image
abroad:
It is in the context of the present world struggle between
freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination
must be viewed . . . . Racial discrimination furnishes grist
for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubt even
among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion
to the democratic faith.^7
Not only was American prestige damaged by segregation, but it was
aiding communism everywhere in the world.
seemed to end that threat.

pA

The Brown decision briefly

As Newsweek expressed it, segregation in

American public schools had become a symbol of inequality to people
all over the world and was a weapon of world communism; now, with

°"President Wilson's Appeal to the Voters to Return a Demo
cratic Congress," in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American
History (7th ed.; New York, 1963), II, 152.
27Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow
(2nd rev. ed.; New York, 1966), 132.
pQ

See Max Beloff, "No Peace, No War," Foreign Affairs, XXVII
(January, 19^9), 22U; and Hans J. Morgenthau, "United States Policy
Toward Africa," in Calvin W. Stillman, ed., Africa in the Modern World
(Chicago, 1955), 321, 325.
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Brown, "that symbol lies shattered."

29

The optimism that accompanied Brown was soon undermined by a
worsening of race relations in the South.

30

In 1955 there were three

lynchings of blacks in the state of Mississippi, the first such in
cidents in the United States since 1951.

One lynching in particular

received world wide attention, that of Emmet Till, a fourteen year old
boy who allegedly had whistled at a white woman.

The next year, the

ugly incidents that accompanied desegregation of the public schools in
America began to occur.

Vicious mobs arose and rioted when Autherine

Lucy attempted to enter the University of Alabama in February 1956.
The actions of the mob ultimately had the desired effect of postponing
the integration of the University, but it also led to hostile criticism
of the United States from abroad.

Later in the year mob action opposed

the integration of public schools in Clinton, Tennessee, with the same
effect on world opinion.
Such events as these and the resulting foreign criticism could
not be dismissed simply as the product of Communist propaganda.

Ameri

cans began to doubt they were making as much progress as they had pre
viously imagined, and they were increasingly concerned that this was
29

"Supreme Court: Historic Decision," Newsweek, May 2k , 195^,
p. 26. It is interesting to note the priorities indicated by even so
strong a supporter of the civil rights movement as Christian Century.
In a report which contrasted the good news of 195k from the United
States with the news of Strijdom becoming Prime Minister in South
Africa, it commented that "there is satisfaction that the courts
should have moved against racial segregation, partly because this
brings our social practice somewhat more into accord with our democratic
pretensions, but even more because of the improvement in the position
from which we can deal with the world of color." "Retrospect,"
Christian Century, 1576.
30

See C. Vann Woodward, "The New Reconstruction in the South,"
Commentary, XXI (June, 1956), 501-508.

hurting the United States abroad,.^"

Americans had told the world that

their country was the home of freedom and the hope of the oppressed
everywhere.

The uncommitted peoples of the world were told to look

to the benefits of American democracy as their model for a new order
and not to the virtual enslavement of communism.

What conclusions

could they draw from the examples of Emmet Till and Autherine Lucy?
America editorialized in 1956 on "U.S. Racial Bias and Asia," saying
that bias was not only a moral evil in itself, but was also damaging
the United States in Asia and thus did not even make good common sense.
"Ask any U.S. Information Service employee," the magazine suggested,
whose task is to make known to Asia’s colored millions the
virtues of American democracy. . . . That these tensions are
blown up out of all proportion both by the Communist and
Asian press is quite beside the point. They exist. The fact
of their existence does us untold harm throughout Asia.32
The argument that the United States should make reforms at home to
aid its foreign policy and fight communism was most clearly stated by
George F. Kennan in an article in Harpers in 1956 entitled "Overdue
Changes in Our Foreign Policy."

Kennan wrote that "we are all aware

^Polling data confirm this conclusion dramatically. A
National Opinion Research Council poll taken in 19^7 asked respondents
"Do you think the way Negroes are treated in this country has any
effect on the attitudes of people in foreign countries toward us?"
Thirty-four per cent of adult Americans felt that it did; but fortysix per cent felt that it did not. A Harris poll of 1963 asked a
similar question. In it, seventy-eight per cent believed foreign
attitudes towards the United States were adversely affected by Ameri
can race policies and only eight per cent believed that they were not.
Polling data on foreign attitudes indicate that the seventy-eight
per cent were correct. See Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: World Opinion
of U.S. Racial Problems," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXXII (Summer,
1968}, 299-312.
^2"U,S. Racial Bias and Asia," America, May 12, 1956, p. 152.
Only Asia is mentioned; Africa was not considered by many Americans
to haye any bearing on the civil rights question until several years
later. See also "Contrasts in Segregation," Commonweal, 137-38.

6k
of the vicious distortions and exaggerations peddled hy the Communists
throughout the world about the state of race relations in this country.'1
He had no desire to condone such irresponsibility that caused the
Communists to mislead other people, but he had to ask if Americans did
not "pour oil on these fires" instead of putting them out.

The prob

lems that remained were difficult and there was no quick, easy solution
to them.

But he wanted Americans to think about

the effect on hundreds of millions of colored people in other
lands of direct reports from this country of what goes on here
in the field of race relations. What do we suppose is the
effect of the news photograph of Authurine Lucy's car surrounded
by the mob with a man jumping up and down on its roof, apparently
trying to break it in with his heels?— and all this purveyed to
the world as an example of what happens to a colored girl who
tries to get a higher education in this country? That one
photograph is worth more to Communists than all the lies they
could invent in a decade.33
If foreign opinion had seemed important in 1956, it assumed_
much greater significance the following year, for it was then that the
most traumatic events in race relations in almost a century began.

It

was then that news media all over the world reported that in cities in
various parts of the South black children attempting to go to formerly
all white schools were cursed, threatened, intimidated, spat upon.
Little Rock became the symbol of it all, for it was there that the
situation became most critical.

Arkansas's governor, Orval Faubus,

called out the national guard, ostensibly to maintain order but in
actuality to maintain segregation in defiance of court ordered integra
tion of Little Rock's Central High.

The Justice Department sent the

F.B.I. in to investigate why the integration order was not being carried

■^George F. Kennan, "Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy,"
Harpers. CCXIII (August, 1956), 31-32.

out.

Finally the national guard was withdrawn and the handful of

black children attempted to enter the school.

Mob demonstrations

prevented the integration, and President Eisenhower felt it necessary
to take the step that several months earlier he had declared unthinkable
he sent a thousand paratroopers to Little Bock and put the Arkansas
national guard on federal, service to prevent the mob from obstructing
integration any longer.^

Both Americans and foreigners were dis

abused of Illusions they may have entertained about the state of race
relations in America.

Time magazine stressed the importance of the

situation for foreign affairs, stating that Faubus and his followers
were giving aid and comfort to Communists,

Reviewing foreign criti

cisms of the United States for the Little Rock incidents, the magazine
observed that ’’millions of brown-skinned Asians, unaware of great U.S.
constitutional issues, saw only dark-skinned American children being
held away from school by rifles of white American s o l d i e r s . T h e
editors of America asked the people of Little Rock to "remember that
not only the eyes of the nation but the eyes of the whole world are
intently watching them.

For Little Rock is, alas, not the least of

the battlefields of the Cold War."

Policy makers were even more

acutely aware of the enmity and hostility engendered abroad by Ameri
can racial incidents.

When Vice President Nixon made a visit to Latin

America, mobs in Venezuela shouted at him "Little Rock! Little Rock!"
The State Department was flooded by dispatches from American embassies
^Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York, 1965), U0-l*7»
•^"What Orval Hath Wrought," Time, September 23, 1957, p. 13.
^"Issue at Little Rock," America, August 30, 1958, p. 5^2.
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and consulates all around the world describing the damage done to Ameri
can prestige. ^
The incidents of racial animosity did not end with Little
Rock; instead, they continued and were exacerbated.
still more recalcitrant.

The South became

The rest of the country grew increasingly

disturbed about the South's unwillingness to accept the change that
had been decreed for it and about what this signified for American
and foreign conceptions of the meaning of America.

This had consid

erable significance for American thinking on South Africa.
After 1956 parallels continued to be drawn between the United
States and South Africa, but now there was a marked difference.

As

Americans began to realize that their own racial problems were more
serious than they had previously thought, attention was drawn to South
Africa to emphasize the worst qualities in American life, not to show
the favorable contrasts between race policies in the two.

In other

words, South Africa became the paradigm of racism, the vision of evil
of what the United States was or could be.

Thus when Daniel Friedenberg

reviewed John Gunther's Inside Africa for the Mew Republic he did not
praise the United States for its liberalism while condemning apartheid,
but instead asked the reader:
Have you had a single sleepless night over the murder of Till
in Mississippi? Has your hand shaken when you read that a
minister in the South was shot down in broad daylight because
he urged his fellow citizens to vote, and that no one has even
bothered to search for the killers? . . . Is it really Inside
Africa or more likely InBide Ourselves?-^

■^Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York, 1963), ^0*1.
oft

0 Daniel M. Friedenberg, review of John Gunther's Inside Africa,
in Hew Republic, October 31, 1955, p. 2h,

The shift in comparisons could also be seen in the Christian
Century early in 1956 when it commented on a new book by a South
African Dutch Reformed Church theologian which denied any Biblical
sanctioning of segregation.

The magazine suggested that it be read by

"the fomenters of our own southern apartheid . . . .

If they can't be

lieve northern 'radicals' on this, maybe they can learn from equally
conservative, equally embattled South Africans."^

The Nation, edi

torializing on "Arkansas and Another Union," suggested that if
Governor Faubus was feeling lonely in his struggle to maintain "apart
heid— Arkansas variety," he might roam the corridors of the United
Nations with his South African "companions in d i s t r e s s . C a l l i n g
attention to the fact that white South Africans had sent Faubus $18.75
to help him fight integration, the editors said that the racists in the
United States and in South Africa should get together just to ex
change such pleasantries as "How would you like your daughter to marry
a Kaffir?

«Ul

Continuing in the same vein a few months later, the

Nation discussed the effort being made in Arkansas to make integration
and communism synonymous.

The tactic was "in the savage repression

pattern of the Union of South Africa."

American Jim Crowism had con

tributed to apartheid and was now, the magazine said,

39"Sign of Hope in South Africa," Christian Century, February

8, 1956, p. 165. In discussing the Group Areas Act, the same publica
tion said that the "logic of the white supremacists in the United
States points in the same direction." "South Africans Take A Step in
Segregation," Christian Century, September 5S 1956, p. 1013.
^"Arkansas and Another Union," Nation, October 25, 1958» P*

282.
^Ibid.
"nigger."

"Kaffir" is the South African equivalent of the term

aping apartheid racism. Once again Governor Faubus has
obligingly confirmed the most serious charges of his most
severe critics. As rapidly as circumstances will permit, he
is busily proving that he is a racist in the Strydom mold.
This same issue of the Nation contained a long article by Anthony
Sampson on "Little Rock and Johannesburg,"

Sampson had just completed

his study of the recent treason trials in South Africa, The Treason
Cage, and was now reporting on how strongly similar the South and
South Africa were; he concluded that "the resemblance is astonishing."^^
He found the same brooding atmosphere, the same stock phrases and
shibboleths, the same obsession with race, the same type of character
in both Southerners and Afrikaners, the same consciousness of defeat
in the Civil War
thing, the

and the Boer War, and other similarities. If any

South came off worse in the comparison:

If there seemed to be a difference, it was th&t West Ninth
Street in Little Rock was more, not less, segregated than
Victoria Road, Sophiatown [an African shanty town Just out
side Johannesburg]. A white mein was a rarer sight In Red's
Pool Hall than in the Back 0 1 The Moon in Sophiatown. In
Little
Rock, if you wanted to have
lunch with a Negro,you
had to
bring sandwiches into your office. No one there whom
I met had heard of a white man meeting a black man at dinner,
as white and Negro sometimes meet in the smart liberal homes
in Johannesburg. Even in material things, the Negroes in
West Ninth Street seemed more forlorn, more left-behind than
the Sophiatowners. The clothers were shabbier, the furniture
more shaky, the young men less confident and less articulate—
unmistakably downtrodden. . . . Even the regional headquarters
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People in Little Rock seemed more defensive, and less confident,
than the African National Congress.
As the American civil rights movement grew in intensity in the
^ " ' K 1 as in Kremlin," Nation, January 10, 1959, p. 21,

^Anthony Sampson, "Two Souths: Little Rock and Johannesburg,"
Nation, January 10, 1959, p. 23,
Ibid. , p. 2l+.
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early 1960s references to South Africa in connection with the South
continued to "be made hut now with a greater sense of alarm at the
parallels.

Both South Africa and the American South were, said a

writer in the Kew Republic, "caught in a rule of 'rednecks.

'

A

study of the attempt to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama,
in such a way as to exclude most of the blacks from the voting district
and the case that followed was entitled Gomillion v. Lightfoot;
1*6

Apartheid in Alabama.

One Catholic priest's sermon against racism

in Mississippi occasioned the statement by the editor of America that
"in a solution that reminds one of South African apartheid, whites [in
Mississippi] are trying to overcome their fears by systematically
w
refusing to allow Negroes their human and civil rights."
The
British writer D. W. Brogan, writing on "The Impending Crisis of the
Deep South" in Harpers, drew the distressing parallel that both the
South and South Africa were Joined in the same siege mentality; both
were trying to shut out a hostile outside world.

1*8

An even harsher

statement was an article by the civil rights activist Father Daniel
Berrigan comparing Selma, Alabama, with Sharpeville, South Africa, the
site of the massacre of sixty-nine Africans by police.

For Berrigan,

1*^David
5
Cort, review of Peter Eitner's Death of Africa, in New
Eepublic, May 30, 1960,p. 19,
v‘.... *.... ’'1
^Bernard Taper, Gomillion v. Lightfoot; Apartheid in Alabama
(New York, 1962).
w
"Courage in Mississippi," America, July 6 , 1963, p. 2.
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon similarly declared that Birmingham,
Alabama, was like South Africa when Martin Luther King was Jailed
there in 1963 for leading demonstrations against segregation. David
L. Lewis, Kingc A Critical Biography (New York, 1970), 16.
k®D. W. Brogan, "The Impending Crisis of the Deep South,"
Harpers, CCXXX (April, 1965), 1^8.

the brutality was essentially the same in both cities; both were
"stereotypes of brutal power."

h9

Alabama and South Africa were again

likened to one another in an editorial on the assassination of Prime
Minister Verwoerd in 1966.

The Mew Republic said that there was no

possibility for change in South Africa because all the leaders were
fanatical and whoever was selected to succeed Verwoerd "will strive
to promote the kind of race policy that George Wallace would in
Alabama, if the state and the federal government let him.""^
By the mid-1960s people were concluding that race problems
were not simply confined to the South; increasingly they were per
ceived as a national phenomenon.

Now South Africa came to be held up

by some liberals as a vision of evil for the whole nation.

Thus a

"T.R.B." column in the New Republic in 1966 editorialized on "Vorster
and Dirksen."

The columnist made use of the association with South

Africa to condemn Senator Dirkserfs position on the open-housing pro
visions of the Civil Rights Act of 1966.

As if to show that liberals

could use smear tactics as well as Joe McCarthy could, the article
preceded discussion of the bill with the statement that:
In South Africa a racist pro-Nazi prime minister, Vorster,
succeeded a racist pro-Nazi premier, Verwoerd. In Grenada,
Miss., a crowd of screaming white men, swinging ax handles
and chains, forced a 12-year-old Negro school child with
a broken leg to crawl away from school while police stood by.
After this, the editorial began going over Dirksen's stand in leading
^Daniel Berrigan, "Sfelma and Sharpeville, Commonweal, April 9
1965, p. 71.
50
"Death of Apartheid?" New Republic, September 17, 1966, p. 9
^"Vorster and Dirksen," New Republic, September 2k , 1966,
p.
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the opposition to the open-housing provision.

Dirksen was little

different from Yorster in the columnist's view:
It is not the color of tenants in Chicago that he objects to,
he explains; it is their conduct. (South Africa's new premier
says he doesn't object to blacks either; it's just their general
inferiority. )■*
As the Hew Republic pointed out, desegregation was now moving
from Atlanta and Birmingham to Boston, Detroit, and Chicago.

The

phenomenon of racial housing segregation was nationwide, and its
existence led to a national legal conference on equal opportunity in
housing at Berkeley, California, in 19^5.

The immediate cause of the

conference was California's Proposition 1^, a measure requiring
community approval before any low income housing projects could be
built in that particular community.

The book which resulted from the

conference was entitled Apartheid American Style. The author indicated
that although the United States did not have the systematic laws that
South Africa had, the effect was virtually the same because minority
groups almost without exception found that they did not have free
choice of residence in any part of the nation.

The California bill

had to be viewed in that context, said the author, for "Proposition lU
can only be fully understood if it is seen as the latest in a long
series of devices developed by the real estate industry to support and
develop the American style of apartheid.
South Africa became the vision of the real America, the
brutal, hidden America of the imagination that sometimes emerged from
52

Ibid. (emphasis in original).

"^John H. Denton, Apartheid American Style (Berkeley, 1967),
36.

the psyche and shoved itself to the world as it really was.

Thus

Stanley Kauffmann, after reading Ernest Cole's House of Bondage,
claimed that "the Afrikaners are acting out the unacknowledged dreams
and fantasies of many white Americans.

„5l).

When Ramsey Clark was

Attorney General, he and his aides envisioned the possibility of a
few black militants conspiring together to kill whites simultaneously
in a number of American cities.

Their fear was that this would lead

to immediate wide spread suppression of blacks throughout the country.
Clark said grimly that if this were to happen, then the United States
would more closely resemble South Africa than any other country.^
Every effort had to be made to avert that prospect.

More recently,

an article in the New York Post declared the need to defeat President
Nixon was a moral imperative because Nixon was moving the country ever
closer to a totalitarian police state.

The article found that it was

significant that the only two countries in which the free
press is under attack from its elected government are South
Africa and the U.S.A. It's significant that in both these
countries, the intellectuals, the artists, the "communicators"
and the socially active clergy are considered "enemies of the
regime." There are other parallels, including South Africa's
secret police and controlled courts. I, for one, find the
Nixon Administration frightening.5°
Similarly, a Carolina Symposium debate on busing between Senator Sam
Ervin and constitutional law authority William W. Van Alstyne produced
^ Stanley Kauffmann, "Hue and Cry," New Republic, October 28,
1967) p. 22. Cole's book, a Book-of-the-Month Club selection, con
sisted of pictures which he, a young African, had taken of the condi
tions under which Africans lived in South Africa. Ernest Cole, with
Thomas Flaherty, House of Bondage (New York, 1967).
55
Richard Harris, Justice; The Crisis of Law, Order and
Freedom in America (New York, 1970), 76.
56
New York Post, November 15, 1971, quoted in National Review.
December 3, 1971, p. 1335*
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the statement by Van Alstyne that President Nixon's proposed mora
torium on busing would "lock in apartheid in the neighborhood school
system."
What is the significance of all of this?

In domestic matters,

it is possible that the existence of South Africa's policies and the
fact that they were regarded with almost universal opprobrium served
to encourage a more liberal approach to race relations in the United
States than had previously characterized American views and policies.
The phenomenon of cross-national political linkages has been noted
and discussed by various political scientists, in particular by James
N. Rosenau.-^

Stripping the concept to its essentials and disregarding

distinctions between different types of linkages, the theory is that
events and ideas in one country influence thought and action in
another country.

Political scientists are familiar with the phenome

non, and historians have also from time to time demonstrated the
principle in their writings.

For example, Bernard Bailyn has effec

tively shown that the polemics of English "country" politicians and
publicists influenced profoundly thinking among the American colonists
which ultimately led to the American Revolution. 59
^

Likewise Ernest R.

May has discussed at length how English thinking on colonialism had
an impact in the 1890s on American thought and policies on
-^Durham, North Carolina, Morning Herald, March 31, 1972, p. 1.
^James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in
James N. Rosenau, ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York,
1967)> 26-36. See also the later work he edited, Linkage Politics:
Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New
York, 1969).
59
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts^ 196?), 3^-35.

imperialism.
Examples of cross-national awareness and linkages can be found
between the United States and South Africa over a long period of time,
the impact has been more greatly marked in South Africa than in the
United States simply because there has been a much greater awareness
of America in South Africa, but there can be no doubt that the phe
nomenon has existed for both countries.

In action the effect of the

principle is not to bring about a revolutionary change in an individ
ual's thinking but rather to reinforce, encourage, or substantiate
a preexisting attitude or mode of thought.
Alfred H. Stone, a Mississippi plantation owner and polemicist
for segregation, found justification for his views on race relations
by looking to South Africa.

Stone's book, Studies in the American

Race Problem, showed a great awareness of race policies in South
Africa, which he said he followed with as close attention as the prob
lems confronted nearer home.^

Developments there supported his

"fundamental proposition that the attitude of the so-called AngloSaxon people toward the Negro the world over is essentially the same
tinder similar conditions."
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The parallel developments in the two

regions as well as in other parts of the world convinced him that
segregation was part of a fundamental law of human relations, not a
perverse phenomenon confined to the American South.
^Ernest R. May, American Imperialism:
(New York, 1968}, Chapters VI, VII, IX.

Stone said in

A Speculative Essay

^Alfred H. Stone, Studies in the American Race Problem (New
York, 1908), 322-23.
62Ibid., 6.

essence that the North should not criticize the South for its policies,
for the South was only acting according to universal and immutable
principles— as proved by South Africa.
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Events in South Africa were

discussed to show that the disfranchisement of the black American was
a wise policy, as were other forms of segregation.
If South African segregation may have influenced or justified
American segregation for individuals like Stone, American segrega
tion also had an impact on South African race policies.

Sir George

Campbell, an Englishman, toured the South in 1878 in an effort to
obtain useful information which might aid Eritain in dealing with
the black masses in its southern African colonies.

In the South he

found that social segregation was growing; the implications for
southern Africa were clear when he discovered that a ’'certain friendly
familiarity and association was possible and common . . . when the
6U
parties met on acknowledged terms of superiority and inferiority.”

Maurice S. Evans likewise visited the United States for insight into
dealing with racial problems.

He found the South strikingly similar

to his own South Africa, and that the problem of both was the same.
The South he felt had lessons to teach South Africa.

The Southern

experience convinced him that the Native should not be given the
65
vote in South Africa. '

Similar lessons were learned by a South

African visitor to the United States in the early 1930s, J. E.

63rbid. , U05-U06.

6U
Sir George Campbell, "Black and White in the Southern
States,” Fortnightly Review, XXV (April, 1879), 588-607.
^Maurice g. Evans, Black and White in the Southern States;
A Study of the Race Problem in the United States from a South African
Point of View (London and New York. 1915). 280-83.

Holloway.

He found that prejudice, in the final analysis, had

nothing to do with race or color.

He noted that black Americans were

freely admitted to hotels and theaters in the North until large
numbers of blacks moved into an area, then attitudes hardened,
friction grew, and segregation became the usual solution.

After dis

cussing the development of race riots in Northern cities, he con
cluded :
The Americans, who have followed a policy of assimilation of
Negroes with better conditions for its complete fulfilment
than any nation is ever likely again to have, are as far from
a solution of the problem of social and racial assimilation
as we are in South Africa . . . . The failure of assimilation
in its final stages in America, and the inter-racial bitterness
which the failure is bringing in its wake, is, to my mind,
a serious warning of the danger of pursuing a policy of
assimilation in this country.
Still another South African visitor’s views may have directly
influenced the growth of the apartheid concept.

Two ministers, J. G.

Strydom and Johan Reyneke, made a tour of the Southern states in
1938 to study segregation there.

The visit convinced Strydom that

separate development was the only possible solution to South Africa’s
67
problems. ' Strydom's advocacy of a separation policy played an
important role, according to Rhoodie and Venter, in the growth of an
intellectual rationale for apartheid.

More directly, the Minister of

the Interior made use of the American legislation prohibiting mixed
marriages as an argument for similar legislation in South Africa.

On

flfl

DDJ. E. Holloway, American Negroes and South African Bantu
(.Pretoria, 1932), 25-26. Holloway later became the South African
Ambassador to the United States.
^N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid: A Sociohlstorical Exposition of the Origin and Development of the Apartheid
I d e a CCape Town ancT Pretoria, I960). 162 .
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May 25, 19^9, he told the House of Assembly:
Look at the experience of other countries in this 'very same
sphere of mixed marriages. Is it not something for the other
side to think about that in thirty out of the forty-eight
States of the United States they have legislation on similar
lines to this? Is that not an argument to show that it is
no reason for discarding such legislation, because it is
not so effective as one would like it to be? I take it the
difficulty is as great there as it is here, but thirty states
have decided on legislation on these lines; thirty states
have found it necessary to take legislative steps to keep
down this social evil. And let me remind hon. members that
the numerical position in the United States of America, in
those thirty states is not a half or a quarter so serious
as the position in South Africa.
In more recent years American racial disorders and rioting have
served as additional justification for apartheid.

69

Many more ex

amples of this phenomenon at work in South Africa, encouraging both
conservatism and liberalism in race questions, could be cited but
that is beyond the scope of the present study.
In a sense, most of this chapter has been devoted to demon
strating how South Africa may have encouraged greater liberalism in
the United States.

Each time that a writer compared apartheid in

South Africa with segregation in the United States, it was with the
purpose of showing what the United States should not be like.
68

^
South Africa, House of Assembly Debates. vol. 68, col. 61+93
(May 25, 19^9).
69
^Even very liberal white South Africans had reservation about
integration because of the American experience. Denis Cowen, a noted
law professor at the University of Cape Town, told an audience at
Cornell's law school that "when I see the travail of the United States
in making integration a reality, and when I think of the different
proportions of the South African population, I am almost tempted to
believe that total partition or separation might be the only way of
establishing peaceful race relations in South Africa, despite my own
strong preference for the way of integration." Denis Cowen, "Cry, the
Divided Country," Hew York Times Magazine, May 17, 1959, p. 75. See
also A. S. Mathews, Law, Order and Liberty in South Africa (Cape Town,
1971), 309.

Beferences to South Africa were made to encourage Americans to follow
or continue on a different course of action.

A striking example of

the phenomenon was furnished by a Christian Century editorial on the
195^ American school desegregation decision.

The magazine was strong

ly opposed to letting the parochial schools in the South become segre
gation academies.

It warned that to allow this to come about

would make the church the last bulwark of racism in a society
which is rapidly moving toward integration. It would bring
Christianity into discredit in the United States in exactly
the way it is being compromised in South Africa. It would
Invite the terrible judgment of racial strife which is hanging
over that continent.
Beviewing the provisions of some of the segregation legislation in
South Africa5 the New York Times said that South Africa "may be a
lesson to us as we try to make headway against segregation, bias, and
prejudice in this country . . . . If we are rightfully shocked by
what is happening in South Africa we must be more than ever determined
that no part of it can ever happen here."^
The mere fact that news items appeared in the press and else
where on South Africa's racial problems may have drawn more attention
to American race problems.^

A writer in This Week magazine took note

^"The Desegregation Decision," Christian Century. June 15,
1955, PP. 702-703.
71

New York Times, May 27, 1957, p. 30. A few months later
Christian Century similarly declared that South Africa was "a standing
object lesson in how not to do things. For us the answer to this ne
gation of human rights must be the positive pursuit of integration in
all aspects of our common life," "Using the Human Gauge," Christian
Century. October 9, 1957, pp. 1191-92.
72
1 Beading through the materials on South Africa in American
publications, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that South
Africa was used to indicate criticism of the United States indirectly.
For example, the New Republic would sandwich editorials on South
Africa between similar ones on American racial injustices. See New
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of this in 1950 in a discussion of Alan Paton's Cry the Beloved Country
and the opening of a Broadway musical "based on it, Lost in the Stars.
He stated that Paton’s story was immensely popular and that it had
"made Americans understand something of what life is like for the
11,000,000 people of many races and origins in South Africa.

And as

they have set the hook down or walked away from the theater, they have
felt a hit more conscious of our own problem over here .

.

.

.

An

article in Time on apartheid led a reader to call for more liberal
American laws:
I am struck by too many unhappy similarities in attitude between
white South Africans and Americans. I hope that with the aid of
enlightened governmental legislation within the next generation,
I shall never again hear statements similar to the one made by a
four-year old neighborhood child to the effect that she is glad
not to be colored because "Negroes aren't people!"7^
Allard Lowenstein, who later became a Congressman, wrote in his
book, Brutal Mandate, that the fact "that each new racial atrocity in
the United States encourages South Africa's misbehavior should provide

Republic. December 31, 1951» p. 7. Time placed a critical article on
the Bantu Education Act just before one on Georgia's resolution to
revoke for life the license of any teacher who in any way supported
teaching integrated classes. Time, August 15, 1955, pp. 28, 30. See
also Christian Century, April 8 , 1953, pp.
^Howard Young, "Dixie in South Africa," This Week, February
26 , 1959, reprinted in Negro Dipest, VIII (June, i950")"j" 29-31 • Paton's
novel was very popular In the United States; by 1968 the book alone had
sold more than 1.2 million copies, according to statistics provided
by the publisher, Charles Scribner's Sonsj Theodora Poulos to author,
October 30, 1969. The novel and the play reached millions of other
Americans after being made into a motion picture. Although Cry the
Beloved Country was probably the single greatest source of information
for most Americans about South Africa, it did not suggest that it was
important that the United States take any action against South Africa,
Rather, its effect seems to have been simply to increase American
awareness of race problems in both the United States and South Africa,
^Letter of Fredi Hubler from Old Tappan, New Jersey, to the
editor, Time, September 2, 1966, p. 6,
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added incentive— as if any should be needed— to speed progress at
home."^5

Attorney General Ramsey Clark's fear of the United States

becoming like South Africa encouraged him further to take steps to
avoid the possibility.

Although there is as yet little to support

it, it seems possible that South African apartheid at least indirectly
influenced Brown v. Board of Education. The United Nations had dis
cussed racial segregation in South Africa since 19h6 and the General
Assembly had gone so far as to resolve in 1950 that racial segrega
tion was necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination.

If

this meant then that South Africa stood in violation of Article 55
of the United Nations Charter, presumably so too did the United States.
It was obvious to some people that if the United States did not bring
its domestic policies in line with the United Nations declarations on
South Africa, the United States could be very embarrassed,
A more direct influence of South Africa on American policies
can be seen in several of the opinions of Justice William 0. Douglas
in cases involving American civil rights questions.

Holding up South

Africa's policies as the very epitome of evil, Douglas argued in two
"sit-in" cases that the United States must not accept apartheid,

"When

the doors of a business are open to the public," he said, "they must
be open to all regardless of race if apartheid is not to become in
grained in our public places."

Apartheid, he went on, was "foreign to

"^Allard K. Lowenstein, Brutal Mandate:
West Africa (New York, 1962), 22^.
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A Journey to South

See, for example, the petition to the United Nations by the
Civil Rights Congress, William L. Patterson, ed., We Charge Genocide
(New York, 1951), xiii, 38-39; "South Africa Challenged,' Nation,
August IT, 19^-6, p. 172.
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our constitution."77

jn another case he asked why "should apartheid

he given constitutional sanction in the restaurant field?"

He feared

that to allow private companies to discriminate would he "fastening
apartheid on America."^

No douht Mr. Justice Douglas would have

cast his vote the way he did even if he had never heard of South
Africa; nonetheless, the vision of evil in South Africa reinforced his
views and gave at least rhetorical strength to his argument.
What has been discussed thus far is how South Africa's policies
may have stimulated the white conscience in America to do something
more about American segregation.

The extent of the influence was not

very great, hut it was at least one factor among many others at work.
Black Americans also equated South African apartheid with American
segregation, and the effect of this was probably to encourage greater
militancy among some.
Black Americans have seldom argued that conditions for the
black man were better in the United States than in South Africa.
Rather the American South and South Africa were both examples of white
racism, and the two were generally associated together in any writing
on South Africa.

This can be found in some of the earliest issues of

the publication of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, the Crisis, which began in November

1910.

A report

in 1913, for example, stated that the
Union of South Africa, in imitation of the United States, and
especially the southern section thereof, having decreed that a
white skin is always to be the sine qua non to the realities
expressed by the hifeh-sounding phrases about "life, liberty

^ Lombard v. Louisiana. 373 U.S. 267, 28l, 283 (1962).
7QBell v. Maryland, 328 U.S. 226, 25^, 271 (196U),
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and the pursuit of happiness," has been so Industriously
pointing to the black man the way to become white that the
government ofthe South African Union has had to make a special
investigation of the so-called black peril . . . .79
Another article, this one by a black South African, was entitled
"James Crow in Africa," and was preceded by the statement of the
editors that the story showed "the almost dead parallel between ,}im~
crow methods in South Africa and America, even to the attempts of
native African 'leaders' (even as some American Negro ’leaders’) to
persuade their brothers to accept a segregated colony."

80

The same

author, Jameson G. Coka, had another article on political segregation
the

next year and it was preceded by a similar statement: "American

Negroes should recognize easily the situation described by Mr. Coka
and the pronouncements of South African whites, for the same political
philosophy, with but few exceptions, holds away in Dixie."

fil

Other black publications likewise equated the United States
and South Africa.

An article by Ernest Cole was printed in Ebony

together with pictures from his book House of Bondage; Cole stated that
the pictures would show why he felt somewhat at home in the United
Dp
States. c

A letter to Ebony said that the article and the photographs

brought to me a startling revelation of the inhuman conditions
perpetrated by South Africa's racist minority white regime. The

^"Foreign:

South Africa," Crisis, VI (September, 1913), 231.

80
Jameson G. Coka, "James Crow in South Africa," Crisis, XLI
(September, 1 9 3 M , 267. For linkages between black Americans and
black South Africans, see Peter Walshe, "Black American Thought and
African Political Thought in South Africa," Review of Politics. XXXII
(January, 1970), 51-778l
Jameson G. Coka, "Political Segregation in South Africa,"
Crisis, XLII (September, 1935), 266.
^Ernest Cole, "My Country, My Hell," Ebony, XXIII (February,
1968), 69.

similarity is quite evident in America's racist attitude toward
her "black minority. Who is the carbon copy of whom?®3
One of the chapters in South of Freedom, by the black
Rowan, was entitled

"Apologies to South Africa."

journalist Carl
Whythe apologies?

Because he found that Birmingham, Alabama, and not Johannesburg or
Cape Town, was the world's most race-conscious city.

8U

American civil

rights leader James Farmer described how on his visit to Africa
people repeatedly asked him what the difference
and American segregation.

was between apartheid

He attempted to explain that segregation

was not official policy in the United States as it was in South
Africa.

He was himself not convinced that there was a great distinc

tion and commented that those with wham he talked "were not particular
ly impressed by the argument, but then most of the people I know in
Be

Mississippi aren't impressed by it either," ^

The antipathy that

most black Americans felt toward South Africa was indicated by Rayford
Logan's statement that an "increasing number of American Negroes [were
becoming] more hostile to the Union of South Africa than to any part
of the world except the state of Mississippi."
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^Letter of W. C. Jones and C. L. Billings from Chicago, to
the editor, Ebony, XXIII (April, 1968), 20.
^Carl T. Rowan, South of Freedom (New York, 1952), 158.
Qr

James Farmer, Freedom-When? (New York, 1965), 1U2. The
Black Muslim leader, Malcolm X, told a British audience in 1961* that
there was no difference between American segregation and South African
apartheid, Cecil Northcutt, "Mission to South Afriea," Christian
Century, December 16 , 1961*, p. 1550; New York Times. August 23, 196U,
p. 8&. And Ralph Bunche was quoted in 1967 as declaring: "The
ghettos in America are like the reserves in South Africa." "The Negro
in America," Newsweek, November 20, 1967* p. 39.

86
Rayford W. Logan, "The American Negro's View of Africa," in
John A. Davis, ed., Africa Seen by American Negroes (Dijon, 1958), 221.

The way in which knowledge of South African apartheid may
have influenced black action on civil rights matters in the United
States was indicated by the reaction of one reader of Ebony to an
article there by a Coloured South African.

After reading Peter

Abraham's discussion of the effects of the Bantu Education Act, a man
from Pittsburgh wrote:

"Think of what it would mean to those black

peoples today if the Negroes here in America commanded such power and
respect that we could demand such an injustice not be allowed to pass
undone.
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Of a more direct effect on black Americans were the events

surrounding the killing of sixty-nine Africans in Sharpevllle in
March i960. Following the shootings, the regional director for the
NAACP in Atlanta, Georgia, told a reporter that "more and more of our
people are talking about South Africa and relating what is happening
there to their own situation."

88

An incident more grimly indicating

the influence of the Sharpevllle events took place in Portland, Oregon
on April 3, i960. On that date, three blacks assaulted several whites
killing one of the whites.

The blacks told that they had been reading

about both South Africa and the American South and had wanted to do
something about it. 89

Indeed, Sharpeville taught some blacks the

^Letter of Robert E. Butler from Pittsburgh, to the editor,
Ebony, X (July, 1955), 6.

88Ruby Harley, quoted in "South Africa:

Showdown Comes,"

Business Week. April 9, I960, p. 29.
®^McKay, Africa in World Politics, U05. In Philadelphia at
about the same time, a white boy was stabbed to death by a gang of
twelve black youths. The city's mayor, Richardson Dilworth, partly
attributed the murder to Sharpeville, stating that the "shooting of
NegroeB in South African race riots and the arrest of American Negroes
demonstrating against discrimination at lunch counters in the southern
states have their effects In Philadelphia." Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin. March 2h , i960, p. 3 [the quotation is a paraphrase of the
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folly of using nonviolent means to seek Justice from the white man.
One of the letters of Angela Davis to George Jackson clearly showed
this.

The black revolutionary wrote:

Above all, we do not want
cerning nonviolence: the
thousands machine-gunned,
apartheid, nonviolently.
suicide.90

to repeat past errors . . . . Con
specter of Sharpevllle, South Africa-—
kneeling in the streets, protesting
Nonviolence . . . is a philosophy of

The similarities between the United States and South Africa
were also important because this had significance for American foreign
policy.

People both in the United States and abroad felt that apart

heid had much in common with American segregation.

When American race

relations worsened in the latter part of the 1950s, it could be said
of the United States, Just as Alan Paton had said of South Africa, "the
world looks at us in astonishment, wondering what madness has possessed
u s . ’'9-1-

In the eyes of the world there were two men on the cliff, both

the United States and South Africa.

Many Americans were concerned

about their image abroad and wanted the world to know that they were
opposed to racism.

The United States government felt it had to make

it clear that the country opposed segregation.

But in the dialogue

between the world and the United States the world could challenge
American sincerity by pointing to American failure to oppose apartheid
in South Africa.

A country without race problems could say that it

did not condemn apartheid because it was an internal matter within

Mayor’s remarks by the newspaper].
^Quoted in "Trials:
8 , 1972, p. 38.
91

T^rom Angela With Love," Newsweek, May

Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow
(.2nd rev. ed.; New X&Rk, 1966), 122.

South Africa's own Jurisdiction.

But the United States was open to

the charge that it failed to say anything because it really was not
committed to ending segregation and was still infected with racist
notions.

So there was considerable incentive, both at home and

abroad, for the United States to try to disassociate itself from the
other "man on the cliff."

CHAPTER III
THE NEW AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN RACE WAR

If worsening American race relations provided an argument for
a more critical policy toward South Africa, that argument was strength
ened by an apparent increase in the importance of Africa to the United
States and by a widespread belief in the imminence of a racial blood
bath in South Africa.

The way in which these latter two developments

came together was indicated in an article in Commonweal in 1955 which
stated:
Africa today stands before the Gates of Destiny, the keys of
which are held by Mr, Strijdom. These could open to a glorious
future of progressive endeavor, but in the implement of
Apartheid they may prove to be the Gates of Hell, leading to
a conflagration of hate and bloody revenge. In its atavistic
urge to savagery, such an outbreak could not only engulf
the Union of South Africa but sweep through the whole con
tinent, utterly destroying a century of civilizing.1
For many years observers of South Africa in the United States and
elsewhere have predicted the outbreak of a violent and bloody race war
in South Africa.^

A crisis in South Africa in i960 following a

■*\D. C. Johnstone, "Diamonds and Fear: The Afrikander, Unseeing,
Uncomprehending, Holds in His Hands the Future Civilization in Africa,"
Commonweal, March 11, 1955, p. 599.
^See Martin Legassick, "Guerrilla Warfare in Southern Africa,"
in Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, eds., The Africa Reader (2 vols.;
New York, 1970}, II, 381: "Hardly a book has appeared on South Africa
in recent years which does not predict the inevitability, or strong
likelihood, of a violent confrontation between the white minority and
the oppressed African majority; a confrontation usually described as
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violent incident at the police station at Sharpeville, a town near
Johannesburg, made many Americans believe the war had entered its
first stages.

This crisis occurred at the same time that numerous

African countries were becoming politically independent,

Americans

thought it important that the new countries should not come under the
influence of communism, but South Africa seemed to pose a threat to
these countries and to American Interests in them.
The race war thesis resulted from a combination of simple
mathematics and elementary political wisdom.
follows.

The reasoning was as

Blacks outnumbered whites in South Africa four to one;

numerical strength was overwhelmingly with the former.

Like all men,

the blacks deeply resented segregation and the denial of their rights.
When men are denied their rights, they rise up in revolt, seize the
powers of the state, and restore rights to themselves.

Since segrega

tion and the denial of rights was increasing rather than decreasing in
South Africa, a bloody race war was inevitable.

Added to this analysis

was the feeling that evil is visited with retribution; the wages of
sin is death.

In much this spirit, the New York Times declared that

the 1953 election which increased the Nationalists' strength was a
"Victory for Evil," and stated:
That the vastly outnumbered white man has a practical problem
of enormous difficulty and complexity in South Africa is not
denied, but that it should be rationalized into the monstrous
doctrine of racism is wicked. Therefore, there will be a day
of reckoning for these men, since human beings will not endure
a 'bloodbath,' but which would lead to African rule." Making the same
point but coming to a different conclusion from Legassick about the
inevitability of the blood bath is Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial
Domination (Berkeley, 1971), 13-15*

injustice and the loss of freedom interminably.

3

The predictions of the inevitable war began years before
apartheid became a word in the international vocabulary, but they be
came more widespread when the Nationalists began the implementation of
their race policies.

k

Apartheid would, it seemed obvious, only

exacerbate the existing tension and racial friction.'*

Observers

looking to events in South Africa for confirmation of the dire pre
dictions found substantiation.
Just a year after the Nationalists had taken office, race
riots occurred in Durban, a coastal city with a large Indian popula
tion.

Several hundred people were killed, and millions of dollars

worth of damage done to property.

The rioting by the Africans was

directed, however, at the Indians and not at the whites of Durban.
How was this to be explained?

Since both the Indians and the Africans

had been subjected to apartheid, it would have seemed that they would
be making common cause against the whites.

The interpretations had to

fit in with the image of black-white conflict; thus, it was generally
concluded that the Africans were venting their frustrations against
the whites and apartheid by turning upon the Indians.

The Africans

did this because the Indians were unable to retaliate but still were a
more privileged group than the Africans.

Life took this position,

^New York Times, April 17, 1953, p. 2h.
^See, for example, Christian Century which thought in 19^^
that the racial situation was moving rapidly to the breaking point.
"Racial Tension Growing in South Africa," Christian Century, December
6 , 19U, p. 1403,
^"Political Power in South Africa," Nation, June 5, 19^8, pp.

617-18.

stating:

"Fearing the whites, Durban's Zulus had struck blindly at

the more vulnerable Indians.

The Nation even hinted darkly that the

whites had encouraged the African rebellion against the Indians:
"There is good reason to believe that much of the hostility between
these two unfortunate groups was deliberately fanned by their over
lords , who dread the Negro masses and who have a score to settle with
the Indians for bringing South Africa's condition to the attention of
the United Nations.
Incidents continued to occur throughout the 1950s which re
inforced the theme of conflict and provided the basis for predictions
of the coming holocaust.

The forecasts of violence appeared in all the

major news magazines and in the reports of traveling journalists.

Many

people believed that the Passive Resistance Campaign of 1952, supported
by leaders of the African National Congress and the South African
Indian Congress, would erupt in violence.

Time announced that the

"restless and politically awakening Negroes" had scheduled nationwide
demonstrations\ it stated that "the possibility of civil war hovered
over South Africa, and a desperate decision faced Daniel Francois
Q
Malan, who had sown the whirlwind."
The government put about eight

^"South African Racial Hatreds Erupt in Riots," Life, February

7, 19^9, P. 27.
^Editorial, Nation, January 29, 19^9, pp. 11^-15. The
Christian Century also suspected that government agents provoked the
rioting. "South Africa's Race Riots a Warning," Christian Century,
February 2, 19^9, p. 132.
Q
"Reaping the Whirlwind," Time, March 31, 1952, pp. 37-38. See
also C. L, Sulzberger's report in the New York Times, January 21, 1953,
p, 7, and Sulzberger's diary in C. L, Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles
Memoirs and Diaries 193^-195^ (New York, 1969}, 822. The diary entry
seems to indicate that the explosion in South Africa would come later
than suggested by the newspaper report.
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thousand of the protestors in jail, and no civil war qxupjted.

A

visiting American journalist, Eobert St. John, felt that instead of
quelling revolt, the government's action encouraged revolution:

"By-

listing and banning and hog-tying the . . . men of moderation, Malan
9
was inviting the bloodbath everyone feared."
Oden Meeker, another
American writer, discussed the defiance campaign in his Report on
Africa. He praised the leaders for remaining non-violent, but he re
peated the warning in Paton's Cry, the Beloved Country that when the
whites some day turn to loving, they will find that the blacks have
turned to hating.'*'^
Many other reports of events also emphasized conflict in South
Africa.

Rioting at an African beer hall was seen to have been caused

by apartheid.

The killing of a nun by Africans, and the eating of her

flesh by her murderers, also demonstrated the race hatred that apartheid
was breeding.-*"** A bus boycott in 1956 by Africans that was accompanied
by noting received attention in the American press.

12

Relocation of

African families from the slums around Johannesburg to government-built
housing led to some incidents of violence in the mid-1950s.
reported one such moving under the headline "South Africa:
Showdown."

The lead sentence of the story was:

Newsweek
Racial

"The fuse of racial

^Robert St. John, Through Malan's Africa (New York, 195*0, 298.
■*-^0den Meeker, Report on Africa (New York, 195*+), 260-68.
11
Indicating how far some Americans would go to present the
Africans in a favorable light, one writer commented on this act of
cannibalism that it represented "admiration for the victim because it
express[ed] a desire to absorb the spirit of the fallen one." John
Considine, Africa, World of New Men (New York, 195*+), 271.

1^E.g., "The Commuter^," Time, July 9, 1956, p. 26.

hatred burned shorter in South Africa last week.

1 *3

Harold Issacs,

an American journalist and political scientist, gave the following
statement on conditions in South Africa in a 1953 report:
With the police under orders to shoot first and investigate
afterward, killings, riots, and pillage have occurred.when
ever trivial incidents have fanned into quick flame the
highly combustible accumulation of fear, terror, and des
peration on both sides.
Over and over such stories as these appeared in the major news media,
each reinforcing the predictions of coming massive violence.

The

forces of racial conflict were, as the Christian Century expressed it
IS
"driving implacably toward national doom."
The conflict in South Africa came to be perceived by American
observers as having importance to the United States for several rea
sons.

One of these was that apartheid and racial friction could en

courage communism within South Africa.
victory in 19W

Soon after the Nationalist

the New Eepublic said that the denial of rights to

Africans would create a situation that was "tailor-made for Moscow
propaganda."

l6

Newsweek featured a story in 1955 on Soviet plans for

world conquest and indicated that the opponents of apartheid in South
Africa would be given full support by the Kremlin."^
■^"South Africa:
1956, pp. kk, k'f.

America, which

Racial Showdown," Newsweek, September 10,

ik

Harold R. Isaacs, "The Dismal Annals of South African In
tolerance," Reporter, January 6, 1953, p. 37.
1^"Tragic South Africa," Christian Century, June 22, 1955, pp
726-27.
"South Africa Turns Backward," New Republic, July 5, 19^8,
p. 9.
^"The Route of Conquest," Newsweek, November 28, 1955» p. 5^
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was critical of the Bantu Education Act because it cut off subsidies
to parochial schools, warned that "unless a genuine Christianity can
fill the moral vacuum [created by the secularization of the schools],
id
it will be filled by a fanatic nationalism or communism."

Another

writer asserted that South Africa's Suppression of Communism Act was
forcing well-meaning liberals into the arms of communism. 19
Conflict in South Africa appeared to be important to the United
States also because it seemed to threaten other parts of Africa.

As

colonial powers relinquished their authority in Africa and new coun
tries appeared throughout the continent, .American interest in Africa
increased greatly.

Americans felt they had a special relationship with

Africa and were intensely optimistic about the future of the new states.
However, it was feared by many observers that South Africa's racial
conflict could have disastrous consequences for Africa and for Ameri
can interests in Africa.
The new American interest in Africa was reflected in many ways
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The articles and issues of period

icals devoted to Africa grew in number.

Foreign policy organizations

turned their attention to African issues, and new Africa-oriented
organizations were formed. 20

African studies programs were instituted

■^"Apartheid Hits the Schools," America, February 12, 1955, p.
U99. See also ’^Biack Extremists in South Africa," America, February
27, 195k, pp. 551-52.
■^John Scott, "Last Chance in Africa:
Atlantic, CCIII (April, 1959), 92.

An American View,"

20
A partial listing of such organizations by Vernon McKay in
1963 included the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy
Association, the African-American Institute, the African Studies
Association, the American Society of African Culture, the Africa
League, the Africa Research Foundation, the African Service Institute,

at major American universities.*^

The State Department in 1958

created a Bureau of African Affairs and the office of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

PP

President Kennedy stressed the

importance he attached to Africa hy announcing the appointment of G.
Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
before any other State Department appointments.

23

The New Republic

reflected on the new "climate of opinion" on Africa in i960 in a
passage that bears quoting at length:
The new African-consciousness in the US begins at the grass
roots; i960 has been named "Africa year" in American churches,
and every Sunday School class and Ladies Aid circle from Pine
Creek, Oregon, to Eagle Creek, Maine, has been conscientiously
holding study sessions on the political situations below the
Sahara. Congressmen’s offices have been flooded with requests
for data on the awakening continent. These discussions are
augmented by materials received by local churches from their
missionaries, who convey an image of Africans as individuals
with aspirations comparable to those of anybody else.
The over-familiar stereotype of African nationalists as
potential Mau Maus has been broken down by the appearance on
American television this year of such impressive leaders as
Tom Mboya and Julius Nyerere— whose cultured British accents,
remarkable social presence, and obvious intellectuality have
relieved thousands of viewer-voters of many of their anxieties
about post-independence Africa. American magazines have been
outdoing each other to bring out bigger and better "special
issues" on Africa. This is one case, then, where public opinion

the African-American Students Foundation, the Foundation for All
Africa, and the American Committee on Africa. Vernon McKay, Africa
in World Politics (New York, 1963), 253-51**
21

Ford Foundation, Report of the Committee on African Studies
(New York, 1958), 6; "African Studies Programs in US Universities,"
Africa Report, IX (October, 196H), 40.
^ V e r n o n McKay, "The African Operations of the United States
Government," in Walter Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa
(rev. ed.; New York, 1963), 273-75*

23
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days:
Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1967)» 511-12•

John F.

95

i8 very nearly abreast of the experts in recognizing that
Africa deserves an independent American appraisal.^
In the great outpouring of literature on Africa that accompa
nied this strong interest, there was a new image of Africa.

Americans

writing on Africa knew that they were dealing with a dramatic new
force in world affairs.

They struggled to reject older images of

Africa— images of savage natives in primordial rain forests and
jungles— and to replace them with an image which would better fit the
post-colonial era.

In the new image, the Africans were a progressive,

democratic people.

Now that colonialism was ended, the great weight

holding the Africans down had been removed and they could unite to
confront the tasks before them.

It seemed that they were creating a

new civilization on a pristine continent where the beauty of nature
remained unviolated, and that they would avoid the excesses of commercialism and industrialism that had characterized Western development.

25

The new image of Africa was significant not only because it
made South Africa appear all the more backward and foolish in its
fears, but also because Americans believed the "new" Africa to be very
important to the United States.

The economic and strategic importance

of Africa were asserted by Rupert Emerson, a Harvard political scien
tist and former government official, in the American Assembly’s

^"Censure of South Africa," New Republic, April 4, i960, pp.

4-525

See, for examples, Gonsidine, Africa:

World of New M e n ,

54-56; John Hughes, The New Face of Africa (New York, 19^1), 1-5;
Thomas Patrick Melady, Paces of Africa (New York, 1964), 1-6. For
criticisms of the "conventional wisdom" of the 1960s on Africa, see
Stanislav Andreski, The African Predicament (London, 1968), 13-14; and
Russell Warren Howe, The African Revolution (London, 1968), 25, 39-40.
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collection of essays on The United States and Africa:
The stake of the West and of the United States in Africa is
great. Negatively, the primary concern is to ensure that the
Communist "bloc secures neither the prestige nor the material
gains that would flow from enlisting Africa, or any substan
tial part thereof, in its camp. Strategically, the vital
importance of North Africa to Europe was demonstrated in
World War II, and Dakar, offering potential command over
South Atlantic shipping lanes, juts out as the nearest
point for an invasion of the Western hemisphere. . . . To
a crowded Europe, Africa holds the promise of a frontier
land still susceptible of great expansion, both as a market
and as a source of raw materials, plus an almost unexplored
industrial potential.
Its riches in strategic and other
minerals are impressive.
In industrial diamonds, columbium,
cobalt, chromium, and berylium, Africa either heads the
list of world producers or stands close to the top*, it is
a significant producer of tin, manganese, copper and anti
mony; and its large reserves of iron ore and bauxite are
just beginning to be tapped.^6
Newsweek called Africa "the richest prize on earth.
Africa also seemed important to the United States because to
some Americans Africa was a test of the American character.

For many

generations Americans had held themselves up as a nation of revolu
tionaries , men and women dedicated to the cause of human freedom every
where.

How real could this claim seem in the postwar world, when the

United States was proving itself committed to the status quo in coun
try after country?

Communism now claimed to be representative of the

revolutionary spirit that was so much a cherished part of the American
heritage.

The United States had already lost Asia; it had made a

26Rupert Emerson, "The Character of American Interests in
Africa," in Goldschmidt, ed., pie United States and Africa, 28-29.
See also, Bichard L. Conolly, Africa's Strategic Significance," In
C. Grove Haines, ed., Africa Today (Baltimore, 1955), 55-63; and
Kenneth T. Young, J r . , "New Politics in New States," Foreign Affairs,
XXXIX (April, 1961), 503.
^"Colonialism:

31, 1955, p. U6 .

The West's New Challenge," Newsweek, October
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sorry record for itself in Latin America; commitments in Europe had
forced it into an uneasy complicity in the policies of the colonial
powers with possessions in Africa.

Now, with Africa coming to inde

pendence, it seemed that the United States had one last opportunity
to demonstrate its continuing commitment to all that it said was its
heritage.

Africa was America's challenge to prove to itself and to

the world that it was in reality what it claimed to be.

Americans be

lieved they had a special identification with Africa because ten per
cent of the American people were from Africa and because Americans and
Africans shared the same ideals, the same revolutionary spirit and
purpose.

Over and over this appeared in writings on Africa.
Chester Bowles, whose views on South Africa have already been

mentioned, said that Africa's anti-colonial revolution was based on
"our traditionally American principles."

He felt that, because of the

revolutionary origins of the United States, "we have a clear moral,
ideological, and— one might say— historical responsibility to play a
constructive role in Africa or repudiate one of the most basic elements
in our American history."

Adlai Stevenson similarly asserted that

it was up to the West to determine whether the future of Africa, "the
most innocent of all the continents," would be good or evil.
Stevenson said that "what is being tested is, in the last analysis, the
moral capacities of our s o c i e t y . A writer in the Christian Science

28

Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America (Berkeley and
Los Angeles, 1957), vii, l’
oS.

29

Adlai Stevenson, "The New Africa: A (Juide and a Proposal,"
Harpers, CCXX (May, i960), 5^. See also W. Averill Harriman, "What
the Africans Expect of Us," New York Times Magazine, October 9, I960,
p p . 21, 116-17•
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Monitor thought that "the United States should he uniquely equipped
to understand African problems and aspirations— having in its early
years faced many of the same."30
If Africa's new countries appeared to hold a promise and
challenge for the United States, South Africa seemed to pose a threat
to American interests in several different ways.

To begin with, South

Africa's continued existence as an apparent vestige of colonialism
stood as an obstacle to good relations between the United States and
the rest of Africa.

The United States, many felt, could not maintain

normal relations with South Africa and still expect other African
countries to be friendly toward the United States.

Rupert Emerson

asked if the United States "looks the other way when South Africa
elbows its African majority aside, can it expect better than a suspi
cious neutrality when it seeks to rally Africa's people to the free
world's standards?

31

He felt that Africa had yet to be convinced that

the American concern for freedom and equality embraced the black man
as well as the white.

Similarly an article in Africa Today arguing

for a stronger American policy on South Africa said that the "great
significance of Southern Africa for us lies in the fact that it in
volves issues of racial and political justice so stark and so closely
related to our own greatest shortcomings that our failure to respond
adequately raises doubts about the sincerity of our avowed commitments,
Op
at home as well as abroad."
Thus South Africa stood in the way of

^°Christian Science Monitor. April 8 ,I960, p. 2k.
-^"Emerson, "The Character of American Interests in Africa," 35.

32

John jMarcum, "Southern Africa and United States Policy: A
Consideration of Alternatives," Africa Today, XTV (October, 19&7)> 12-13.
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convincing Africans that the United States really did "believe in human
freedom; and if Africans could not "be convinced of this, it was feared
they might choose communism over democracy.
A more direct threat to Africa seemed to arise from the threat
of a race war originating in South Africa.

A special issue of Life

magazine in 1953 pointed out the dangers to Africa which South Africa
posed.

One article said that apartheid was turning the blacks of South

Africa into a cruel and bitter people, and it raised the possibility
that
these aroused Negroes, linking hands with their brothers all
over the continent, may yet blow all hopes for Africa skyhigh. There is still time to avert this, but not too much
time. In Africa, both white and black stand at a fateful
crossroads. Working together, they can pass from darkness
to light. If they clash, Africa will pass back into jungle
night.33
A Foreign Policy Association pamphlet in 1952 said that any aggressive
action by South Africa in the event of a war between the West and
communism would arouse concerted African resistance "and automatically
create in Africa a major ally for the Communist foe.

Chester

Bowles feared that a racial explosion in South Africa would "turn
much of Africa against the white man, create new tensions in Asia and
hasten the swing to Communism throughout the world." 35

Newsweek

spelled out the threat to American interests even more starkly and
graphically than did Bowles in this special "box" from a feature story
^ A l e x a n d e r Campbell, "Africa: A Continent in Ferment," Life,
May U, 1953, p. 10.
3U
Harold R. Isaacs and Emory Ross, Africa: New Crises in the
Making, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No. 91 (New York,
1952)7 55.

■^Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America, 66-67.
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on South Africa:
Powder Keg;- Seasons Why
The Problem; The Determination of Prime Minister Strijdom
and his South African Government to enforce total segregation of
12 million blacks, impose complete control by 2.8 million whites.
The Danger: Strijdom's policies could touch off an African
explosion which would lay the continent's vast untapped wealth
and human resources open to Red ambitions.
The Stakes: South Africa is the free world's largest uranium
producer, source of U0 per cent of its gold, ll+ per cent of its
diamonds. Ultimately in the balance are the loyalties of all
Africa's 210 million people; its natural resources which now
supply the U.S. with 60 per cent of its cobalt (jet engines,
super-hardened steel); 36 per cent of its chrome (steel alloys
and platings); and 35 per cent of its manganese (alloys for
aircraft components).3°
The Seattle Times similarly saw South Africa as aiding communism in
Africa.

It put South Africa and the Soviet Union in the same category,

stating that the policies of both were exacerbating the political
atmosphere throughout Africa.

Apartheid, it said, "can be compared
*3*7

to tightening the lid on a steaming teakettle."

Still other Ameri

cans took the view that South Africa was so great an affront to the
rest of Africa that the work of nation-building could not progress
until white domination was ended there, or that the Africans of the
new countries would invade South Africa to end apartheid.

38

South Africa's threat seemed to some Americans to extend even
beyond the African continent.

As early as 19^8, the Christian Century

warned that "the storm that will eventually burst over South Africa
36

"African Showdown," Newsweek, July 2, 1956, p. 33.

37

Seattle Times, February 27, 1959 (clipping provided to the
author by the newspaper).
^"Double Game in Africa," America, July 6, 1963, p.
G.
Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1969),
2k, 205.
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is not likely to "blow itself out until it has loosed a cloudburst of
blood over that continent, and over most of the other continents. h 39
^
Malcolm Ross, the former chairman of the Fair Employment Practices
Commission, told a 1951 conference in New York that violent conflict
in South Africa "would harm race relations all over the world.
Communists would be the only ones to benefit,"^

Such fears increased

after a series of events in i960 made a race war seem inevitable and
imminent.
No one knows for sure exactly what happened outside the
Sharpeville police station that Monday afternoon, March 21, i960.
The guns spoke only briefly, and many of the demonstrators at the
back of the crowd did not even hear them at first.
day was over, the whole world had heard them.

But before the

Had the Africans thrown

stones and begun an attack on the police station, or had they been
protesting peacefully, waving their hated passes?

Had the gunfire

been started by a nervous and inexperienced young policeman, or had
it been a callous massacre, a premediated plan to show Africans that
they should not attempt further protests?

The result was the same

regardless: sixty-nine Africans were dead and over two hundred lay
wounded.

Whatever actually took place within the crowd and the ranks

of the police, the nationwide anti-pass campaign organized by the
newly-formed Pan African Congress and its dreadful yield outside the

^"South Africa's Witches' Brew," Christian Century, November
10, 19^8 , pp. 1198-99.
ilO
Malcolm Ross, "Emotional Aspects of the Civil Rights Issue,"
in Iyman Bryson, ed., Foundations of World Organization; A Political
and Cultural Appraisal (New York. 1952), 108.
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police station made Sharpeville a household word on five continents,^1
When Sharpeville occurred, there were already a number of
foreign correspondents in South Africa, for Africa was big news in
i960. Prime Minister Verwoerd had announced in January that there
would be a plebiscite to determine if the country should become a
republic.

Only two weeks later the British Prime Minister, Harold

Macmillan, told the South African Parliament while on a widely pub|lp
licized tour that the "winds of change" were sweeping through Africa.
The anti-pass campaign had been announced in advance; reporters had
been sent to cover it or had been instructed to stay for it after
covering the other events.

One reporter was able to take pictures of

the crowds fleeing the police at Sharpeville and pictures of two
policement with guns standing over the field of dead.

These photo

graphs were featured prominently in many papers and news magazines
and added immeasurably to the sense of horror and outrage that people
everywhere felt.
There was immediate and widespread condemnation of South
ItO
Africa throughout the world.
Even before most‘editorial writers in
the American press had time to assess the situation, their papers
were reporting that Lincoln White, the State Department's press
officer, had told an Indian journalist at a press conference that:
The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes
that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain
^F o r a study of world reactions to Sharpeville, see Peter
Calvocoressi, South Africa and World Opinion (London, 196l).
^2New York Times, February 5, i960, p. 26.
1*3
,
Calvocoressi, South Africa and World Opinion, 3-4.
United States, see ibid., 6-8.

On the
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redress for legitimate grievances by peaceful means. While the
United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily
comment on the internal affairs of governments with which it
enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic
loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the
demonstrators in South Africa.^
Editorials appeared in newspapers all over the country simi
larly condemning South Africa; they were given a continuing opportunity
to do so because the crisis in South Africa went on for weeks.

Huge

demonstrations were staged by Africans in several cities in South
Africa.

An African work boycott began in many areas, and, when the

police responded sharply, headlines such as "Whips Drive Africans to
Their Jobs" appeared in American papers.^

A state of emergency was

declared by the South African government; this was followed by an
assassination attempt on the life of the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd,
by an unstable English-speaking farmer.
The crisis was seen as the inevitable result of apartheid.
The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin said that "with the inevitability
of a Greek tragedy, the South African policy of apartheid . . .

is

producing the ugly fruits that nearly everyone but its sponsors had
foreseen."^

To the New York Herald-Tribune "it was obvious that the

harsh injustice of the South African government must sooner or later
11U7

exhaust the stoic patience of the Negroes of the Union . . . .

It was, said the Washington Post, "a warning inscribed in blood,"
UU

Quoted in Washington Post, March 23, i960, p. 6 . On the
background of this statement, see McKay, Africa in World Politics,
299-300.
k5

New York Herald-Tribune. April 5» I960, p. 6.

U6

Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, March 23, I960, p. 2.

^ N e w York Herald-Tribune, March 2k, i960, p. 16.
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that an entire people "cannot he kept in permanent subjucation and
denied all outlets for peaceful redress without inviting exactly the
calamitous incident that has now occurred."

hQ

leased by the AFL-CIO, George Meany declared:

In a statement re
"These official mur

ders— they can be called nothing less— are the bloody fruition of a
program of terror and inhuman racialism.
The events in South Africa seemed to have a special signifi
cance for the United States.

The same publications commenting on the

South African racial problems were reporting on the discussions in
Congress of a new civil rights bill for the United States and on civil
rights sit-in demonstrations that were taking place in the South and
in cities of the Ncrtheast.

The Toledo Blade said that the American

protest to Sharpeville "offers an occasion to ponder the relative
barbarism of suppression in a frontier African nation and the more
sophisticated means

of glossing over the problem at home."'*1"1 The New

York Herald-Tribune

took Sharpeville as a reminder that theUnited

States waB not moving fast enough in civil rights, and observed that
"it is no use pretending that there are not a good many white Americans who would feel at home in South Africa."

51

Unless South Africa's

racial policies were tempered, the newspaper asserted, it was "more
than likely that the temper of racial disputes will be sharpened in
lift

Washington Post, March 23,

^Quoted in

19^0, A lU.

Washington Post,March 2U, 19^0, A J.

■^Toledo Blade, March 2h , i960 (clipping provided to the
author by the newspaper).
■^New York Herald-Tribune, March 2U, i960, p. 16 .
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many places . . . .We, too, have explosive situations that a spark

might ignite."

52

Calling South Africa a "Sick Country," the New York

Times said that "there was no doubt whatever that the trouble in
South Africa was a contagious malady that might sweep across frontiers
Just as other diseases do."-^

Two days later the Times made it clear

that it was the United States' frontiers that it was worried about:
What happens in South Africa touches half a continent immedi
ately. It crosses the frontiers of every Asian country. It
affects our own country, where the Federal courts and the
Federal Executive are committed to the doctrine of equal rights
before the law, but Southern Senators invoke the Constitution
to prevent the passage of laws which make the Constitution
effective.
"South Africa's Southern Colonels" thus threatened the United States.55
Repeatedly the point was made in American publications that
Sharpeville was not a single historical event but simply the beginning
of a larger one; it was only a prelude to the race war that would
follow and become ever larger and bloodier.

Time, for example, re

ported as things calmed a bit, that "it was clearly Just the end of
a skirmish; few doubted that the real battle lay ahead— perhaps not
too far ahead." 56

The

the whites intimidated

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

asserted that the more

the moderates, the more likely it was that the

leadership of the Africans would fall to younger and lawlesselements 57

52rbid., March

31, i960,p. 20.

^ N e w York Times, April 1, i960.
^Ibid. , April 3, i960, Sec.

p. 10.

55rbid., April U, i960, p. 28.
eg
"The Assassin of Milner Park," Time, April 18, I960, p. 2b.
57

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 5, i960 (clipping provided to
the author by the newspaper).
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The Denver Post expected the violence to spread and to have effects
elsewhere in Africa:

"Each outburst of violence, each new edict that

pushes down on non-whites in the Union makes it harder for native
African politicians to the north to advocate programs of moderation
rQ

toward the white man."5

In a similar vein the Toledo Blade said that

'the stakes in the rising nationalism of Africa are global." 59
The relative peace which came to South Africa after Sharpeville
was repeatedly said to be a deceptive calm.

The government's strong

measures were seen as simply encouraging further extremism among
Africans, as demonstrated by the formation of the militant organiza
tions Poqo and llmkhonto we Sizwe— both rejecting nonviolent tactics—
after the banning of the Pan African Congress and the African National
Congress.

60

But there were no more large scale African demonstrations

and consequently nothing was to replace Sharpeville as the image of
violent conflict in South Africa.

Sharpeville continued to be used

as the symbol of this conflict, both as a manifestation of the exist
ence of racial turmoil and as a sign“of the imminence of the coming
blood bath.

A decade after Sharpeville newspapers and magazines con

tinued to run pictures of the field of bodies at Sharpeville; they
58
Denver Post, March 2k , I960 (clipping provided to the author
by the newspaper).
■^Toledo Blade, April 12, i960 (clipping provided to the
author by the newspaper).
60

The New Republic said that the formation of Umkhonto signi
fied "a final turning away from hope that peaceful change might be
accomplished by traditional protest and reconciliation." "South
Africa Underground," New Republic, February 12, 19f>2, p. 11. See
also "Hate Against Hate.*1 Newsweek, April 8, 19^3, p. Ul; and James
S. Coleman, "The Character and Viability of African Political Systems,"
in Goldschmidt, ed., The United States and Africa, 70.
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warned of the possibilities of "another Sharpeville massacre."
Sharpeville not only convinced many that a race war was
likely in South Africa but it also persuaded some that action against
South Africa was desirable or necessary.

It was Sharpeville more than

anything else that set in motion a movement in the United States for
some type of action against South Africa.

CHAPTER IV
THE MOVEMENT FOR AMERICAN ACTION AGAINST
SOUTH AFRICAN APARTHEID

In the first decade of apartheid in South Africa under the
Nationalist Party, few Americans felt that it posed any problems for
the formulation of American policy.

Apartheid did not seem to in

volve Americans directly or touch strongly on American interests.
Even for those who became very interested in the racial situation in
South Africa, the only action that seemed to be called for was to make
the American public aware of apartheid and on occasion to extend pri
vate aid and encouragement to some of the "victims" of South Africa's
policies.

Sharpeville, worsening American race relations, and the

appearance of new African states made stronger action seem appropriate.
However, even before Sharpeville there were some Americans who called
for action against South Africa's race policies.

Several black Ameri

can groups became critical of American policy on South Africa at an
early date, and a broader "public" became interested in a policy de
cision on one occasion when it directly involved black Americans.
Black Americans, as suggested earlier, have long had a very
harsh attitude regarding South Africa.

It represented to them in an

acute form the racial supremacist views and denial of rights which
they faced in the United States.

Because they believed the two

systems to be related, black Americans began to attempt to influence

108

109
policy on South Africa in an organized way with the formation of the
Council on African Affairs in 1937.

The Council was established under

the guidance of Max Yergan, a black sociologist who had spent a number
of years working in South Africa, and Paul Robeson, a black activist
singer and actor."*'

At its inception, the Council announced that it

had three purposes to accomplish:

to give aid to the struggles of

the African masses; to disseminate information concerning Africa and
its peoples; and to influence the adoption of governmental policies
designed to promote the advancement and freedom of African people and
preserve international peace.2
To further its goals, the Council on African Affairs pub
lished a monthly bulletin, New Africa. South Africa received much
attention in the pages of New Africa.

During World War II the

bulletin focused on the oppression of the Africans by the South Afri
can government rather than on that government's participation in the
war.

That is, unlike most other American publications which concen

trated on the conflict between the "good” followers of Prime Minister
Smuts and the "bad" Afrikaner Nationalists, New Africa portrayed an
oppressive white government without differentiating significantly be
tween the white groups. It printed stories of police brutality and
described the government police as being like the German

•^Council on African Affairs, The Job to be Done (n.p., n.d.),
6 (pamphlet collection, Perkins Library of Duke University).
2Ibid.
3
The author examined most of the issues of New Africa and its
successor Spotlight on Africa for the period from 1 9 ^ through 1952
in the files of the New York City Public Library.
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Gestapo-

k

Even as the war was drawing to a close, Hew Africa de-

picted South Africa as being on a course toward Fascism and turmoil.^
The Council on African Affairs attempted to influence racial
policy in South Africa and American policy towards South Africa in a
variety of ways.

It tried to make information on South Africa more

widely available and opposed South African injustice editorially.
supported efforts to raise funds for Africans living there.

It

It re

ported that it "repeatedly urged South African officials to remove
the burden and shame of the pass regulations freon African society."

c

An example of such urging occurred in 1 9 ^ after race rioting took
place in Johannesburg.

Max Yergan, the executive director of the

Council, wrote the South African minister to the United States,
S. F. N, Gil, a long letter deploring the rioting.

In part, the

letter stated:
Whether such riots occur in the Union of South Africa, in the
United States, or elsewhere, they are a matter of concern to
all democratic peoples of the United Nations who are fighting
to destroy the concept of racial inferiority and the practice
of racial oppression. Continued failure to take effective
action against these evils, it appears certain, spells disas
ter for both Europeans and non-Europeans in South Africa.7
Officials of the Council

on African Affairs had meetings with

^See, for examples, the articles in New Africa, III (February,
19UU), 2. New Africa evidently had good sources of information. It
regularly quoted from South African papers and publications, and it
made references to correspondents in South Africa.
5
"Pro-Nazis in South Africa Heading Country Toward Fascism and
Chaos," New Africa, III (October, 19^*0, 1.
6New Africa, III (May, 19^0, 1-2.
7
Max Yergan to S. F. N. Gil, in New Africa, III (December,
19M0, 1.
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State Department officials during World War II and sought to influence
postwar planning on African questions.

In April 19^5 the Council

issued a memorandum for consideration by the delegates to the con
ference drawing up the United Nations Charter.

Entitled The San

Francisco Conference and the Colonial Issue, the pamphlet called for
an end to colonialism and declared principles of international responQ
sibility for colonial peoples.
In furtherance of these principles,
Yergan wrote Edward R. Stettinius, soon to become the American dele
gate to the United Nations, voicing strong objections to the inclusion
of South Africa as a member of the temporary trusteeship committee of
the United Nations.^

Although unsuccessful, such efforts did call

attention to the issues of race before the United Nations.
In the postwar

period, the Council on African Affairs grew

increasingly radical, and it was placed on the Attorney General's list
of subversive organizations in 19^8.

The Council continued to urge

United Nations action on South Africa, but, in a pattern to be re
peated by other organizations two decades later, it became more highly
critical of American policy on South Africa and American business
activity within South Africa.

"Apartheid in South Africa," said one

Council pamphlet, "pays big dividends to the few— not only in that

^Council on African Affairs, The San Francisco Conference and
the Colonial Issue (New York, 19^+5) (pamphlet collection, Perkins
Library of Duke University).
^Max Yergan to Edward R. Stettinius, in New Africa, IV
(November, 19^5), 1.
10,IU. N. Approval, of Indian Resolution in Blow at Racialism
Throughout the World," New Africa, V (December, 19^6), 1; "U. S. A.
Blocks U. N. Action on South African Discrimination Issue," New Africa,
VI (December, 19^7)* 1.
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country and in Britain, but alao in the United States of America."11
The author of the statement, Alphaeus Hunton, the Council's Secretary,
asked:

"How much of the blood of South Africa's oppressed black

people is on America's own hands?"1^
The reason for the Council's concern over South Africa was
repeatedly given in its publications: the struggle of black South
Africans and of black Americans was the same struggle, not only against
the same racial ideas, but also the same economic forces and individu
als.

The enemy was white American capitalism, and it was, in the

Council's view, responsible for black oppression all over the world.
An editorial in Spotlight on Africa, the successor to Mew Africa,
stated in 1952:
The South African government is aiding in "preserving democ
racy" in Iforea by sending its Jim Crow air force to help kill
Koreans. South Africa is a part of President Truman's "free
world." Yes, dozens of America's biggest auto, oil, mining and
other trusts have highly profitable holdings in that country.
. . . Hence it is clear that in raising our voices against
the Malan regime we simultaneously strike a blow at the re
actionary forces in our own land who seek to preserve here,
in South Africa, and everywhere else the super profits they
harvest from racial and national oppression. United support
for our brothers' struggles in Africa is an integral part of
our task in achieving freedom for all Americans and peace for
the world.13
The Council on African Affairs portrayed the Passive Defiance
Campaign of 1952 in South Africa as part of the struggle of black
Americans for equality and dignity.

It printed the text of an African

1 Alphaeus Hunton, "Postscript for Americans," Resistance
Against Fascist Enslavement in South Africa (Mew York, 1953), U8
(pamphlet collection, Perkins Library of Duke University).
12Ibid.
^Spotlight on Africa, XI (February 25, 1952), 1.
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National Congress and South African Indian Congress memorandum to
the United Nations concerning the campaign and appended to it a post
script urging American action.

Answering the question of why Americans

should respond, the postscript's author said:

"If you hate Jim Crow,

if you hate fascism, that is e n o u g h . T h e problem of the United
States, he continued, could not be divorced from that of South Africa:
"Can the octopus of racism and fascism be killed by simply cutting off
one menacing tentacle?"-*^

The Council's Spotlight on Africa put it

more forcefully:
A people's victory in South Africa will mean a victory for
PEACE— a decisive set-back to those interests in Washington,
whose profits-and-war schemes depend upon racial and rational
oppression. On the other hand, the defeat of the Civil Dis
obedience Campaign in South Africa will mean OUR defeat, too—
a set-back for OUR struggle for democratic rights.l6
The increasing radicalism of the Council led to defection from
its ranks by its more moderate members, including Max Yergan, and to
further harassment by governmental officials.

Finally, it was dis

solved in 1955.^
In the meantime, however, other civil rights groups began to
take up South Africa as a cause.

The National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, for example, began demonstrating more
concern over South African issues at the United Nations and American
policy on South Africa.

In 1955 the NAACP challenged American policy

llfHunton, "Postscript for Americans," 48,
15Ibid.
^Spotlight on Africa. XI (June 24, 1952), 1.
^ O n the Council on African Affairs, see also Mark Solomon,
"Black Critics of Colonialism and the Cold War," in Thomas G. Paterson,
ed., Cold War Critics (Chicago, 1971)» 205-239.

llU
by demanding that a United States Navy ship, the Midway, refrain from
calling on South African ports where black American sailors would be
-|Q
segregated.
Although the Navy rejected the demand, the NAACP
found some degree of support in the press because it was a situation
in which South African apartheid directly affected American citizens.
The New York Times agreed with the NAACP, editor dalizing that either
South Africa should have agreed to waive apartheid in respect to
American sailors, or the Midway should have stayed out of Cape Town. 19
That an element of national self-interest was beginning to be perceived
in policy questions on South Africa was seen in the argument in support
of the NAACP position made by Canmanweal. It observed that "surely a
refusal by the U. S. to allow its personnel to be humiliated by South
Africa's apartheid laws would be a striking demonstration to the
world's non-white peoples of the official opposition of the United
States to racism."

OQ

It was, however, obvious that if the United States

government attempted to accede to the NAACP demand, it would have been
put in the incongruous position of demanding of Cape Town, South Africa,
something it could not demand of the Midway1s home port of Norfolk,
Virginia, or of other naval installations at Charleston, New Orleans,
and other locations in the South.

pH

^®New York Times, January l6 , 1955, p. 9.
^ N e w York Times, January 17, 1955, p. 22.
Qn

"Apartheid and the Navy," Commonweal, January 28, 1955,
p. 1+U6.

21
On this, see the letters to the New York Times of Warren
Goodman, January 19, 1955, p. 26, and Hob E. Hurst, January 2k, 1955,
p. 22.
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Apart from one or two other Isolated instances, there were
few questions raised publicly about American policy on South Africa
until the end of the 1950s.

For those disturbed by apartheid, American

progress in race relations in the early 1950s seemed to offer the
possibility of progress elsewhere.

America, it seemed, could do more

to end unjust race practices in South Africa by its good example than
in any other way.

And interference in the internal affairs of a

friendly, non-Communist country was unprecedented.

There were individ

uals and groups who voiced concern over South Africa, but they directed
their efforts at making Americans aware of South Africa's race problems
and into alleviating the conditions of some of those suffering from
apartheid in South Africa.

In the late 1950s, they began showing

greater concern over American policy.
One such group was the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), one
of the oldest and most important of the Africa-concerned organizations.
The ACOA had contacts with many people in the United States interested
in Africa.

The Committee's techniques of operation were typical of

special interest groups operating on limited budgets.

Its publications

illustrated changing views on policy of liberal Americans concerned
about South Africa.
The American Committee on Africa was founded in 1953 by a
group of liberal-minded persons who had broad experience in the civil
rights movement in the United States. These included Donald Harrington
of the International League for the Rights of Man, Rayford Logan, a
professor at Howard University, Harold Isaacs, a professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, George Carpenter of the National
Council of Churches, Walter Offutt of the NAACP, Homer Jack, an
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Evanston, Illinois minister, and George M. Houser, formerly executive
director of the Congress of Racial Equality and national projects
secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. 22

Houser, the son of

American missionaries, had been secretary of another organization
formed the previous year by some of the same people who founded the
ACOA.

Called Americans for South African Resistance, it had been

organized to arouse American interest in the Passive Defiance Campaign
of 1952 and attempted to do this through demonstrations and mass
meetings. J

The ACOA, on the other hand, expected to engage in less

direct tactics.

It planned to act, its founders stated, principally

"as a clearing house for information about present day political and
economic events in Africa in order to create a concern for intelligent
and constructive American action in Africa."

oil

Although it thus

claimed all Africa as its interest, its major emphasis from the be
ginning was on South Africa,
In its first years, the American Committee on Africa acted as
a "clearing house" for information rather than as a policy advocate.
It attsnpted to reach a broad public by writing letters to the editors
of various publications, and it published its own periodic newsletter,

Africa Today, I (April, 195*0, 1. For much of the material
on the ACOA, the author is indebted to the assistance of several of its
personnel who sent materials to the author. In addition, the author
visited the Hew York offices of the ACOA and received further such
assistance in June 1972.
23

Letter of George M. Houser to the editor, Nation, November
29, 1952, pp. 503-50U; letter of Jim Peck to the editor, Africa Today,
III (May-June, 1956)* 13; Peter Weiss, "American Committee on Africa:
Rebels with a Cause," Africa Today, X (November, 1963), 38-39*
^Africa Today, I (April, 195*0, 1*
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Africa Today.

It held conferences and coordinated meetings with other

liberal groups, including, among others, the NAACP, the International
League for the Rights of Man, the Congress of Industrial Organization,
Americans for Democratic Action, the Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, the National Ethical Union, and the American Jewish
Labor Committee.

25

It set up informational activities for visiting

African leaders, including controversial South African figures such as
the Reverend Michael Scott, a spokesman against South African control
of South West Africa, Peter Abrahams, a Coloured writer, and Ellen
Heilman of the South African Institute of Race Relations.
special projects to assist South Africans.

It undertook

After the passage of the

Bantu Education Act, for example, it set up a fund to support mission
ary schools that might otherwise have lacked sufficient funds for
operation.

When a number of opponents of apartheid were arrested and

tried for treason in 1956, the ACOA raised money for a Defense and
Aid Fund to help defray defense costs and to support the families of
the defendants.
In addition to these activities, the American Committee on
Africa began to establish contacts with public officials.

ACOA person

nel met with members of Congress and with othar elected and appointed
government officials to provide them with information on African
issues.

Officials were also given the opportunity to present their

views in ACOA publications.

Thus the ACOA carried on informational

activities on three levels: it attempted to filter information down
to a broad public; it attempted to work through other opinion influen
cing organizations; and it reached "up" to embrace policy leaders and
25Africa Today, I (October-November , 195*0, 1-2.
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makers.
With the passage of time, the American Committee on Africa
began to express increasing concern about American policy on colonial
Africa and South Africa.

Writers in Africa Today began asking harsh

questions about American policy.

Harold Isaacs, for example, wrote an

essay for a 1957 issue in which he predicted disaster forthe "blind"
racists of South Africa. He asked what the United States
the showdown came.

should do if

Isaacs had no answers but urged "Let's start

groping, hard."^
In the same issue another author indicated how the image of
South Africa was becoming

tied up with the American imageabroadand

American policy on South Africa.

Commenting on the world wide pub

licity given to the denial of a glass of orange juice to an African
diplomat in a road-side restaurant in Delaware, the author of Africa
Today's "Talking Drums" column stated:
It is fitting in an issue devoted to the dangers and evils
of South African racialism that we should state for the record
our increasing opposition to all manifestations in the United
States of racial discrimination and segregation. Our situation
might be comparable to South Africa if the attitude of the
citizens of Mississippi prevailed in all America. Fortunately,
it does not, however, not because we are more virtuous but
simply because the Negroes in other areas are in a minority
rather than a majority. We have yet to prove to the world that
America has any better claim to fulfilling the rights of man
than the Union of South Africa.^
Increasingly it seemed necessary to such people to state "for the
record" official American opposition to discrimination and segregation
26
Harold E. Isaacs, "South Africa: Alternatives to Disaster,"
Africa Today, TV (November-December, 1957)* 6 .
^"Talking Drums," Africa Today, IV (November-December, 1957),
U9-50.

in both South Africa and the United States.
The implications of Isaacs's article and the "Talking Drums"
statement began to be formulated into specific policy proposals by
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, a member of the ACOA's
National Committee, in a subsequent Africa Today issue.

Senator

Humphrey was critical of the fact that for years the American govern
ment had annually been foregoing the opportunity "to make clear where
we stand on the racial issue" by failing to denounce South Africa at
the United Nations. 28

He continued:

lOjn the issue of apartheid our representative failed to get
up on his feet before the nations of the world to point out that
we in the United States, administratively, legislatively, and
judicially, have recently launched a new effort to eliminate
segregation in a wide variety of fields from schools to public
transport. We might have made it perfectly clear that we be
lieve in putting one's own house in order first on this matter,
but that deliberately putting it in disorder by cultivating
racism, whether under Hitler or as apartheid, is an evil
humanity will not tolerate.
Senator Humphrey claimed that communism threatened Africa, and urged
that the United States should do all it could to forestall the
advance of communism.

Opposing apartheid officially was one way of

hindering the spread of communism into Africa, said Humphrey.
As these articles in Africa Today indicated, changing condi
tions in the United States and Africa were leading some Americans to
argue that a more critical policy on South Africa was necessary.
Criticism of apartheid could, it was believed, convince foreigners
of American "sincerity" on civil rights issues and also forestall the
oA
Hubert H. Humphrey, "U, S., Africa, and the U. N.," Africa
Today, V (January-February, 1958), 9, 20.
29

Ibid.. 20.
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spread of communism.

Given the assumptions of these articles, the

arguments for policy change were plausible, indeed persuasive.
Apparently personnel in the Department of State thought so too, be
cause in 1958 the United States made its first important change in
policy on South Africa.
Prior to 1958, the United States carefully avoided taking an
official stand against apartheid at the United Nations.

Official

statements indicated that the United States opposed every form of
racial discrimination, but the proper method of dealing with it was to
let each member state work to solve it in its own way.

30

The United

States generally abstained from voting on resolutions dealing with
South African apartheid.

However, in October 1958 the United States

voted in favor of the perennial resolution denouncing apartheid, on
this occasion one expressing regret and concern that South Africa had
not responded to United Nations appeals to revise its policies.

31

Much of the announcement declaring the American position was devoted
to the race problems of the United States and explaining how the
government was moving to a multiracial society without discrimination.^
Thus both domestic and foreign political developments combined to
produce a shift in American policy on South Africa.
30 See, far example, the statements James W. Wadsworth in
Department of State Bulletin, January 3, 1955, pp. 32-36. For further
details on the development of American policy on South Africa from 19^5
to 196b see Sanford David Greenberg, "United States Policy Toward the
Republic of South Africa, 19^5-196k," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1965).
31
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 12^8 (XIII)
(1958).
^Department of State Bulletin, November 2k, 1958, pp. 81+2-M.
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For a brief period, the decision to Join in the criticisms of
South Africa at the United Nations seemed an adequate change in policy
to meet the country's foreign policy needs.

However, the Sharpeville

crisis of March-April i960 brought about new and much stronger demands
for changes in American policy on South Africa.
As discussed earlier, the State Department reacted immediately
to Sharpeville with a strong statement deploring the African deaths.
Through its immediate criticisms of the police shootings, the State
Department was able to seize the initiative in responding to the
crisis in South Africa.

That is, the government's statement preceded

the public outcry against the police actions; it was not made in
response to American public opinion.

Not only did Lincoln White

deplore the incident in his news conference a day after it occurred,
but the American ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge,
acting in his capacity as President of the Security Council, called
the Security Council into session to consider the situation.

The

American Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, at a press confer
ence also put the United States on record as opposed to South Africa's
actions and policies and in favor of United Nations discussion of the
33
matter.
Although the United States was thus issuing rather extraordi
nary statements on the internal affairs of another state, there were
few, outside the South, who disapproved of them and many who commended
them.

The Seattle Times, for example, commented on the government's

^Washington Post, March 23, I960, A 1; March 25, I960, A 1;
March 26 , i960, A 5• New York Times, March 26 , i960, p . 2.
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statements:
It is necessary and fitting that all major nations of the
free world make clear, not only that they regret the "blood
shed in South Africa, but that they abhor the doctrines that
led to the bloodshed.3*»
The Seattle newspaper suggested that apartheid should now come to mean
the segregation of South Africa from the rest of the world.

The New

York Times likewise saw nothing to criticize in the government state
ments.

It went so far as to editorialize that international pressure

would be required to "cure" the "sickness" of South Africa.^
Some groups and publications not only commended the American
response but went on to call for stronger policy measures.

In a

declaration signed by many prominent citizens praising Secretary
Herter's statements, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action called
for taking the further steps of halting gold purchases from South
Africa and recalling the American envoy to South Africa.^

Similarly,

Christian Century called for a boycott of South African gold, sug
gesting that this could be a means of averting civil war In South
Africa.

Proclaiming that the United States had the means to "bankrupt"

South Africa, the periodical declared that if the United States

"^Seattle Times, April 6 , i960 (clipping provided to the
author by the newspaper).
■^New York Times, April 1, i960, p. 32. The Christian Science
Monitor urged that it was no longer enough to condemn apartheid. ,ri"f"
Americans," it said, "take a forward position against it in the United
Nations, they obligate themselves to offer clear Ideas far a pertinent
American policy." Christian Science Monitor, April 12, i960, p. 1 8 .
Approving of United Nations debate on apartheid, the St. Louis PostDispatch said that South Africa *s objections to such discussions
carried "a vague echo of states' rights." St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
March 31, i960 (.clipping provided to the author by the newspaper).
36
New York Times, April 17, I960, p . 9.
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refused to buy gold,
the Verwoerd governnent -would have to yield or fall. . . .
A boycott threat by Washington and London might end the mad
ness which threatens to plunge South Africa into a blood bath.
If the threat is not heeded, an imposition of a boycott on gold
would soon paralyze the country which threatens world peace
more seriously than any other.’ ’
The close correspondence between American race problems and
American views on South Africa was effectively symbolized in a Joint
demonstration by the American Committee on Africa and the Congress of
Racial Equality.

After picketing a New York City Woolworth's store in

protest against Woolworth's exclusion of blacks from lunch counters
in the South, leaders of the two organizations marched directly to
the South African consulate in New York to picket it in protest
nO
against the Sharpeville shootings.
In addition to its demonstration, the American Committee on
Africa held an Emergency Action Conference on South Africa in coopera
tion with representatives of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, Americans for Democratic Action, the American Society of
African Culture, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the
Jewish Labor Committee, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, and the United Auto Workers. The avowed purpose
of the Conference, which was held in New York City at the Carnegie
International Center on May 31 and June 1, I960, was to find ways to
bring about change within South Africa.

The Chairman of the Confer

ence was Jackie Robinson, the first black to play major league

^"Stop Gold Purchases from South Africa," Christian Century,
April 6, I960, p. U05.
^®New York Times, March 2k , i960, p. 8 .

baseball.

In his opening statement Robinson t o M the participants

that
America, however removed from South Africa, has the task of
aiding in the establishment of real democracy there. . . .
I see the struggle against race supremacy and racial inequality
as world-wide. The fight against Jim Crow here is part of
the same struggle in South Africa.^
Die Conference made a number of recommendations for actions
against apartheid.

These included a consumers' boycott of South

African products sold in the United States, discouraging American
tourism in South Africa, a ban on South African participation in the
Olympic games, nondiscrimination by American businesses operating
in South Africa, having local groups sponsor conferences on South
Africa, and calling for donations to the Defense and Aid Fund which
had been Bet

up several years earlier.

As for government policy,

the Conference commended the State Department for its condemnation of
Sharpeville.

It urged that the President and Congress by joint

resolution declare that United States policy was opposed to apartheid,
that both major political parties pledge themselves to seeking an end
to apartheid, that State Department operations in South Africa be
integrated, that aid be given to refugees from South Africa and South
West Africa, and ihat r'no future purchase of gold or strategic
materials from South Africa will be made where there are alternative
sources of supply.
A shortcoming of the Conference was that it adopted an allinclusive approach to its calls for action against South Africa, a
39
""American Committee on Africa, Action Against Apartheid (New
York, i960), 1 (pamphlet in possession of the author).
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broad listing of all types of measures that might be taken to show
disapproval of South Africa's policies.

The organizations supporting

these proposals lacked the means of following up on their exhortations
except through educating their members about South Africa.

It should

be noted, too, that there was an assumption implicit in the proposals
that the government, with some prompting from the public, could be
induced to take a much stronger policy against South Africa.

It is

interesting to observe that the Conference expected the South African
government to continue to provide the United States with strategic
materials even after harsh policies would be adopted.
The Emergency Action Conference represented only one of
several phases through which the movement for action against South
Africa went after i960. Before proceeding with the subsequent phases
of the movement, it should be pointed out that participants in the
movement, although united in their hostility to South Africa, were
not entirely in agreement on the ultimate purposes of the movement j
that is, they were not clear on the rationale for action against
South Africa.

Lack of clarity on the point did not necessarily lead

to disruption between the critics of South Africa, for they often
could agree on method if not ends.

But to understand better how

changing perceptions of South Africa, Africa, and United States race
problems were linked to changing views on policy, it is necessary to
understand the different reasons given for the movement for action
against South Africa.

These have been touched upon already and will

emerge again in the materials that follow.
clarity they will be summarized briefly,

But for purposes of
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First, there was the argument from national self-interest.^
Because of its poor image abroad, the United States needed to show the
world that it was truly opposed to racism.

If the United States

opposed racism at home, it also had to oppose it abroad.

Only by

effective opposition to South Africa’s race policies could the
American image be rehabilitated abroad and the spread of communism
to the strategically important continent of Africa be forestalled.
A significant problem which inhered in this rationale was that no
opposition to apartheid could be considered adequate until apartheid
was ended.

Each step in opposition required further steps in order

to prove the United States's sincerity.
A second rationale for a stronger American policy against
South Africa was that it could help bring about change within South
Africa.

This argument proceeded partly from humanitarian and ideo

logical concerns and partly from considerations of self-interest.
American policy, some felt, could be a means of convincing the whites
of South Africa that their racial policies were futile and had to be
abandoned in favor of advancing human freedom.

Alternatively, it was

believed by some that the United States could encourage black South
Africans in their struggle, and once majority rule was established
the new leaders would be favorably disposed towards the United States.
The difficulty with this rationale was that it depended upon a belief
that American policy could bring about a change in policy in South
Africa or that majority rule was soon forthcoming.
1*1
For an essay linking views of South Africa with a variety of
policy alternatives, see Vernon McKay, "American Attitudes Toward
Apartheid," in Philip W. Quigg, South Africa: Problems and Prospects
(New York, 1965}, **0-1*8.
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The third principal rationale for a stronger American policy
against South Africa was essentially moralistic. Some participants
in the movement for action against South Africa, particularly those
with strong religious affiliations, believed that it was necessary for
the United States to disassociate itself from South Africa so as to
avoid complicity in the evil system of apartheid.

The argument was

that the United States should ’’disengage” itself from South Africa so
that it was no longer upholding an unjust regime and no longer prof
iting from the economic and racial policies of the South African govern
ment.

This element of the movement against South Africa came to focus

on American business activity there, and it continued as a rationale
for urging group action even after the other two became less per
suasive .
In the same year as Sharpeville, a book was published which
evidenced aspects of each of these rationales and which brought
together, in a sometimes exaggerated form, many of the ideas preva
lent about South Africa upon which the movement for a stronger
American policy depended.

This book was The Death of Africa by Peter

Ritner, an executive editor at the Macmillan publishing company.

h2

In Ritner's view, the Afrikaner was cruel, perverted, even
bloodthirsty.

South Africa's government he described as ”a constitu

tional freak, the only polity left which is based on readings from
1^3
ancient scriptures.”
The country was governed "the way the
United States would be run if only Daughters of the Confederacy had

^Peter Ritner, The Death of Africa (New York, i960).
^3Ibid.. 27.
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the s u f f r a g e . R i t n e r declared that the Afrikaners had decided
that they would "prefer to die horribly rather than surrender the
pleasures of kaffir-beating.

1*5

It was Ritner’s belief that the continent of Africa was so
important to the United States that it should set up an Institute
of African Affairs within the American government with eight billion
dollars a year in funding.

The Institute should then "build itself

up to become the virtual world center of all things African.
One might have thought somewhere in Africa would have been more con
venient for the Africans.

It was in the national self-interest of

the United States, he believed, to look out for the well-being of
Africa.

South Africa's impending race war threatened all of Africa

and Ritner wanted the United States to step in and impose a settlement
as the only way a total disaster could be averted.
Indeed, Ritner viewed forcing a settlement of the race prob
lems of South Africa as an admirable goal,

Ritner wrote of riding

in a chauffeur-driven car along a South African highway.

When the

African driver continued calling him baas he told the driver to stop
it; he was an American and did not like being called baas. The
driver then pulled off the road and stopped to tell Ritner he had
not realized that Ritner was an American.

When, the driver asked

him, were the Americans coming to South Africa to aid the Africans?
Ritner was moved by this and commented:
^ I b i d . , 28.
1*5
Ibid., 292.
Ibid., 281.

129
It had "been a long time since I had heard the word "American"
used like this, like a sort of invocation of the Great Spirit;
Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt used it this way, and so did this
African man. He knew almost nothing of our country, hut he did
know of the radiant glories of our dream which has so changed the
world— though not yet his world. To this man, and to hundreds
of millions of men like him around the world, America shall
forever be the great and gentle Paladin of the North, feeder
of children pid liberator of fathers. What more does anyone
ask of life?^7
Ritner's dream of being a liberator of course involved freeing
Africans from racism, but there was an economic element in his view
point that was not fully spelled out, though it did emerge as an
important rationale for action later.

Ritner was antagonistic to

what he called the New Capitalism, an economic development which
stood in contrast to Old-Fashioned Business.

"As everyone knows,"

he said, "the chief structural difference between the New Capitalism
and the Old has been the substitution of the business decisions of
one individual, who possessed the resources he was hazarding, of the
decisions of a group, hired to manage these resources in behalf of
a faceless multitude of shareholders."

Hostility towards the New

Capitalism itself became a basis for sanctions against South Africa.
In the initial phase of the movement for action against South
Africa, groups and individuals sought to demonstrate personal opposi
tion to apartheid.

They also urged the United States government to

criticize apartheid, either on its own or together with other coun
tries through the United Nations, and to take steps to manifest the
criticism through some token demonstration of disapproval.

It soon

became obvious, however, that the United States government was very
**7ibid., 75.
**8lbld.. 2U3 .
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reluctant to go beyond verbal condemnation of South Africa’s race
policies, and with this the movement entered into a new phase.

Rather

than calling for new American initiatives, activist groups and pub
lications now criticized the United States government for its inac
tion, focusing on the government’s unwillingness to Join in the
policies urged by a majority of the countries at the United Ifations.
With the addition of many new African states to the General
Assembly, the United Nations had quickly gone beyond a policy position
to which the United States would agree.

This became clear in the

spring of 1961 when the initial draft of General Assembly Resolution
1598 was offered for passage.

The draft condemned apartheid policies

and stated that the General. Assembly "considers it to be the responsi
bility of all members of the United Nations to take separate and
collective action to bring about the elimination of these polillQ
cies . . .
^ Paragraph Five, the key provision of the Resolution,
recommended that all states consider taking the following steps to
eliminate apartheid:
(a) !fo break off diplomatic relations with the Government of the
Union of South Africa, or to refrain from establishing such
relations;
(b) To close the ports of each State to all vessels flying the
South African flag;
(c) To enact legislation prohibiting the ships of each State from
entering South African ports;
(d) To boycott all South African goods and to refrain from ex
porting goods to South Africa;
(e) To refuse landing and passage facilities to all aircraft
belonging to the Government and companies registered under
the laws of the Union of South Africa.50

^United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, Official
Records:Annexes. II (Agenda Item 72), 7.
g0Ibld.

131
The United States was quite unwilling to approve of this.-’-*' A vote
was taken on this draft; forty-two members favored it, thirty-four
opposed, and twenty-one abstained.

52

thirds had to approve it for passage.

Thus the draft failed because twoA much milder paragraph was

substituted for Paragraph Five and this draft was approved.
The American delegate to the United Nations, Francis T.
Plimpton, explained to the Assembly why the United States opposed the
proposals of Paragraph Five.

Although the United States condemned

apartheid, the United States believed, he asserted, that the measures
proposed
simply will not accomplish what they are intended to do. If
sanctions as extensive as these were to be approved and carried
out, the effect could be an internal explosion in South Africa,

The relationship between American domestic problems and
foreign policy on racial matters was again demonstrated when Ambassador
Alex Quaison-Sackey of Ghana opened discussion of Resolution 1598.
He began by throwing down, in essence, a challenge to the United
States on 1598. He did this by reading to the Assembly a letter he
purportedly received from an American calling himself Count Albert
von Hohenzollern. The letter read:
Dear head nigger:
The white people of the world should boycott all you
niggers and put you cannibals out of business. What right
have you half-ape niggers to dare to question the policy
of South Africa on racial segregation. Furthermore, we
don't need you niggers here in the U.S. to tell us how to
run our business, and we are getting fed up with supplying
you black apes with blackmail for your nigger friendship.
(signed) A white American for South Africa.
United Nations, General Assembly, 15th Session, Official Records:
Plenary Meetings, April 13, 1961, p. 267. It was in poor taste to
read this, but the implication was clear: if the United States did
not support the stronger draft of Resolution 1598, it would be
refusing to repudiate the views of the letter.
52Ibid., 273-7^.
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the "brunt of which could be borne by the very Africans we are
striving to help. Beyond that, the peace of the whole conti
nent of Africa could be in jeopardy,?3
Plimpton argued that adoption of the stronger draft of the resolution
would not "bring an end to apartheid or improve the lot of the victims
of that abhorrent policy.
The shift in attitude among the anti-South African activists
produced by the American position was seen in a new pamphlet published
in 1962 by the American Committee on Africa.

Commenting on the fail

ure to get the necessary two-thrids majority for the first draft of
Resolution 1598, the authors of the pamphlet said that the key to the
defeat was the opposition of the United States and the abstention of
South American states favorable to the United States. Although they
expressed a hope that the United States might change its position,
they said that the United States was showing the Afro-Asian states
that it was not willing to "go beyond pious words of 'regret* con
cerning the situation in South Africa."^-’ In so stating, they were
echoing the question put by Ambassador Usher of the Ivory Coast in
the General Assembly;

"What is the purpose of deploring, of depre

cating, if nothing is done to end this catastrophic state of affairs?"-^

■^Department of State Bulletin, April 2U, 1961, p. 603.

^ Ibid.
55 Colin Gonze, George M. Houser, and Perry Stujrges, South
African Crisis and United States Policy (New York, 1962), Hi "(pamphlet
in possession of the author).
^United Nations, General Assembly, l6th Session, Official
Records; Plenary Meetings. November 28, 1961, p. 888. Putting it
even more strongly that same day was Mr. Amonoo of Ghana who criticized
the "apostles of moderation" who opposed sanctions because they had
"economic, military, diplomatic and political interests in sustaining
the white regime in South Africa. Moreover, there are blood ties

133

The ACOA critics were unwilling to accept the arguments ad
vanced by Ambassador Plimpton against sanctions. Engaging in a dia
logue of sorts with the American government, the pamphlet's authors
attempted to counter each of the points Plimpton had made in the
General Assembly.

Although his speech had been a "model" of condemna

tion of apartheid, words were no longer enough.

In reference to

American ostracism of Communist states such as Cuba and China, the
pamphlet stated that "in a period when examples of the use of economic
and diplomatic sanctions by the U.S. are multiplying, the condemnation
unaccompanied by action could not be taken seriously,
Since these critics did not find Plimpton's arguments convin
cing, they sought the reasons for American opposition to sanctions
elsewhere.

They placed the blame for it on American military relations

with the South African government and on American economic activity
within South Africa.

They noted that the United States Navy made good

will stops in South Africa and participated in training exercises with
the South African Navy, and that the American military was becoming
deeply involved with South Africa through the installation of space
tracking stations in South Africa.

They also observed that American

economic involvement in South Africa had increased substantially in
recent years.

The pamphlet urged that military relations with South

Africa be curtailed or terminated entirely, that further private
American loans and investments be discouraged, and that economic
sanctions be adopted against South Africa.

between them and South Africa."

By these measures, the

Ibid., 885.

^Gonze, Houser and Sturges, South African Crisis and United
States Policy, U5 , 56-58.
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United States could contribute to the breakup of the South African
government and commit itself "as the champion of equality and freedom"
while there was still time.'*®

However, the authors did not think it

likely that the United States would do so.
Others joined with the American Committee on Africa in criti
cizing the United States for its position at the United Nations on
the sanctions questions.

In 1962, the United Nations, despite American

opposition, mustered the two-thirds majority necessary to pass a
resolution (General Assembly Resolution 176l) containing the provisions
for sanctions found in Paragraph Five of the rejected draft of
Resolution 1598.

Attempting to shame the United States for its vote

against this resolution, Stephanie Gervis, the United Nations corre
spondent for the Village Voice, commented that without the backing of
the United States, Britain, and France, the resolution could not be
effective.

She stated:

Ironically enough, the very democracies that taught the Africans
the principle of majority rule are now about to instruct them in
the art of breaking it, because there is little doubt on either
side that those who did not vote for the resolution will not
implement it— or least not the paragraph on sanctions.59
The New Republic also noted a disparity between American words
condemning apartheid and American actions on South Africa.

Although

admitting to doubts about some aspects of economic sanctions, the
editors declared that the case for ending arms sales to South Africa
was impeccable.

The magazine stated editorially:

^ Ibid., i(5-58, 62.
59stephanie Gervis, "Sanctions and South Africa," Commonweal,
January 18, 1963, p. ^32.

135

The Nationalist policies seem bent on plunging the whole of
Southern Africa into a blood bath. Are the NATO allies,
through their sales of arms, to provide support for those very
policies of apartheid for which they so eloquently proclaim
their loathing? If this course is pursued, the Africans can
turn in only one direction for aid. And the Communists surely
will provide it. ®
A few weeks later another writer in the New Republic commented that
the sooner the United States began cooperating with the African states
at the United Nations "to demonstrate that its exhortations about
democracy match its exertions for democracy," the sooner the United
States would get out of "low gear" in Africa.
Criticisms of American policy such as these at home and abroad
probably had an effect on policy makers.

William C. Attwood, for

example, in his memoirs of his experiences as a diplomat at the United
Nations and in Africa during the Kennedy and Jchnson administrations,
wrote that he never understood why the United States never took the
initiative with a resolution that it could support "without always
appearing negative and reluctant."

Even though he believed sanctions

were impractical, he felt "morally and politically, we needed to do
mare than deplore apartheid in speeches that many Africans considered
hypocritical in view of our massive investment in South Africa.
The element of posturing on Southern African policies for purposes
of placating world opinion came out in Attwood*s comments about when
he persuaded the Ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, to take a different,
^"Investment in South Africa," New Republic, December 1, 1962,
p. 9.
^Richard Dale, review of Allard Lowenstein's Brutal Mandate,
in New Republic, December 22, 1962, p. 2h.
^2Willlam C. Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks; A Personal
Adventure (New York, 1967), 139"VoV
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stronger position on a South West Africa resolution at the United
Nations;
lOjur African and Asian friends were delighted. Our vote cost
us nothing-— we supported a moral principle without committing
ourselves to a course of action— and gained us considerable
goodwill and publicity.
Something of the same spirit— the triumph of form over sub
stance— was present in an American decision to support an arms embargo
against South Africa.

The United States first decided it would adopt

a policy of providing South Africa only with arms that could not be
used to enforce apartheid.

This was a category of weapons that was

very difficult to define, and it satisfied few people who wanted the
United States to adopt a stronger policy against South Africa.

In the

summer of 1963, the United States decided to go further and support a
total arms embargo of South Africa, even though this was contrary to
a treaty with South Africa.

According to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,

who apparently took part in the arms embargo decision, the State
Department favored a United Nations resolution that all member states
refrain from supplying South Africa with arms that could be used to
suppress the African population.

President Kennedy, in what Schlesinger

described as a "brilliant stroke," went a step beyond this.

The

President proposed that the United States declare unilaterally, as a
matter of national policy, that it would supply no more arms to South
Africa so long as the policy of apartheid was enforced.^

Such an

embargo policy, effective January 1, 196^, was announced in August,

^3Ibid., lUl.
6k
Arthur M, Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days;
Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1967), 537.

John F.
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1963, and in that same month the United States voted in favor of
Security Council Resolution S/5386 calling upon all states "to cease
forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and
65
military vehicles to South Africa . . . ."
Although American support for Resolution S/5386 was a step
further than any previous policy change by the United States on South
African policy, it was still far short of the more stringent measures
that the General Assembly had called for only a year earlier.

In

short, it was unlikely to satisfy any critics of American policy.

Just

a few days before the American vote on S/5386 a group of black Ameri
cans, with William M. Worthy of the Baltimore Afro-American as spokes
man, staged a protest at the United Nations against American policy.
Worthy was given the opportunity to meet with Ambassador Adlai
Stevenson, and Worthy presented him with the protest group's demand
that South Africa be expelled from the United Nations.
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American

support of S/5386 was considerably less than Worthy had demanded.
Typical of the critics of the American position was the response of the
Nation to S/5386;
The Security Council's recent approval of a resolution barring
the shipment of arms and ammunition to South Africa is no
answer to the challenge posed by that country's maniacal
pursuit of its apartheid policy. At best, it can provide a
temporary respite. . . . Bloodshed on a scale that would
constitute war by any standard is inevitable unless the United
Nations takes more drastic action than it has so far shown

^United Nations, Security Council Resolution S/5386 (1963)..
The New York Times, August U, 1963, Sec.
p. 8 , apparently had
doubts about the wisdom of United States support of this measure.
It is clear that the Times did not think the United States should go
further.

66 "United Nations:
1963, pp. 3U-35.

Boycott or Death," Newsweek, August 5,
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any signs of doing. ^
The Nation suggested that the United States support economic sanctions
against South Africa, a naval blockade of its ports, and the severing
of diplomatic relations.
The effort to promote American participation in United Nations
sanctions against South Africa reached its high point in 1965-1966.
Strongly anti-South African groups made their views known and urged
American support of United Nations measures in several different forums
that should be noted as indicative of the strength of the movement for
action against South Africa.
As usual, the American Committee on Africa was in the forefront
of organizations in opposition to South Africa.

By 196^ it had taken

steps to set up a Consultative Council on South Africa, a "clearing
house" consisting of more than thirty major American church, union,
civil rights, and student groups.
of the Consultative Council,
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The ACOA served as Secretariat

Representatives of some thirty-eight

participating organizations met in Washington on March 21, 19^5, the
fifth anniversary of Sharpeville, to take part in a national conference on "The South African Crisis and American Action."

6q

These

6?"A Wrong Remedy," Nation, August 2h, 1963, p. 8l.

68American Committee on Africa, Annual. Report:

1961 (New

York,
69

Included among the group were representatives of the ACOA,
the National Council of Churches, the Catholic Interracial Council,
the American Jewish Congress, the AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers,
the National Farmers Union, the United Federation of Teachers, the
Congress of Racial Equality, the National Student Association, the
NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom, the student division of
the Young Women's Christian Association, Students for a Democratic
Society, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, and Americans
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representatives listened to Congressmen, ministers, exiled South
African leaders, union officials, academics, and others who appeared
as speakers or took part in group discussions 1 ®
The purpose of the national conference appears to have been
twofold;

to educate and to advocate.

The conference was to make the

participants, the groups they represented, and the general public more
aware of the nature of the South African race policies and the char
acter of the white ruling class.

The conference took the position

that South African apartheid was "a totalitarian system strongly
reminiscent of H i t l e r i s m . S p e a k e r s stressed the intractibility of
the whites and said that change in South Africa could only c one from
outside pressure. 72

A warning was issued by the conference that if

change were not brought to South Africa, apartheid would "lead
inevitably to violence and bloodshed and possible escalation into
world conflict."^

for Democratic Action.
70
Virgil E. Lowder, "U. S. Conference on South Africa,"
Christian Century, April 21, 1965, PP* 508-510; Conference "Program"
(copy made from a collection of materials on the Conference lent to
the author by the American Committee on Africa).
71
Mia Aurbakken, "What Did the Conference Accomplish," Africa
Today, XII (March, 1965), 13-lU; "National Conference Requests Economic
Sanctions Against South Africa" (press release by David Apter and
Associates of Washington for the national conference in possession of
the author).
72

E.g. , Leslie Rubin, "The White Man in South Africa— The
Politics of Domination, Isolation and Pear," 2-3 (paper among the
materials on the conference lent to the author by the American
Committee on Africa).
^"National Conference Requests Economic Sanctions Against
South Africa" (press release); Aurbakken, "What Did the Conference
Accomplish."

I*t0

Another educative function of the conference was to make the
public more aware of American involvement in South Africa through its
trade and investment policies.

The American Committee on Africa had

begun to attempt to fulfill this function in 1963 after the United
States had adopted an arms embargo against South Africa.

The ACOA's

annual report for 1963 had commented on the embargo and said that
the organization should now turn to focus its campaign "on awakening
Americans to the extent of their economic involvement with South
7h
Africa."J
Its efforts did produce some results. For example, in
March 196U the ACOA published a special issue of Africa Today on
"United States Policy on South Africa:

Partners in Apartheid" which

contained information on American business activity in South Africa.
Several months later, the editors of the Catholic publication America
called the attention of their readers to this ACOA report and ob
served :
This country has opposed the use of economic boycott by the
U. N. to force South Africa to change its racial policies.
Question: To what extent have American business interests
determined our attitude?
Other publications responded similarly to such reports by anti-South
African activists.
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Now, at the 1965 national conference, several

papers and discussions were directed at American trade and financial
' American Committee on Africa, Annual Report: 1963 (New
York, 196U), n.p. (brochure in possession of the author).
75

United States Policy on South Africa:
Apartheid," Africa Today, XI (March, 196*1).

Partners in

^"Boom in South Africa," America, May 9, 196*t, p. 622.
^E.g., "Stop South Africa Now," New Republic, May 16, 196U,
pp. 3-U.

lUl

involvement, and others touched on the subject tangentially.7®
The views of South Africa's policies and American business
activity in South Africa presented by the speakers were the pre
conditions of, and basis for, arguments for stronger measures against
South Africa.

After covering these views, the conference turned its

final discussions to the question of what the United States and the
participating groups could do to bring about change with regard to
South Africa.
Peter Weiss, a New York attorney and President of the American
Committee on Africa, criticized the United States strongly for its
policy on South Africa at the United Nations.

"So far as the South

African issue in the United Nations is concerned," Weiss told the
conference audience, "the United States haB been the country that
Just can't say yes."79

He reviewed the "sorry record" of the United

States on the issue and rebutted the arguments made by American
officials against collective measures.

In a statement which demon

strated how each further step the United States took on the issue
became simply the basis for arguing that more steps had to be taken,
Weiss said:
[ijf we determine, as a matter of national policy, that the
government of South Africa is so repressive, so insensitive to
world opinion, as to warrant the drastic and unusual measure of
placing a ban on the sale of arms through private channels,

7 E.g., Julian P. Friedman, "American Business and Financial
Involvement in South Africa"; Edward Marcus, "The South African
Economy," (papers among the materials on the conference lent to the
author by the American Committee on Africa).
79

Peter Weiss, "U. S, Policy and South Africa," 2 (paper
among the materials on the conference lent to the author by the
American Committee on Africa).

how can we go on denying that the situation warrants the with
holding from South Africa of other forms of private American
assistance which the South African minority used to perpetuate
its reign of terror against the overwhelming majority of the
citizens of that country?®0
Weiss and the others at the conference urged that the United
States take steps to implement the United Nations proposals for
sanctions against South Africa.

Referring to the war in Vietnam,

and raising the specter of the United States coming down on the "wrong
side" in a similar war in South Africa, Weiss asked:
Iljf we fail to "bringthe Nationalists to their senses by the
withdrawal of American economic support and by collective
action through the United Nations, thereby making an armed
uprising inevitable, how many Chinese guns, Soviet ambulances
and Algerian volunteers will we allow the African freedom
fighters to receive (in the absence of any support from us),
before we decide that theirs is "a Communist-inspired war of
liberation"?®1
Weiss's statement assumed, of course, that economic sanctions
or other forms of international ostracism could "bring the Nationalists
to their senses."

A year earlier a similar conference

had been held

in London which had concluded that sanctions could be effective and
would not work undue hardship on the countries imposing sanctions.
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8°Ibid., U.
8l

Ibid., 10. This fear that the United States would be on the
"wrong side" once the South African blood bath began was prevalent
among supporters of sanctions. See Victor Ferkiss, Africa's Search
for Identity (New York, 1966), 31U; Theodore Rozak, "What It Means
to be an American," Nation, October 25, 1965, P* 277; Stanley Meisler,
"Our Stake in Apartheid," Nation, August 26, 1965, p. 73; testimony of
George M. Houser in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs
United States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess,, 1966, pp. 193-9^ (herafter United
States-South African Relations).
Qp
U£See the collection of papers resulting from the London con
ference in Ronald Segal, ed., Sanctions Against South Africa (Baltimore
I96U), especially Elliot Zupnick, "The Impact of Sanctions on the
United States," in ibid., 186-96.

Others besides Weiss at the American conference attempted to show that
the proposed sanctions could be effective.

For example, Alvin W.

Wolfe, an anthropologist at Washington University, spoke on "The
South Africa Trade and International Sanctions" and declared that if
the United States, Great Britain and West Germany "would so much as
breathe the threat implied in the word 'sanctions,1 South Africa's
On
economy would not hold a candle against that 'wind of change.'" J It
was necessary to believe this would be the effect of sanctions in
order to support sanctions, if the focus of such support was on
bringing about reform within South Africa.

For if economic sanctions

would not cause the whites to change their policies, then the non
white population might well be the hardest hit by sanctions, Just as
the American officials argued.

Those at the conference were not

radical enough to argue publicly that sanctions should be used to bring
about a "cleansing" blood bath in South Africa from which majority
rule would result.
There was, however, another reason why a person could support
sanctions even in the absence of a belief that sanctions could bring
about change in South Africa.

This was the belief that moral principle

could not condone the United States continuing to support a racist
regime or to participate in profits realized from an undemocratic and
oppressive society.

Several speakers asserted this point, but it was

®3jvivin W, Wolfe, "The South African Trade and International
Sanctions," k .(paper among the materials on the conference lent to the
author by the American Committee on Africa). See also "Stop South
Africa Now," New Republic, May 16 , 196k, pp. 3-^: "if the United
States and Britain quit filling iPrime Minister Verwoerd's] pockets
whilst Bhaking a finger at him, he might take them seriously enough
to introduce reforms also."
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the conference chairman, the Reverend James A. Pike, who made it most
clearly.

He argued at the close of the conference that the United

States must impose an economic "boycott on South Africa as a matter of
conscience even if this did not "bring about an immediate change in
South Africa's racial policies.

This rationale could sustain an

argument for sanctions even after the efficacy of sanctions became
very doubtful.

And, to be sure, even some of the sharpest critics of

South Africa had doubts about sanctions.
In the same month as the national conference on the South
African crisis and American action, a study was published which raised
very serious questions about the feasibility of sanctions as a method
of promoting constructive changes in South Africa's racial policies.
The whole range of options open to the United Nations on the South
African issue were examined in depth in a study sponsored by the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Apartheid and United
Nations Collective Measures. ^

The foreword to the study indicated

that it had been prompted by the fear of a revolution in South Africa
and the effect of such an outbreak of violence on world peace.

The

contributors examined the nature of South African society (though
specifically declining to "pause to make the case that apartheid is
wrong, undesirable, and at odds with international standards of human
fill
°""National Conference Requests Economic Sanctions Against
South Africa," 3 (press release). Similarly, George M. Houser told
the House Subcommittee on Africa that even if sanctions did not bring
change to South Africa, "they would help to save the soul of our own
country," United States-South African Relations, 19^.
Qc
?Amelia C. Lelss, Apartheid and United Nations Collective
Measures (New York, 1965).

11*5

rights and Justice"), its amenability to internal and external pres
sures for change, and the steps and measures available to the United
Nations should its members wish to anploy them.
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No specific recommendations for American or United Nations
policy on South Africa were made by the contributors to the study.
Nevertheless, they did make it fairly clear that they believed that
collective measures against South Africa could be justified under the
United Nations charter, and that South Africa did constitute a threat
to world peace through the application of its racial policies.

But

looking on the objective of sanctions as "inducing or forcing the
government of South Africa to remove racial barriers to full and equal
participation in the political, social, and economic life of the coun
try," the contributors were skeptical about the ability of sanctions
to fulfill their objective.

ft*7

As one of them viewed it:

While there are numerous uncertainties present, the greatest of
all is the psychological response of white South Africans.
Based
on purely economic calculations and assuming determination on the
part of the South African government to resist the measures taken,
it becomes reasonably clear that no single economic measure would
be likely to have a sufficiently powerful impact to force
aquiescence IsicJ. Indeed, South Africa could probably hold out
against a complete boycott and embargo reasonable [sic] well for
several years, possibly longer.
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Ibid., 5, passim. For other discussions of sanctions, see
Gwendolen M. Carter, "United States Foreign Policy Toward South
Africa," in Marian D. Irish, ed., World Pressures on American Foreign
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, I961*)» 118-29; and the essays
in William A. Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New
York and London, 1968).
On
JLeiss, "A Summation," in Leiss, ed., Apartheid and United
Nations Collective Measures, 156.
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William A. Hance, "Efforts to Alter the Future:
Action," in ibid., 130.

Economic

Ih6
Given the likelihood of white intransigence in South Africa
even in the face of economic sanctions and the probability that some
countries would not comply with sanctions, the study's contributors
felt it necessary to look into the possibility of a naval blockade of
South African ports and armed invasion of the country.

The study went

so far as to calculate the number and types of warships and aircraft
necessary, the numbers of men required for amphibious and air assaults,
the costs of these for varying periods of time, and the casualties
expected (19,000 to 38,000 killed and wounded among the United Nations
forces alone) so as "to defeat the South African military forces and
break the will of the government and the people to resist in order that
the political system could be altered to meet the U.N. demands.

1.89

Concluding that collective military measures were practical from a
purely military point of view, Amelia Leiss said that the major ques
tion about the use of such force was political.
stated:

Summarizing, she

"Put simply, U. N. collective action will be feasible when

and if those states with the capacity to carry it out Ii.e., the United
States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France] make the political
90
Judgment that it is required."
Although

the Carnegie study did suggest the need

for some type

of collective action against South Africa, supported the legitimacy of
such

action, and tried to show the feasibility of strong measures, its

®^Leiss, "Efforts to Alter the Future:
in ibid., 150.
90

Military Measures,"

Leiss, "A Summation," 156. There was also a United Nations
report by a special committee which came to about the same conclusion
as the Carnegie study. See New York Times, March 2, 1965, p. 6 ; and
March 20, 1965, p. 10.
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overall effect was to cast doubt on the efficacy and desirability
of the United Nations proposals.

This was because it indicated that

change could be brought about in South Africa only with considerable
bloodshed and with considerable sacrifices on the part of the Western
powers.
Others who were hostile to South Africa backed away from
sanctions because of these considerations.

Peter Ritner, for example,

who had earlier called for strong measures against South Africa, now
reassessed his position.

Several months after the publication of the

Carnegie study he said he found something "faintly unedifying" about
the elaborate plans which had been drafted to involve the whole world
in the destruction of South Africa's whites.

Commenting further, he

stated:
Even the most extreme anti-Afrikaner agrees that to achieve its
aims such a campaign Iof sanctions^ will require an unparalleled
degree of synchronized action on the part of all the other
nations of earth. Here is something like the whole world
falling upon the city of Philadelphia.
Is the world justified
in taking so lofty a line?91
One of the reasons why Ritner changed his mind about sanctions was
that now he believed the Afrikaners to be very "tough" and would resist
change strongly.92

Great bloodshed would be required to bring change.

Ritner now decided that time should be the great liberator, not the
United States.
Despite such misgivings about sanctions on the part of some of

^ P e t e r Ritner, "The Problem of Sanctions," Commonweal, May

28, 1965, p. 315.
92Ibid., 318.
93Ibid., 319•
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the anti-South African activists, further efforts were made to induce
the United States to go along with the United Nations proposals.

These

efforts yere perhaps encouraged by steps taken by the United States
government with regard to South Africa in mid-1965, a time at vhich
relations betveen the tvo countries became more strained than at any
time Bince the American statement deploring Sharpeville.

In Hay 1965

the United States cancelled a visit by the aircraft carrier
Independence after the South African government indicated that black
crew members would not be particularly welcome.^

A belief that the

United States might try to integrate some of its South African facil
ities led Prime Minister Verwoerd to announce that black Americans
would not be welcome as personnel in the American space-tracking
stations.
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The South African government was also disturbed by an

American decision to hold multi-racial diplomatic receptions and other
official functions, by American blocking of the sale to the South
African air force of French-made jets which employed American-built
engines, and by the Canadian government's blocking of sales of Ford
Motor Company's Canadian subsidiary's four-wheeled vehicles to the
South African government on the ground that this would violate the
arms embargo.
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Because of the growing differences, the American

ambassador, Joseph C. Satterthwaite, was recalled to the United
States for consultations and an intensive review of American policy

^Nfew York Times, May lU, 1965, p. 3; "South Africa Bars
American Negroes," New Republic. July 10, 1965, p. 8 .

^ N e w York Times, June 29, 1965j P* 8.
^ Natal Daily News, July 16, 1965 (all citations to this news
paper are from the paper's clippings files in Durban, South Africa).

1^9

in August

1965. ^

These developments would have indicated the

possibility of significant changes in American policy.
An additional factor which suggested to anti-South African
activists that change in American policy could be forthcoming was the
prospect of a judgment against South Africa by the International
Court of Justice with respect to its administration of South West
Africa.

South Africa had acquired South West Africa, a former German

territory, as a Class C Mandate at the end of World War 1.^®

After

World War II South Africa made a request at the United Nations that
it be allowed to incorporate South West Africa as an integral part of
its own territory.

This proposal met with strong opposition and was

defeated because of concern over South Africa's racial policies.

The

United Nations then began to assert that it had jurisdiction over
South West Africa, and South Africa denied the competency of the United
Nations to treat on the subject.
The issue of South West Africa was still unresolved in i960
when Ethiopia and Liberia, the only African states which had been
members of the League of Nations, took the question to the Interna
tional Court of Justice.

They sought a binding decision that the

League Mandate was still in force and that South Africa had failed to
live up to its obligations to provide for the material and moral
welfare of its indigenous population.

Two years later the Court ruled,

by a vote of eight to seven, that it had jurisdiction to hear the

9?Natal Daily News, August 2, 1965; August 7, 196598
7 On the background of the South West Africa question see
generally Ruth First, South West Africa (Baltimore, 1963); Allen Ray
Newman, "South Africa and the Post-war Question of the Incorporation
of South West Africa," (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of North
Carolina, 1967).
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case.

The litigation then proceeded in very lengthy inquiries with

volumes of evidence produced hy South Africa's legal team.

Ethiopia

and Liberia were represented by an American attorney, Ernest A. Gross.
By 1965, people were anticipating an imminent decision by the
International Court, and many expected it to be adverse to South
Africa.

Critics of South Africa believed that once such a verdict

was rendered there would be no legal barrier under Article II,
Paragraph Seven of the United Nations Charter (the paragraph pro
hibiting intervention in the internal affairs of member states) to
collective United Nations actions, since the United Nations would then
clearly have authority over South West Africa,

The United States, it

was felt, would have to go along with United Nations measures with
regard to South West Africa.

This in turn, particularly if opposed

by South Africa, could be the basis for further activities against
South Africa itself.

A clear statement of this scenario for action

was made by Elizabeth S. Landis, an attorney and an official of the
ACOA, in an editorial in Africa Today. Writing in reference to the
possible refusal of the South African government to accept United
Nations control of South West Africa, she stated:
Such a refusal would send the enforcement problem to the
Security Council under Article 9^ of the Charter; and the
Council, like Eisenhower at Little Rock, might feel obliged
to vindicate the Court's authority by drastic measures. . . .
The moral for the United States is clear. In the event of a
potentially favorable decision, it must cut through legal
technicalities, bureaucratic inertia, and Europe-oriented dogma
to help implement the Court's decision swiftly and effectively.
For the second time in a single generation our country may have
the chance to prove b^ action its belief in equality and the
brotherhood of man. Domestically we are gingerly grasping
the opportunity. Internationally we can do no less: indeed,
with the experience in our own country to guide us, in both
purpose and compassion, we must take the lead in helping to
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end the blight of apartheid in southern Africa,-7,7
It was against this background that the Subcommittee on Africa
of the House of Representative's Committee on Foreign Affairs held
hearings on American policy on South Africa,

According to the

Chairman of the Subcommittee, Representative Barratt O'Hara of
Illinois, the hearings arose from his own embarrassment over the
American position on South Africa when he served as a delegate to the
United Nations.

Stating this and the purpose of the hearings, he

opened the inquiry with the following;
As a delegate to the United Nations, I was called upon to
present the position of the United States as regards apartheid,
I stated, as had other delegates from the United States to
previous General Assemblies of the United Nations, that it was
a practice which the American people could not condone.
Yet despite that positive position on the immorality of
apartheid, our Government took the position that apartheid
did not constitute a threat to peace, the kind of threat
that would properly bring the matter of sanctions before the
Security Council of the United Nations. This resulted in a
growing misunderstanding with the emerging nations of
Africa. . . . Whether that position is valid or not I do
not know. That is the reason these hearings were scheduled.
A report from Washington appearing in a South African news
paper suggested that the real driving force behind the hearings was
not O'Hara but Arthur J. Goldberg, then the American Ambassador to
the United Nations.

According to the report, Goldberg cornered O'Hara

99Elizabeth S. Landis, "South West Africa; Hatching a Deci
sion," Africa Today, XIII (March, 1966), 3 (emphasis in original).
See also, Patrick Duncan, "South West Africa: Timetable for Freedom,"
Nation, March l6 , 196U, pp. 265-67.
100United States-South African Relations, 1. O'Hara had lived
long enough to come full circle on his views on the Afrikaners. As he
told a South African reporter in Washington, Ken Owen, he once tried
to join a unit to fight on the side of the Boers in the Anglo-Boer
War, Natal Daily News, April 19, 1966.
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in a hotel suite in New York and suggested that O'Hara hold the hearings,
hoping that such Congressional action could influence American policy
to the point where President Johnson would drop opposition to sanc
tions.

Thus an American policy maker was attempting to influence

public opinion so as to gain support for a foreign policy position. 10P
Goldberg later made quite explicit his support for sanctions.

in o

Activist groups were also probably in part responsible for
the decision to hold the hearings.

Both Goldberg and O'Hara had come

under pressure from such organizations.

For example, on Christmas

Day, 1965, members of the NAACP and the Du Bois Club picketed the
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York where Goldberg made his residence,
protesting the American position on South A f r i c a , A n d the ubiqui
tous American Committee on Africa had some Influence.

After the

national conference which the ACOA had more or less hosted in 19&5,
delegates from the conference had called on O'Hara to urge policy
101

Natal Daily News, March 10, 1966. The author had occasion
to ask Goldberg about the truth of this report, and Goldberg admitted
that he had been responsible for O'Hara's calling the hearings.
Goldberg said his reason for this was that he did not feel that the
American people knew enough on the subject, a subject which was very
important at the United Nations. Personal interview with Arthur
Goldberg, Durham, North Carolina, November 29, 1973.

102
Bernard Cohen has found after extensive interviews that an
overwhelming proportion of foreign policy officials accept the
desirability or necessity of shaping the public opinion environment
along supportive lines. Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on
Foreign Policy (Boston, 1973), l8l.
■^^See Arthur J. Goldberg, "A Case for Disengagement," in
George M. Daniels, ed., Southern Africa; A Time for Change (New York,
1969), 22.
■^^New York Times. December 26 , 1965, P- 37.
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changes.

At the 1966 hearings George M. Houser, Executive Director

of the ACOA, testified:

"I guess it -wouldn't he out of place to say

that in a discussion some of us had with Ambassador Goldberg at the
United Nations shortly after he had taken office last fall, he
seemed to favor a very strong policy and agreed with many of the
things which we presented to him . . . ."1^6
The hearings were stacked rather heavily against South Africa.
The Subcommittee heard the testimony of same thirty-six witnesses who
appeared as private citizens, as representatives of organizations, or
as spokesmen for the government; it also received written statements
from many other groups and individuals.
Nine witnesses were government spokesmen or former officials
who explained the position of the American government on South Africa.
Some of their testimony will be discussed further in a later chapter,
and it will be sufficient at this point to observe that the general
position they took was that South Africa, although its racial policies
were abhorrent, offered certain benefits to the United States and that
circumstances did not, as of the date of the hearings, warrant con
sidering South Africa so great a threat to peace as to Justify
Security Council sanctions
105Lowder, "U. S. Conference on South Africa," 510.
~*~^United States-South African Relations, 203. The influence
of the ACOA appeared in the hearings in other ways. It was obvious
from the statements of some of the Congressmen that the ACOA had pre
pared background material for their use; e.g., see ibid., p. 31. And
several of the witnesses had been participants in the 19^5 national
conference on sanctions.
107

See, for example, the testimony of Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, ibid., 2-12.

15U
Of the other twenty-seven witnesses, twenty-one were private
individuals, or representatives of private organizations, who were
hostile to South Africa and favored a stronger American policy against
South Africa.

The spectrum of opinion in this group ranged from

advocates of moderate sanctions to those advocating very harsh meas
ures .
Waldemar Nielsen, the President of the African-American
Institute, was a good example of an advocate of relatively mild
sanctions.

He was unambiguous in his criticism of South Africa,

stating that "the racial policies of the South African Government in
the mid-1960's confront all decent and democratic individuals In the
world with the same essential issue as nazism posed in the 1930's.
He made it clear that South Africa presented a dangerous threat to
world peace.

And he believed that it was in the national interest

that the United States show the world its strong condemnation of
apartheid:
Nothing {he saidj could so foul the principles and prestige
of the United States in the eyes of the world as collabora
tion with— or even an ambivalent attitude toward— the
political and social philosophy symbolized and flaunted by the
Government of South Africa.1*9
Despite his strong feelings, Nielsen advocated only limited
measures against South Africa.

He called for ceasing to encourage

investment in South Africa, warning business of the dangers of in
vestment there, controlling the flow of South African "propaganda"
to the United States, increasing contacts with the non-white majority

108united States-South African Helations, 72-73.
1Q9lhid.. 77.
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in South Africa, and giving further assistance to refugees from South
Africa.

As he put it, he believed that until the whole problem of

southern Africa came to a head, "we must allow this stench in the
nostrils of decent humanity to continue to exist."
Others were not so generous as Nielsen.
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Irving Brown,

Director of the New York office of the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and Executive Director of an AFL-CIO project
called the African-American Labor Center, called for much stronger
measures through the United Nations.

He indicated his belief that

South Africa constituted a present threat to world peace and intro
duced into the record ICFTU and AFL-CIO statements that all actions
short of war should be used to change or eliminate the white regime
in South Africa.

Congressman Boss Adair of Indiana pursued this

latter point, asking Brown:
How far should the United States go? Mr. Brown, you said in
your statement . . . '.'employ every action short of war." That
is pretty clear. You are not, then, advocating the use of
armed force, is that correct?
Mr. Brown: No, I think that you will find in my statement
that I quoted to the United Nations that any effective boycotts
would require certain military means at the disposal of the
United Nations to enforce such a boycott.
Mr. Adair:
force.

Well, then you would favor the use of armed

llOlbid., 78-80. Nielsen drew back from stronger measures
because he feared that war would result. As he had stated in a
book published a year earlier, "any other course than rejection [of
mandatory sanctions] would be a violation of [the United States's]
own responsibilities as a world leader and contrary to the interest
of its own citizens and of all mankind." Waldemar A. Nielsen,
African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa (New
York, 1965), 86.
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Mr. Brown: I would favor, if this boycott is adopted by
the United Nations, that in order to implement it, that they
have sufficient force to make it effective.m
Similar positions were taken by several other witnesses.
Chairman O'Hara came close to this himself.

At one point he told a

witness:
There is an American spirit. We are fighting for something in
Vietnam. We are fighting for exactly the same thing in South
Africa, and we must be consistent.-*--^
Such observations suggest that perhaps the Vietnam war was
not an aberration, but instead an outgrowth of a general view of
world affairs that was prevalent among American leaders.

The ''lesson”

of World War II was that events limiting freedom anywhere in the world
had an immediate impact on and directly involved the interests of
the American people.

This point was repeatedly made by Congressman

Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota.

He told one witness that he kept

thinking back to the 1930s and Germany and had concluded that "never
again can we say that what happens inside another nation can remain
beyond our concern no matter what."

113

To another witness who said

apartheid was an internal matter, Fraser commented, "I find it hard
to believe that on this planet we can ignore what happens to our
fellow human beings.
There was another "lesson" too that played a part in the
thoughts of Fraser and others on sanctions against South Africa,
-*--*--*-United States-South African Belations, l6l.
112Ibid., 111.
113

Ibid., 339.
Ill:
Ibid., 185.

This
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was the "lesson" of the history of race relations and the civil rights
movement in the United States.

Fraser noted that blacks in the .Ameri

can South had achieved rights only through war and federal legisla
tion.

"The realities," he said, "are that the North imposed its

will through Federal legislation upon the S o u t h . O t h e r Americans
too were convinced that persuasion was not a useful method of dealing
with racism.

Edward Crowther, for example, was a clergyman who had

engaged in civil rights activities in the United States and had then
gone to South Africa as the Anglican Bishop of Kimberly and Kuruman.
In the Christian Century he wrote that the church’s "participation in
the civil rights movement in the U. S. . . . has a great deal to teach
us in South Africa about direct confrontation of wrong, about standing
up and being counted."11^

In the same publication, several other

activists argued in favor of sanctions, saying:
Martin Luther King, Jr., would not have obtained integrated
public facilities in the south if he had simply written letters
to the mayors of all U. S. cities asking them to work toward
integrated seating in their municipal bus systems; he had to
begin in Montgomery, Alabama. The church has accepted the
validity of this kind of thinking in most areas; on what
basis does it pull back when the problem of its investments
[in South AfricaJ arises?!!?
Among the twenty-one witnesses clearly hostile to South Africa
were four former South Africans who strongly opposed the Nationalist

115Ibid., 327.
*i *|ZT

Edward Crowther, "The Church's Task in South Africa,"
Christian Century. July 27, 1966, p. 93^.
117
’Letter of David Hornbeck, Charles W. Powers, and John C.
Paines to the editor, Christian Century, December 7, 1966, p. 1506.
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government.

They favored the strong actions against Saruth Africa.

There were also six witnesses not associated with the federal govern
ment who gave what could be considered testimony favorable to South
Africa at the 1966 hearings.

This is not to suggest that they

necessarily favored apartheid, but instead that they opposed a harsh
policy on South Africa.

The testimony of several of these will be

taken up in later chapters.

It is only pertinent to note here that

several of the Congressmen were openly hostile to them for their
statements on South Africa.

Congressmen O'Hara, Benjamin Rosenthal of

New York, and John C. Culver of Iowa attempted to put several of these
witnesses in a bad light by asking rather demeaning questions about
who had paid for their travel expenses to visit South Africa, or
whether they had been reimbursed for their testimony in the South
West African case.

119

Indicative of the attitude of several of the Congressmen
towards these witnesses were several remarks made to General S. L. A.
Marshall, a noted writer on military affairs.

After Marshall stated

he did not believe that the United States would necessarily be com
mitted to observe or implement a decision on the South West Africa
case if it should be contrary to American interests, Congressman
Rosenthal commented:

"If your position is that individuals or nations

should not be bound by court decisions, you are perfectly entitled to
nt A
These were Leslie Rubin, a professor at Howard University
and former Senator in the South African Parliament; Kenneth Carstens,
a Methodist clergyman; Gladstone Ntlabati, a student at the Harvard
Divinity School; and Mary Benson, an author.
"^^United States-South African Relations, 182, 283, 286,
321-22.
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that position."120

Later, Marshall was quizzed by Congressman Fraser

on apartheid, and Marshall indicated to him his disapproval of
apartheid.

Nonetheless, Fraser showed his distaste for Marshall in

an exchange that followed a few minutes later:
Mr. Fraser: I would think that one's moral sensibilities
would be offended greatly by the logic of apartheid as it
has unfolded in Africa.
General Marshall: Sir, you already asked me that question.
You asked me if I am sympathetic-Mr. Fraser [cutting Marshall shortJ: I perhaps feel more
strongly about it than you do,121
Anticipation of such treatment at the hands of hostile
Congressmen is undoubtedly a major reason why more witnesses favorable
to South Africa did not appear at the hearings.

The Subcommittee did

indicate a desire to hear from American business leaders, but only one
(Clarence B. Randall, President of Inland Steel Company) was interested,
and he was too ill to attend.
Nothing came out of the hearings of the Subcommittee.

The

Subcommittee made no policy recommendations, and no visible policy
changes were made as a result of the hearings. They stirred no great
interest in South African policy in Congress.

122

The testimony of the

120Ibid., 323.
-L21Ibid., 328.
122For an excellent analysis of sentiment in Congress on South
Africa and other African issues, see Gary Gappert, An Africanists1
Guide to the 91st Congress (Washington, 1969) (mimeograph available
from the American Committee on Africa; copy in possession of the
author). For an earlier analysis, see Stanley Meisler, "The II. S.
Congress and Africa," Africa Report. IX (August, 196*1), 3-7. Both con
firm that while some Congressmen were active on African issues,
Congress did not play a significant role in policy making.

witnesses did not mobilize American public opinion against South
Africa.

The hearings were simply inconclusive.
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This was not

primarily the fault of the conduct of the hearings; rather, it was
due to events extrinsic to the hearings.
Even as the Subcommittee on Africa was hearing testimony the
drama of the South West Africa case was reachinga denouement
Hague,

-^e

The long-awaited decision of the International Court of

Justice was handed down on July 18, 1966. By an eight to seven
decision (with the President of the Court having to break a tie by
casting a second vote) the Court held that the complaining parties—
Liberia and Ethiopia— lacked standing; that is, they lacked legal
capacity to bring the suit before the Court.
The Court’s decision was unexpected, and It Infuriated a
number of South Africa's critics.

The Subcommittee on Africa had

Ernest Gross, the American lawyer who had represented Ethiopia and
Liberia, appear befo're it to discuss the decision.

Representative

Rosenthal declared that in his Judgment world order suffered substantially from the decision.

TOll

At the United Nations, the Afro-Aslan

group of states decided to proceed to place South West Africa under
123

^The Subcommittee on Africa held further hearings on
Southern African issues after Charles C. Diggs, a black Congressman
from Michigan, became its Chairman. In 1969 there were hearings on
the granting of a permit for the planes of the South African Airways
to land in New York, and on the continuation of a quota for South
African sugar. In 1971 and 1973 there were extensive hearings on
American business involvement In South Africa. None of these pro
duced significant policy changes.
12k
s
United State3-South African Relations, 526. See also
"South Africa's Victory," Nation. August 8 . 1966, p , 107; "World
Court's Non Decision," New Republic, August 13, 1966, p. 7; Ernest A,
Gross, "The South West Africa Case: What Happened?" Foreign Affairs,
XLY (.October, 1966}, 36-1+8.
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United Nations authority despite the decision.
Whatever the merits of the decision of the International
Court, it altered the complexion of the policy questions which faced
the United States.

The decision removed the prospect of clear legal

justification for American intervention in South Africa, and it
strengthened the hand of those who felt sanctions inappropriate.

When

the United Nations attempted to "override" the decision through its
resolution, it made the African bloc appear to be the side to the
controversy which was unwilling to adhere to the rule of law.

The

International Court's decision was thus a significant factor in

c

reducing or eliminating the prospects for success of the movement for
American participation in United Nations sanctions against South
Africa.

There were other factors contributing to this which will be

discussed in the final chapters of this study.
Before turning to these other factors, it will be necessary to
consider briefly what became of the movement for sanctions after it
became apparent that the United States would not initiate a stronger
policy against South Africa.

The movement did not die with the

International Court's decision and the termination of the 1966 Congres
sional hearings.

It simply took a new tack.

Paradoxically, while the

moyement lost the possibility of bringing about broad change within
South Africa, it gained somewhat in effectiveness in limited areas
and grew in the volume of materials its spokesmen put out on matters
pertaining to South Africa.
The anti-South African movement now followed a course of

I25united Nations, General Assembly Resolution 21^5 (XXI}
U966).

action implicit in its earlier criticism of American business in
volvement in South Africa,

Instead of devoting further substantial

efforts to getting the United States government to use American
business as a diplomatic tool (through sanctions) against South
Africa, the movement now turned directly against business itself.
Although bringing about change within South Africa remained a stated
goal of the movement, the emphasis of the movement shifted to the
apparent goal of cleansing the United States of a collective guilt
from earning profits from apartheid and from giving support to South
Africa through business.involvement.
The dissatisfaction with government policy and the extent to
which business was blamed for policy was seen in the reaction of the
liberal journals of opinion to a speech attacking apartheid by
President Lyndon B. Johnson in May 1966. Speaking at a White House
reception for African leaders on May 26 , President Johnson had made a
"model" denunciation of apartheid and r a c i s m . T h e Hew Republic
quoted a portion of it on American support for majority rule and
opposition to South Africa's "narrow and outmoded policy" and com
mented that this was America talking out of the left side of
its mouth.

Out of its right side, American business was saying

This is not to say that activists ceased to urge policy
changes by the federal government. Some continued to call for the
same policy changes advocated earlier; e.g., John Marcum, "Southern
Africa and United States Policy: A Consideration of Alternatives,"
Africa Today, XIV (October, 1967), 5-13; Lincoln Bloomfield, The
UN and World Order, Foreign Policy Association Headline Series No.
197 (New York, 19&9), 56. Rather, the focal point of activity
shifted in the manner described below.
127l$mdon B. Johnson, "The United States and Africa: A Unity
of Purpose," Department of State Bulletin, June 13, 1966, p. 915.
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something else, said the Hey Republic, addingj

"The sheer scale of

existing business investment itself offers assurance that the U. S.
government will not act 'rashly* by putting too much pressure on South
Africa to alter her 'narrow and outmoded policy,'"

128

Commonweal noted

President Johnson's words against apartheid and commented:
If they had been accompanied by equivalent action, say by the
economic disengagement of the U. S. from South Africa, we might
celebrate. . . . Il]nstead of celebrating, the President's
speech is an occasion to reflect on how little reason Africans
have to believe our stated good intentions.-*-29
The Nation similarly noted that American investments spoke louder than
American words denouncing apartheid. nJo
Because of sentiments such as these, the main thrust of the
anti-South Africa campaign since about 1966 has been against
American business operations in South Africa.

The movement has been

directed primarily at forcing reduction of business involvement re
gardless of governmental policy.

The details of this movement for

"disengagement," as it has been commonly called, are somewhat beyond
the scope of this study and are of too recent a date to be readily
accessible.

Nevertheless, the activity itself is germane to this

study in that it has been an outgrowth of the harsh image of South
Africa and a sense of guilt among some Americans over alleged complicity
-*-28*tg0uth Africa," New Republic, August 13, 1966, pp. 7-8.
■'■^"African Investments," Commonweal, June 10, 1966, p. 327.
It should be noted that the American Committee on Africa had published
an updated "Special Report on American Involvement in the South
African Economy," as a special issue of Africa Today, XIII (January,
1966), and that the Commonweal editorial, and probably the New
Republic editorial, relied on it.
■^^"South Africa's Victory," Nation, August S, 1966, p. 107.
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in apartheid.

One of the leading proponents of disengagement,

Henry P. Van Dusen, President Emeritus of Union Theological Seminary,
enunciated a basic premise of the policy when he stated:
Every American investor or employee in American firms doing
business in South Africa, every American depositor or employee
of virtually every major American bank involved with South
Africa, every American educational, philanthropic or religious
body holding similar investments or deposits is, however
unwittingly and unwillingly, a profit-taking partner of
apartheid. Let Americans of conscience declare to those
who administer their money: "This sordid involvement must
cease."131
The ethical demonstration of such action, he said, would be epochal.
The activity against American business aimed at disengagement
is also pertinent to this study because it has further stimulated
efforts to produce more favorable images of South Africa, or at least
of American business activity in South Africa.

Thus it would be

worthwhile to examine scane examples of the campaign against American
businesses operating in South Africa that have developed in recent
years.
The types of activities engaged in by anti-South Africa groups
have been quite varied.

They have ranged from simple demonstrations

staged to embarrass individual businessmen— such as mining entre
preneur Charles W. Engelhard— to rather sophisticated use of the proxy
system under the securities laws for shareholder participation in
corporate decision making. 132

The employment of these activities can

best be suggested by tracing the campaign against a loan to South

-'-^Letter of Henry P. Van Dusen to the editor, Life, December
2, 1966, p. 29. See also Van Dusen1s statement on western "guilt" in
"Third Thoughts on Africa," Christian Century. July 1, 196**, pp. 855-57On such a demonstration against Engelhard, see "Hews and
Views," Commonweal. May 2k, 1968, p. 282.
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Africa "by a consortium of American banks.
In 1951, a revolving credit agreement for about $30,000,000
(later increased to $1+0,000,000) was set up for South Africa in which
a consortium of American

banks participated.

It did not begin to

draw serious criticism until the mid-1960s after attention was drawn
to it because of its renewal during the critical period after
Sharpeville.

1"3-3

Even then, it was not the more established opponents

who began the attack on the credit agreement.

Instead, it was a

newer generation of activists who transformed the growing concern of
the opponents of South Africa over business involvement in South Africa
into specific initiatives against such business involvement.
Foremost among the student activist groups of the 1960s was
the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

It is perhaps indicative

of the prominence of South Africa as a target for liberal groups in
the mid-1960s that the first time that the SDS's national council
singled out a program of action for chapters throughout the country it
chose to demonstrate against American investment in South Africa.
a meeting of the national council in New York in December

At

196U, the

SDS endorsed a program of demonstrations against the Chase Manhattan
Bank and other banks which had participated in the loan to South
Africa.

13l+

Demonstrations against the banks took place in at least

■*"33it should be noted that the Council on African Affairs had
strong criticism for the loan. Alphaeus Hunton, "Postscript," Resis
tance Against Fascist Enslavement in South Africa, 60-62. Also, the
Nation had registered its disapproval of the loan. Editorial, Nation,
February 3, 1951, p. 98. For other background material on the loan,
which was really one of several loans made at the time, see S. D.
Greenberg, "United States Policy Toward the Republic of South Africa,

19^5-1964," 108-llU.
■^Silan Adelson, SDS: A Profile (New York, 1972), 212.
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six cities in. March 1965-

In New York, some four to six hundred

members of the SDS and other organizations took part in a five-hour
demonstration at the Chase Manhattan building,

Five of the demon

strators were allowed to meet with a member of the bank’s board of
directors to express their protest.

Forty-nine of the demonstrators

who staged a sit-in at the back doors of the building were arrested,-*-35
Student militancy against the loans to South Africa also re
sulted in the formation, at the Union Theological Seminary, of the
Southern Africa Committee of the National Student Christian Federation
(which later became the University Christian Movement).

These students

began calling on Protestant church bodies to stop depositing, and to
withdraw, their funds in banks which took part in the South African
loan or had operations in South Africa.

For example, in April 1966

a number of Union Theological Seminary students jointly condemned the
Methodist Church's Board of Missions for depositing its funds in the
First National City Bank of New York.

The Board declined at this

time, but did call for American businesses operating in South Africa
to work against apartheid, and for the American government to review
its relations with South A f r i c a . I n the same month, three hundred
students and others took part in a march down Broadway to a branch of
the First National City Bank where seventy of the group withdrew their
■^^New York Times, March 20, 1965» PNational
Student Association also went on record in opposition to the loan;
see American Committee on Africa, A Summary Report on the Bank
Campaign (New York, n.d.), 2.(pamphlet in possession of the author).
l^'What Would John Wesley Do About It7" Christian Century,
October 19, 1966, p* 126k.

accounts.^37
The student activities were united with the work of the
American Committee on Africa in the summer of 1966 when members of
the National Student Christian Federation and the ACOA jointly formed
the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid.

The ACOA was thus

drawn somewhat to the left by more radical student groups.

Direct

activity against business was, however, a logical outgrowth of its
criticisms of business policy in South Africa.

And, as it became

obvious that the 1966 Congressional Subcommittee hearings would have
little effect on policy, the ACOA had no other direction in which it
could turn, except perhaps to close up shop.
lished an institution for that.

It was too long estab

But in moving further to the left it

incurred the risk of losing its more moderate support, just as the
Council on African Affairs lost its audience when it grew increasingly
radical.

It may be doubted though whether the formation of the

Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid (CCAA) was perceived as a
radical step.
Named as Chairman of the Committee of Conscience was A.
Philip Randolph, a veteran black civil rights leader and a Co-Chairman
of the ACOA.

Plans were made to generate public pressure to bring

about the withdrawal of institutional and individual funds from banks
participating in the credit agreement.

The Committee of Conscience

and other organizations which joined in the campaign printed pamphlets,
wrote letters to elected officials, called on personnel at the banks,
staged demonstrations against the banks, made use of bank shareholder
"^^American Committee on Africa, Summary Report on the Bank
Campaign, 2.
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meetings to protest the involvement of the hanks, called on universi
ties to divest themselves of stock in the banks, circulated petitions,
and called for boycotts of the banks by individuals.^8®

The campaign

of the CCAA attracted attention and support in the liberal periodicals
which had long been critical of South Africa.

In lending its support

to the campaign, the Christian Century stated:
The long range purpose of the C. C. A. A. campaign against the
New York City banks is to compel the United States to alter
its South Africa policy radically and to stop allowing U. S.
dollars to finance abroad the racism it seeks to eliminate at
home. This is a cause worthy of the sympathy and support of
conscientious men.^-39
Within a short time, the Committee of Conscience began to
achieve a measure of success.

By December 1966 Chairman Randolph was

able to announce that almost $23,000,000 in funds had been withdrawn
by groups and individuals from the two principal targets of the cam
paign, Chase Manhattan and First National City Bank."*"^

In September

of the following year the Methodist Church's Board of Missions, in a
reversal of its earlier position, voted in favor of transfer to
another bank a $10,000,000 investment portfolio that was held by the
First National City Bank.

Mrs. Porter Brown, the Board's General

Secretary, indicated that the purpose of the action was moral; it was
not expected to bring about change:

138Ibid., 2-6 .
■*-39"Financing Racism," Christian Century, December 7, 1966,
pp. 1^95-96. See also, "Bank Loans to South Africa," America,
February 25, 1967, p. 27^; "Banks and South Africa," New Republic.
December 17, 1966, pp. 6-7; Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., "The United
States and South Africa," Christianity and Crisis, November 28, 1966,
pp. 265-69.
American Committee on Africa, Summary Report on the Bank
Campaign, 3.
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Even the most enthusiastic supporters of the hoard's decision
recognize that the mere transfer of a portfolio amounting to
a little more than $10 million would probably not hring radical
changes in the policies of either the hank or the government
involved. On the other hand, it is a moral ohligation of the
churches to throw whatever light they can upon the dark wounds
of suffering in the world.
Other churches withdrew funds or hegan inquiries into whether they
should do so.

lh2

After radical student activities, Cornell and

Princeton Universities sold their stock in the target hanks.'11*3
The ultimate success of the hank campaign came in November 1969
when a South African official announced in a terse statement that the
credit agreement would not he extended.

The expenses incurred in the

loan, he said, were no longer warranted because of South Africa's
strong gold and foreign exchange position.

lliL.

He might well have said

that the benefits of the loan no longer outweighed the embarrassment
and inconvenience which the loan caused both the South African govern
ment and the hank consortium.

After the South African announcement,

the American Committee on Africa suggested that the hanks themselves
may have been responsible for initiating the termination of the loan.
But even if the South African government took the initiative it seems
very possible that it was doing so to save the American banks from
ll*l
"Methodist Missions Use Economic Leverage," Christian
Century, March 6, 1968, pp. 308-309.
ll+2
Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, The Church Makes a
Decision on South Africa/Banks (New York, 1969) (special report in
possession of the author). This organization, founded in 1956, is one
of the oldest of the activist religious groups on South Africa.
lhl
“American Committee on Africa, Summary Report on the Bank
Campaign, 1*
Ibid., 1.
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further disturbance that might jeopardize more important areas of
business activity.
The bank campaign as such ended with the termination of the
consortium credit agreement.

However, activity did continue against

the principal Hew York banks which operated in South Africa.

In

addition, the bank campaign spawned activities against other areas
of business involvement in South Africa; the techniques employed
against the banks were utilized against other businesses; and groups
formed in opposition to the bank loan continued to operate afterwards,
focusing on other targets for protest.

For example, when students

challenged university officials because of university holdings of
stock in the banks, they went on to challenge them for holding shares
in other corporations.which invested or operated in South Africa.

And

the technique of voicing opposition to the credit agreement in bank
shareholders' meetings came to be employed against other corporations
with activities in South Africa.
After the bank campaign several of the anti-South African
organizations turned their attention to the automotive industry.
Timothy H. Smith, writing as an offical of both the Southern Africa
Committee (University Christian Movement) and of the Council for
Chrisitan Social Action (United Church of Christ), published a lengthy
ikq
pamphlet entitled The American Corporation in South Africa.
Very
lU5

Timothy H. Smith, The American Corporation in South Africa:
An Analysis (New York, 1970) (pamphlet in possession of the author).
In an interview with the author, Smith indicated that the purpose of
sanctions was to bring about a change to a more just society in South
Africa (personal interview with Tim Smith, New York City, June 10,
1972). Two other officials of the Southern Africa Committee indicated
to the author that they looked to sanctions more as a means of
opposing the activities of American business abroad; South Africa was
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critical of the role of American business in the South African
economy, the study contained a considerable amount of material on the
automotive industry.

Some of Smith's research was utilized by

another organization, the Council on Economic Priorities, when Smith
served as a consultant in the preparation of a special report on
"Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in South Africa,"'*'^

The American

Committee on Africa then produced a smaller pamphlet on General Motors
and South Africa, apparently based on the earlier two studies.
With this background information compiled, religious organiza
tions now turned to direct action against General Motors.

In 1971, the

Social Criteria Committee on Investments of the Episcopal Church sub
mitted a resolution at the annual shareholders meeting of General
Motors Corporation which requested the Board of Directors to adopt
resolutions to amend the corporate charter to forbid operations in
South Africa.

lU8

Ostensibly, the reason for proposing such a resolu

tion was fear for the church's investments if apartheid should lead to
turmoil.

The Committee had found that some thirty-one companies in

focused upon simply because it was a particularly egregious example
of such activities (personal interview with Reed Kramer and Tami
Hultman, Durham, North Carolina, December 20, 1972).
■j J ifC

Council on Economic Priorities, "Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors in South Africa," Economic Priorities Report, I
(October-November, 1970).
11,7
'American Committee on Africa, General Motors and South
Africa (New York, 1971) (pamphlet in possession of the author).

lk8

Edgar Lockwood, "The Episcopal Church and General Motors:
David and Goliath— 1971," Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa, n.v.
(April, 1971), 3. See also, "U. S. Business in South Africa,"
Newsweek, March 29, 1971, pp. 80, 83; and "The American Corporation
Under Fire," Newsweek, May 2k , 1971, pp. 7^-83.
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which it had investments carried on business in South Africa.

But it

decided to single out General Motors, probably because it had the
highest degree of visibility.

Although unsuccessful, the action by

the Committee did raise the question of corporate activity in South
Africa to a higher level of public debate.
Later in 1971, members of the Episcopal Committee on Social
Criteria for Investments (subsequently renamed) joined with repre
sentatives of groups from four other Protestant denominations to form
what became known as the Church Project on United States Investments
in Southern Africa.

A group of these churchmen made a visit to South

Africa to investigate activities of a number of American corporations
operating there.

After the visit, the Project undertook to solicit

proxies from the shareholders of General Motors, Goodyear, and Gulf
Oil in support of resolutions requesting the boards of directors of
these corporations to provide reports to their shareholders on details
1^9
of the corporations' activities in southern Africa.
The Church
Project was no more successful than the Social Criteria Committee had
been the previous year.
Still other corporations have come under attack for various
aspects of their operations in southern Africa.

The Polaroid Corpora

tion has been challenged by several organizations, including one
^^Church Project on United States Investments in Southern
Africa, "Proxy Statement" (March, 1972) (copy of proxy statement for
General Motors, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, and Gulf Oil, with
appendixes, in possession of author). For a copy of the report of
the Churchmen after their visit to South Africa, see the Congressional
Record, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., E 2950-55 (March 23, 1972). See also,
New York Times, January 17, 1973, p. k.
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formed from among its own workers, the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers
Movement.1^

The American Committee on Africa has criticized General

Electric and International Business Machines for their operations in
southern Africa.

151

Proxy resolutions with reference to southern Africa

have been filed with the Newmont Mining Corporation and American Metal
Climax by church groups.
Activists continue to bring pressure on American corporations
at this time.

It would be premature to attempt an assessment of their

success or lack of success.

They have forced the corporations

operating in South Africa to respond and perhaps to examine more
closely their policies in South Africa.

They have not, however, re

sulted in the disengagement freon South Africa that their proponents
have advocated.

The activist groups have been troublesome irritants

to the corporations over which they have asserted their moral superiori
ty.

It is doubtful that anything positive has came from their attempts

to impose their consciences upon the people associated with these
corporations and upon all the people of South Africa.
were successful?

And if they

One can ohly speculate, and the activist groups, after

all, need not be too concerned, for they would not have to live with
the consequences of their actions.

^Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement, Polaroid and South
Africa (n.p. [Cambridge, Massachusetts], 1970) {this pamphlet and other
materials were kindly supplied to the author by Ms. Caroline Hunter of
the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers Movement); George M. Houser, "The
Polaroid Approach to South Africa," Christian Century, February 2U, 1971*
2^9-52; "South Africa: Polaroid Stays Put," Hewsweek, January 10, 1972,
pp. 50, 53.
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American Committee on Africa, Power to the Portuguese Empire
from General Electric (New York, 1971); American Committee on Africa,
I.B.M. in South Africa (New York, 1971) (these are ACOA "fact sheets" in
possession of the author).

CHAPTER V

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE SOUTH AFRICA'S IMAGE:
PIERCING THE PAPER CURTAIN

The movement for sanctions against South Africa was not with
out opposition in the United States.

There were Americans who were

favorably inclined towards South Africa and who opposed criticism of
and measures against South Africa.

The remarkable thing is not that

there were such individuals and groups, but that they so seldom gave
expression to their views during the first decade of Nationalist rule
in South Africa.

In the late 1950s and the 1960s, however, some Ameri

cans came to see the situation in South Africa and American policy
towards South Africa as involving issues touching upon or threatening
their own interests.

Also, favorable information on South Africa

became more widely available to those Americans who might be willing to
reject or oppose the hostile image of South Africa.^"
1

It was not, of course, necessary to have favorable information
on South Africa to have a favorable image of the South African govern
ment and the policy of apartheid. Indeed, some of the sympathy that did
appear in the United States for South Africa in the 1960s grew out of a
reaction to the fact that "liberal" publications had been criticizing
South Africa so severely. See, for example, the letter of the New York
Times reader, A. F. P. Mbyler of West Redding, Connecticut, who found
his "sympathies increasingly with the Afrikaners, which is probably one
result of the shrill and intensive propaganda against the regime from
liberal sources throughout the world." New York Times Magazine, May 1,
i960, p. 6 . Likewise, an author of an article favorable to South
Africa in American Mercury said that his work had been "inspired by
the mendacious newspaper coverage of the recent riots, which gave an
intentionally distorted picture of those heroic people whose early

17k
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The activities of several South African and American agencies
and organizations were a significant factor in the creation and pro
motion of more favorable images of South Africa among Americans in the
1960s and opposition to a hostile American policy towards South Africa.
The background and work of the more important of these groups will be
discussed before going over the specific views of Americans who were
favorable to South Africa.
In the period since World War II the governments of many of the
nations of the world have grown increasingly concerned with the way
they are viewed by people abroad.

The growth of the mass media has

had a profound effect on the conduct of politics and diplomacy, and, in
response to this, government agencies have been created to carry on
public relations work abroad for their countries, either specifically
in the hope of exercising political influence through the creation of
favorable public opinion or to promote tourism, trade, and investment.

2

The South African government has recognized for some time the impor
tance of foreign opinion and has carried on an active campaign for a
number of years to influence American views of South Africa.
The South African Information Service which is in operation
today began as an Information Bureau instituted in 1937 in the admin
istration of Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog.

It had only three informa

tion branches abroad during World War II, one of which was a New York
office opened in 19^2.

The Bureau was succeeded by the State

history reads so much like our own." Frank Volkman, "Boer and Bantu in
South Africa," American Mercury, JCCI (November, i960), 2.
p

John Lee, "Preface," in John Lee, ed., The Diplomatic Persuaders: New Role of the Mass Media in International Relations (New
York, 1968), x.
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Information Office created by the government of Jan Smuts in 19^7.
This Office was reorganized when the Nationalists came into power in
19^8, and its operations were placed under the authority of the Depart
ment of Interior.

The Nationalist government stepped up the activity

of the Information Office abroad and increased the money allocated to
the foreign operations.

3

An office of the Information Service was

opened in Washington, D.C. in 1951 to complement the work of the New
York office created earlier.
In the first years of the operation of the Information Office
by the Nationalist government the primary technique of attempting to
influence opinion was through the distribution of various publications,
including a weekly Digest of South African Affairs, "Fact Papers,” and
other pamphlets and sheets aptly known as "throw-aways" among public
relations people.

An early example of the sort of work carried on by

the Information Service was its distribution to news media and
interested persons in the United States of a letter by Prime Minister
Mai an to an American clergyman.
In 1952 Reverend J. H. Piersma of Grand Rapids, Michigan wrote
to Malan asking for a frank description of apartheid which he could use
in discussing the policy and the problems of South Africa with his
fellow Americans.

The response was a rather defensive plea by Malan

for an understanding of South Africa's dilemma.

k

Malan's letter

3
Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African
Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California, 1965), 2h-25i Vernon McKay,
'"South African Propaganda: Methods and Media," Africa Report, XI
(February, 1966), ^3-^; John Laurence, The Seeds of Disaster (New
York, 1968), lU2-l»3.
k
This letter is discussed and quoted in L. E. Neame, The
History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South Africa
(London, 1962), 80-82.
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stressed the vast differences "between the ways of life of the white
and black populations, and the small numbers of the whites in the
country.

It made little sense, the letter said, to criticize apartheid

in the abstract without regard to the extraordinary conditions in
South Africa, and that it would be just as -immoral to consider only the
rights of the blacks as it would be to have regard only for the rights
of the whites.

Attempting to counter the harsh image of the white

population, Malan*s letter stated:
I must ask you to give White South Africans credit for not
being a nation of scheming reactionaries imbued with base and
inhuman motives, nor a nation of fools blind to the gravity
of their vital problem. They are normal human beings. They
are a Bmall nation grappling with one of the most difficult
problems in the world.?
Describing apartheid as a tremendous experiment, Malan pointed out that
his government was doing a great deal to improve the living standards
and education of the non-white population.
Another technique employed by the South African Information
Service to influence American images of South Africa was to write
letters to the editors of publications in response to articles they
published tdiich were hostile to or misrepresentative of South Africa.
An illustrative example of this was the letter by Conrad Norton, the
assistant director of the New York office of the Information Service,
to Time, in 195^.

Time had published a report about the conviction in

South Africa of two young white farmers for flogging an African to
death.^

The magazine's writer quoted a "Boer farmer" who had said

after the trial that it was a deep humiliation to see white men sent
5Ibid., 8l
6"The Flogging of a Kaffir," Time, June 7, 1951*, pp. 30, 33.
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to prison for killing a thieving Kaffir.
editor said:

Norton's letter to the

’’Had your correspondent used a fraction of the diligence

he showed in tracking down and recording an anonymous 1Boer farmer1s1
comments on the case, he could not have failed to mention in passing
the countless numbers of South Africans— both 'Boer farmers' and
others— in whom the crime aroused the same shocked views as those held
7
by the trial judge."
In spite of the fact that the Nationalist government attached
considerable importance to foreign opinion, its early efforts (such as
those described above) at international public relations work were
ineffective.

The repercussions from Sharpeville and the independence

of other African countries spurred the South African government to
devote still more attention to improving South Africa's image abroad.
In 196l Prime Minister Verwoerd established a State Department of
Information and Wentzel C. du Plessis, at one time the Ambassador to
the United States, as its first Secretary.

8

The standard activities

of the Information Service— the printing and distribution of informa
tion on South Africa— were increased, and new approaches were imple
mented that had a somewhat different focus.
Over the years, the South African Information Service had
basically two tasks to accomplish.
7

The first of these was to counter

Conrad Norton to the editor of Time, ibid., June 21, 195U,
p. 8 . For several more typical examples of such letters by Information
Service officials see the letter of W. J, Le Roux to the editor,
Atlantic. CCX (July, 1962), 33; and, more recently, the letter of
L. E. S. de Villiers to the editor, New York Times, August 3, 1971,
p. 29.
Q
Wentzel C. du Plessis, "South Africa's Image Abroad," in
G. Cronje, ed., South Africa in the World (Cape Town and Johannesburg,
1970), 72.
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an existing bad image.

The effort to reject the tenets of the harsh

image is apparent in much of the material put out by the Information
9
Service.
As described by the information counselor of the South
African Embassy in Washington, W. G. Meyer, the media in the United
States often portrayed South Africa in a most unfavorable light: "At
every possible occasion South Africa has been presented to the world
as a despicable monster, governed as a police state by racists prac
tising a policy of oppression contrary to all accepted moral standards
and religious concepts; no less than a threat to world peace.

The

Information Service sought to convince people that such views were
incorrect.
It was not enough, however, just to try to counter the poor
image of South Africa.

A second task was to create a positive image to

replace the negative one.

The government had to try to show that South

Africa has positive value t o those whose goodwill it sought to retain
or win, as well as attempting to demonstrate that its racial policies
were mlspa’ceived.

In the 1960s the Information Service focused more

^For example, a pamphlet published in 1961 and distributed in
the United States, began its discussion of "Race Policy" by saying:
The policy of Apartheid— of separate development— and its
implications as far as White-Black relations are concerned
are not always fully understood.
Firstly, it is sometimes erroneously contended that the
Whites robbed the Bantu of a fatherland, that apartheid is
the system under which the White population exerts a cruel
domination over the Bantu, and that it implies the eventual
herding together of all surplus Bantu workers into barren
reserves, where they will be kept in perpetual subservience
to the whims of the Whites. Nothing is further from the truth.
South African Quiz (Pretoria, 1961), 25.
^■®W. G. Meyer, "The Challenge of South Africa," in Lee, ed. , The
Diplomatic Persuaders, 100.
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on this second task, and was able to undertake somewhat more effectively
both tasks as it made use of new approaches to influencing opinion.
Some of the principles guiding the South African Information
Service were brought out by Derick de Villiers, a United Party member
of Parliament, in an article published in the South African periodical
Mew Nation. ^

Describing the overseas information service as the

"cowcatcher of diplomacy" which’bweep[sj obstacles from the line of
advance," he said that the service had to restrict its activities to
the accomplishment of a few carefully selected aims.

These objectives

had to be chosen with a view to "the country's main strengths— for
example, economic rather than political in the case of South Africa—
and the impact these are likely to make on a particular foreign
audience."12

The correct medium, he observed, had to be chosen to

make the message effective, and personnel had to be selected with an
eye to their "ability to reconcile the political, economic and cul
tural interests of their own country with those of the country in
which they will work."

13

De Villiers recognized that the limited

financial resources and manpower available to South Africa meant that
the overseas information officer had to reach the many through the few.
Finally he said that services offered by the information agency had to
be reliable, fair, objective, and continuously offered.

These stand

ards enunciated by de Villiers are sound from the standpoint of public
relations work, and they describe correctly the basic working

^Derick de Villiers, "The Cowcatcher of Diplomacy: South
Africa's Overseas Information Services," Mew Kation, IV (February,
1971), 16-17.
12Ibid., 17.
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principles in recent years of the South African Information Seryice
in the United States.
In the 1960s the Nev Yo:rit office of the Information Service
continued to make available published information on South Africa
though increasing the amount it produced from what it had previously
distributed.

Three regular publications were prepared and sent out

by the New York office:

a weekly news release which summarized news

from South Africa, a Business Report which stressed material end data
of interest to American investors or potential investors in South
Africa, and a monthly called Scope which varied in content end format.
Another three publications were sent to Americans from South Africa:
the South African Digest, a weekly containing news and statements of
government officials; Bantu, a monthly with information on black South
Africans; and Panorama, a slick paper monthly with attractive pictures
on South African life.

These last three publications were not pro

duced specifically as propaganda for the American market but were
circulated among readers in South Africa as well as abroad.

Department

of Justice data on the circulation of these six periodicals in the
United States, according to Vernon McKay, showed that they were
reaching only a very small audience.

In December 1965 circulation

ranged from a high of 1^,000 for Scope to a low of 1,200 for Panorama.
In addition to the periodicals, hundreds of pamphlets were produced
for public consumption.

lU

The content of the publications of the South African Informa
tion Service varied from the colorful to the highly political.
^McKay, "South African Propaganda," k6 .

In
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general, nearly all tried to project the image of a stable country
facing immense problems which the government has attempted to alleviate
through an enlightened policy of the separate development of the races.
They frequently sought to persuade the reader of South Africa's
strategic importance to the West as an anti-Communist ally, and
emphasized that South Africa was an area of prosperous industrial
development. One such pamphlet, for example, made the point that
apartheid was both necessary and moral, quoting Dr. Verwoerd as
stating:
Cannot you understand us fighting to the death for our existence?
And yet we do not only seek and fight for a solution which will
mean our survival, but seek one which will grant survival and
full development, politically and economically to each of the
other racial groups as well, and we are even prepared to pay
a high price out of our earnings for their future.^5
Another pamphlet produced about 196^ was entitled South African
Prospects and Progress:

Economic Survey of an Industrial Giant in

Africa. The image of South Africa that it sought to convey was
expressed succinctly on its first inner page, as well as in the pam
phlet 's title:
On the southern tip of Africa, in one of the greatest mineral
treasure houses of the world, a new industrial giant is arising.
Already this land of golden opportunity, the Republic of South
Africa, has far outstripped all other countries in Africa in
output and living standards; and is poised for new spectacular
economic advances.

•^Progress Through Separate Development: South Africa in
Peaceful Transition (Mew York, n.d.), 15 (pamphlet in possession of
the author). A "fact sheet" produced at about the same time, probably
196U, in the possession of the author, stated "South Africa is firmly
committed to the cause of the Free World and has outlawed the
Communist Party. The Republic fought on the side of the Allies in two
world wars and against the Communists in Korea."
^ South African Prospects and Progress: Economic Survey of an
Industrial Giant in Africa (2nd U.S. ed. « Hew York., n.d.)T 2.
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These examples were typical of much of the material which was
published by the South African Information Service.

17

Many governments

with diplomatic representation in the United States publish the same
sort of pamphlets and periodicals.
activity influences many.

It is doubtful that this kind of

The publications reach relatively few people,

and they are usually regarded by the people who receive them as propa
ganda.

Nevertheless, many information agencies continue to churn out

such material because it does reach some people, and it is tangible
evidence that the agency has been at work.
Recognizing the limited effectiveness of the information
agency's activities in the 1950s, Piet Miering, the director of the
Information Service at the time, sought the advice of American public
relations firms.

After contacting four firms in 1955 s Meiring con

cluded that they could not effectively represent South Africa's interests in the United States,

lB

Five years later, however, he signed a

contract with a New York public relations firm, the Hamilton Wright
Organization.

19

The Wright Organization was begun in 1908 as a public

relations agency; over the years it came to specialize in representing
foreign governments, including Mexico, Nationalist China, Morocco,
17For more on the publications put out by the South African
Information Service, and a paint by point refutation of the facts
they contain and arguments they make, see John Laurence, Seeds of
Disaster, 80-l68. Laurence, a British subject, worked for ten years
in an advertising agency in South Africa which had been engaged by
the South African government to develop such material for distribution
abroad.
18
McKay, "South African Propaganda," M .
19

■^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives in the United States,
Hearings, 88th CongT, Ts¥ Sess., 1963, 707-709 (hereafter Activities
of Nondiplomatic Representatives).
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Italy, and the Ivory Coast.

The South African government agreed to

pay the Organization $250,000 to represent it in the United States.
The approach used hy the Hamilton Wright Organization differed
somewhat from the standard published fare that the Information Service
had been producing.

The philosophy of the Organization, as Hamilton

Wright, Sr. explained to Meiring, was to make use of "positive nonpolitical propaganda to create an effect essentially political." 21
The public relations firm worked through newspapers, magazines, news
reels, television, shortfilms, and other media.

It concentrated on

what it felt were the positive elements of South Africa:

the progress

of the country, the economy and the extent of foreign investment, the
natural resources, the culture and folklore, the tourist attractions,
and South Africa's social accomplishments.
Films cn South Africa were produced by the Hamilton Wright
Organization, including "A Touch of Gold" on gold mining, "South
African Frontier," and "South Africa Today."

These were turned over

to Twentieth Century Fox, Metro-Goldvyn-Mayer, Universal-International,
and firms in Spain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, and
elsewhere for distribution to theaters.
distributed also to television stations.

Some of the films were

2?

The Organization sent

still-photos of South Africa and articles to several thousand newspapers

20
Piet Meiring to J. William Fulbright, August 1, 1963, in ibid.,
1508-1509.
21
Hamilton Wright, Sr. to Piet Meiring, November 22, 196l, in
ibid., 708-709.
pp

For example, "South African Frontier" was distributed for the
Hamilton Wright Organization by Radiant Films and shown at stations in
Birmingham, Alabama, Houston, Texas, Great Falls, Montana, and Tampa,
Florida. Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 759*
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with, said the head of the firm, an eighty per cent acceptance rate.

23

Still another activity of the Organization was to make contacts with
American news editors with a view to arranging trips to South Africa
for them through the South African Information Service.

2k

The contract between the South African government and the
Hamilton Wright Organization was not extended when it came up for
renewal in 1963.

The reasons for this are not clear.

Hamilton Wright,

Sr. told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that South Africa had
wanted him to use "hard-core" political propaganda, and he was un
willing to do this.

The South African government had already had him

release one such film on the Transkei against his better judgment, and
it had been unsuccessful.

25

But it is likely that the South Africans

did not feel that Wright was delivering as much as he claimed to be.
No doubt the Hamilton Wright Organization was embarrassed when the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee printed a letter from Hamilton
Wright, Sr. to an agent for Warner Brothers Pictures Distributing
Corporation requesting that the agent send him a "rave" letter com
mending him for "A Touch of Go]d" so that Wright could use it to
demonstrate his effectiveness to the South African government.

26

^Wright to Meiring, November 22, 1961, in ibid., 708. In
testimony, Wright, Sr., said that National Geographic magazine printed
a number of photos contributed by the Organization. This was undoubted
ly in reference to photographs in Kip Ross, "South Africa Close-up,"
National Geographic, CXXII (November, 1962), 6Ul-8l.
^Hamilton Wright, Jr. to Willem Le Roux, April 12, 1962, in
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 1 ^ 6 . The author has been
unable to ascertain whether any such trips were made at this time.
25
Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, 717-18.
^Hamilton Wright, Sr. to Charles Bailey, September 12, 1962,
in ibid., 1U92.
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The South African government tried another public relations
firm in 1965 when it entered into an agreement with a Washington con
sultant, T. A, Mclnery.

This arrangement was terminated upon the death

of Mclnery before the agreed-upon work was completed.
Even as the South African Information Service was attempting to
work through American public relations firms, it was broadening the
range of activities that it carried on.

It began producing films of

award-winning quality for television and for motion-picture theaters.
In 1965 short wave facilities were opened to broadcast the "Voice of
South Africa" around the world. ^

Officials of the government at all

four of the South African posts in the United States (New York,
Washington, New Orleans, and San Francisco) participated in television
and radio interviews and delivered public lectures.

The Information

Service also used new approaches to reaching an American audience
through newspapers.
In the spring of 1965 the Information Service purchased three
full-page advertisements in the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Houston Chronicle, the San Francisco Chronicle, and the Chicago
29

Tribune.

The first showed one hundred thousand people in one of

South Africa's football fields.

This represented the number of

Europeans who had immigrated to South Africa because "there is stability,
2^McKay, "South African Propaganda," 1*5; Washington Post,
April 25, 1965, A 31. Mclnery was a former director of public
infoimation for the Justice Department,
2®New York Times, July 19, 1965, p. 30; October 28, 1965,
p. 12.
g^Natal Dally News, March 25, 1965 (all citations to this news
paper are from the paper's clippings files in Durban, South Africa).
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peace and progress in this Republic, one of the fastest growing
QQ
economies in the world.'
It said that capitalism was taken for
granted in South Africa, and that South Africa, as a strongly anti
communist country, had supported the United States in the Berlin air
lift and in the Korean conflict.

The other two advertisements in the

series emphasized South Africa's economic progress and the political
development of the Transkei.

The chief information officer of the

Information Service in New York, J. 0. Adendorff, said that the ads had
drawn a strong response and that most letters commenting on them hed
been very favorable.

31

It was estimated that these advertisements

probably reached more than seven million people in the areas served by
the newspapers.
Even though the South African government was able to reach more
people through newspaper advertising of this sort, it still was a form
of propaganda and was likely to be received as such by most of the
people who read it. To be effective, favorable information on South
Africa had to be in the form of news or opinion by Americans not anployed by the South African government.

A means of achieving this was

found which in part depended, fccr its success, upon the harsh image
that was predominant in the American media.
One of the repeated themes that can be found in the published
writings and statements of Americans who have visited South Africa is
that the country and the government are not nearly so bad as they had
been led to believe by the reports on South Africa that they had read

^®New York Times, March 21, 1965, E 12.
31

Natal Pally News, March 25, 19651965, A 31,

Washington Post, April 25,
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before going to South Africa.

For example, a visiting American

businessman, the president and general manager of a San Francisco
savings and loan institution, was interviewed in Durban in 195^.
told the reporter:

He

"Somehow the picture obtained overseas is one of

great unsettlement, which a personal visit serves largely to dispel.
One of the main reasons why groups opposed to the South African govern
ment have tried to discourage American tourism has been because, as
one critic put it, tourists to South Africa "often leave the country
with a very 'white* picture of her racial situation."^

Or as the

writer E. J. Kahn, Jr., expressed it with regard to his own reaction
to apartheid:

"after a few weeks there, whatever one's views about

aparthei d, one gets used to it. It simply becomes part of the
oh
environment . . . .
The South African government, and seva*al other groups,
32
Quoted in Sunday Tribune (Durban, South Africa), April 13,
195^ (Natal Daily News clippings file).
33
Tim Smith, "Suggested Actions," in George M. Daniels, ed.,
Southern Africa: A Time for Change (New York, 1969), 93. A similar
position was taken by Joseph C. Kennedy in a paper presented at the
national conference on "South African Crisis and American Action"
(March 21-23, 1965) in Washington, D.C., entitled "American Private
Involvement in South Africa," 36 (paper among the materials on the
conference lent to the author by the American Committee on Africa).
His research showed that Americans constituted the second largest group
of tourists to South Africa throughout the period I960 to 196^, and
that many of them reacted favorably to the country. Ibid. , 2-3.
Kennedy's study discusses the activities of the South African Tourist
Corporation (SATOUR) in the United States. These activities have not
been discussed in detail here because they have been glided by the
same considerationsoperative with regard to the South African Informa
tion Service. The two have worked together and used some of the same
approaches.
31*
E . J . Kahn, Jr., The Separated People:
South Africa (New York, 196*3), 2b.
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apparently observed this phenomenon and undertook a public relations
program based on it.

The Information Service began bringing journalists

and other opinion leaders to South Africa to see the country for them
selves.

The hope was that such visitors would be favorably impressed,

or at least conclude that the country was not so bad as they had been
led to believe, and would return to the United States to write and
speak favorably of South Africa.

Although the Hamilton Wright Organiza

tion did make some contacts for the Information Service for such a
program, the author has been unable to find any examples of people who
made the expense-paid tours of South Africa prior to 1965, and officials
of both the South African and the American governments were unwilling
to provide him with information on the program.
People chosen to make the tours were usually newspapermen with
occasional business, religious or military leaders taking paft. 35
^

Many

were conservatives whose views could be expected to be more favorable
to South Africa even before they visited South Africa.

However, South

African officials recognized that some critics had to be brought to
South Africa as well as friends so as to lend credibility to the
program.

36
Normally the visitors and their wives were flown to South

Africa for a fifteen to twenty-five day tour which included sojourns
in the major urban centers, stop-overs in the Transkei, and lectures by
various government officials at the sites of government programs.

The

3^See Francis Pollock, "America's Press on Safari," Nation,
November 7, 1966, pp. 1+79-81. Pollock, who spent three years in Africa
working for the American government, lists a number of the people who
participated in the program in 1965 and 1966,
^ D u Plessis, "South Africa's Image Abroad," 75.
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visitors were generally allowed to see whatever they wished to and to
talk to anyone they wanted to.
impressed.

Often they left the country favorably

For example, the education editor of the Philadelphia

Bulletin, Peter H. Binzen, made the tour in 1966 and was impressed by
the self-government program for the Transkei.

He told a reporter that

his group of fourteen had met white civil servants who were obviously
dedicated and sincere in their
Transkei.

approach to the problems of the

Binzen had thought that there would be more overt repression

than he had seen, and he said:

"I didn't expect the prosperity on the

scale which all races seem to enjoy."

37

American visitors on the Information Service tours would fre
quently publish their views in their newspapers.

Binzen's reports

appeared on the front pages of the Philadelphia Sunday Bullet in and
Evening Bulletin, February 20-25, 1966.

Binzen concluded inter alia

that separate development deserved close study, that the solution to
South Africa lay somewhere between complete separation and proportional
representation, and that South Africa "with its enormous mineral wealth
and key location at the foot of Africa, is of great importance to the
West in the Cold War."

38

On one trip to South Africa of this nature,

George N. Crocker of the San Francisco Examiner wrote that he had.
found that the economic boom in South Africa was so great that Africans
from neighboring countries were clamoring to get in.

He continued:

More importantly, the South Africans are anti-Communist
and loyally pro-West. They are the most reliable opposition
to Communism on the African continent and to the outflanking

•^Natal Daily News, February 7, 1966.
Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, February 25, 1966, pp. 1, 36.
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of Europe, which is known to he a major objective of the
Russian and Chinese apparati of the World Communist
conspiracy.39
Although the Information Service tours occasionally resulted
in unfavorable publicity for South Africa, they generally worked
effectively.

1*0

The program had immediate returns in that visitors

would write favorably in their publications, giving the Information
Service a wider audience than it could have through advertising, and
the "message" was more credible than if it had been prepared by the
Information Service.

The Information Service would sometimes reprint

the views of the visitors and distribute them to people on its mailing
list or to people who wrote to the Information Service for material on
South Africa.

1*1

But the program also resulted in the creation of a

body of American Journalists with generally favorable views of South
Africa and a sense of personal involvement with the country who were
likely to speak up for South Africa when issues arose in the future.
Thus when a film "South African Essay" produced by Henry Morgenthau III
was shown on television in 1966, Thomas R. Weiring of the Charleston
Hews and Courier criticized it in his columns; Waring had made the
Information Service tour in 1965.
39

1*2

Quoted in Pollack, "America's Press in Safari," 1*79-

1*0
For an example of an unfavorable response to the trip, see
Richard Atcheson, "South Africa: It Could Have Been Arcadia," Holiday.
XLVI (November, 1969), 32-33, 7**, 76-77, 61-83.

1*1
E.g., the articles of Ross Mackenzie, sin associate editor of
the Richmond News Leader, which appeared in his paper after a sponsored
tour in Apri1-May 1969 were reprinted in an attractive format with pic
tures and distributed by the Information Service under the title "A
Report on Southern Africa" (pamphlet in possession of the author).
1*2
Letter of Henry Morgenthau, III to the editor of Nation,
December 19, 1966, pp. 658, 686.
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Because the author has been unable to obtain data about the
numbers of American brought to South Africa by the South African
Information Service, it is not possible to assess fully the success of
this program.

After reading South African nevspaper accounts of In

formation Service tours and inquiries to various American newspapers,
it appears that hundreds of such visitors have participated in the
tours and that the program has been fairly effective in mobilizing a
segment of conservative opinion in the United States in favor of South
Africa.
The idea of bringing American visitors to South Africa to gain
a better understanding of its problems from personal observation did
not originate with the South African Information Service.

Instead, the

use of such a method was begun by the United States-South Africa Leader
Exchange Program (US-SALEP), an organization which first brought
American leaders to South Africa in 1958.
The man responsible for the creation of the United StatesSouth Africa Leader Exchange Program was Dr. Frank s. Loescher who
became the Program's first director.

An authority on inter-group

relations, Loescher had served as a consultant to the Fund for the
Republic and as the director of Philadelphia's Commission on Human
Relations. He was the author of The Protestant Church and the Negro
and of articles on race relations in the United States and South
Africa.
Dr. Loescher's first visit to Africa was in 1953 when he
served as a consultant for a program of the South African Institute
of Race Relations.

After this experience he began to consider ways

in which American voluntary organizations could provide constructive
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help for South Africa's problems.

One way, he believed, of accom

plishing this vas through the exchange of influential persons from the

1(0

two countries. J

Friends of his in South Africa encouraged the idea,

and he enlisted the aid of the American Friends Service Committee in
the United States.

A conference sponsored by the Service Committee

was held at Haverford College in May 1955 to inquire further into the
possibilities of an exchange program and to explore the resources that
might be called upon for such a program.

Eighteen representatives of

eleven religious, philanthropic, educational, and cultural exchange
organizations attended the conference.

They appointed an Interim

Committee to carry on with the idea; it called a second conference two
years later.

In January 1958 Ur. Loescher was named director of the

newly created US-SALEP and exchanges were begun a few months later.

1+ 1+

The Program had criticism from liberals in the United States
and from conservatives in South Africa.
nature of the Program.

1+5

This was due to the very

On the one hand, it tried to serve the purpose

of making South African leaders more liberal.

It tried to make them

aware of currents of thought in the United States on race relations and
to break down intellectual isolation in South Africa.

But from the

standpoint of many of the South African supporters of the Program, it
also had the function of showing to American participants that South
Africa's problems were highly complex, far more difficult than the

JNatal Daily News, December 17, 1959-

1+1+

Carol Ann Weisenfeld, The First Decade (n.p., 1968), 2.
This publication was provided to the author by Dr. Loescher.

^See William 0. Brown, "Some Relevant Aspects of South African
Society," in Leiss, ed., Apartheid and United Nations Collective Meas
ures (New York, 1965), 1+1; and Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation
of South African Foreign Policy. 77.
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problems of race relations in the United States,

The International

Management Committee of US-SALEP, made up of an American and a South
African Executive Committee, reflected the diversity of purposes that
the organization has tried to serve; it consisted of individuals of
very different backgrounds and political persuasion, ranging from
black Americans to strong supporters of the Nationalist Party in South
Africa.^

All, however, undoubtedly shared the assumption that commu

nication with South Africa was preferable to its isolation.
Between 1958 and 1968 there were 228 individuals or families
who participated in the exchange programs, most of which were for
periods of three months.

Of these, 160 were from South Africa and

sixty-eight were from the United States.
sponsored by US-SALEP.

Six types of exchanges were

University faculty exchanges had the highest

priority; a third of the exchanges in the first decade of the work of
the organization were associated with universities. A second type of
exchange was functional, that is, dealing with specialized projects
such as conferring on the role of small business in economic and
community development.

Science exchanges were arranged in cooperation

with the National Science Foundation.

Another activity of US-SALEP was

to sponsor South African newspapermen as Associate Nieman Fellows at
Harvard University.

A fifth type of prog? am was to support two-way

exchanges of clergymen, a South African minister serving an American's

congregation and vice-versa.

Finally, there were Independent Exchanges,

visits to each other's country by American and South African leaders
h.7
from various fields. J
^^Weisenfeld, The First Decade, 5-7•
^ I b i d .. 3-U.
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American visitors to South Africa under the US-SALEP exchanges
were often surprised to find that South Africa was not so had as they
had expected from their reading on the country in the United States.
To cite an example, one such exchangeevas the Reverend William H.
Felmeth, a Presbyterian minister from New Jersey.

He took his wife

and daughter to South Africa in June 1967 when he exchanged pulpits
with Dr. J. Dalziel at St. Columba's Church in Johannesburg.

He told

a reporter in South Africa that he had found from his visit that the
situation was at variance with the harsh impressions gained abroad.
He said that he was returning home after his ten week visit to "marvel
at how much was being done, frequently with concern and compassion,
to implement the policy of separate development."

1*8

Participants in

the Program gave expression to similar views in important publications
and places.

Although the Program did not issue a regular publication

and did not adopt any particular "line" on South Africa, it is possible
to speak of a US-SALEP image of South Africa in bringing out some of
the main points in the published views of several Americans who par
ticipated in the exchanges.
The most prominent feature of the US-SALEP image of South
Africa was the view that white South Africans were not depraved and
that there was hope for constructive change in South Africa through the
more enlightened members of the white community.

The people associated

with the program often expressed the belief that racial prejudice is
based on social and economic differences between racial groups rather
than irrational reactions to differences in skin color or psychological

^ Natal Daily News, October 5 S 1967, "Verkrampte v. Verligte,"
Christian Century. November 15, 1967, pp. 1^72, ll*7^-75-
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abnormalities. William 0. Brown, director of the African Studies
Program at Boston University and later a member of the US-SALEP
International Management Committee, wrote in 1955:
Even in South Africa, where great importance is attached to
race per se, the significant factors in race relations are not
the physical differences, existing or imputed, but the basic
divergencies in history and culture as between the so-called
racial components in the South African complex. The emphasis
on race as a physical reality conceals the Europeans' fears
that Africans, Asians, and Coloreds as social groupings may
share with them a common society and compete for place and
status in a common world. °
This approach was most prominently and often expressed by
Edwin S. Munger, a professor of political geography at the California
Institute of Technology who published widely on South Africa.

In

contrast to John Gunther who viewed the South African Bureau of Racial
Affairs (SABRA) as being at the extreme right wing of the Rationalist
Party, Munger found that "SABRA believes that all men are equal in the
sight of God and potentially equal in practice, and that no Christian
solution in South Africa can be based upon an assertion of inherent
superiority of Afrikaner over A f r i c a n . I n d e e d , he said that many
of the speeches he heard at a SABRA meeting were liberal.

It was

Munger's belief that the world press had overstated the importance of
the race issue in elections in South Africa, that the Nazi label on the
Nationalist Party was an "anachronistic epithet," and that South Africa

^ W i l l i a m o. Brown, "Commentary [on a paper presented by
Edwin S. MungerJ" in C. Grove Haines, ed., Africa Today (New York,
1955), 198.
■^Edwin S. Munger, African Field Reports, 1952-1961 (Cape
Town, 1961), 510.

was lay no means a police state under the Nationalists.^
One of Hunger's most important statements of the theme of
hopeful developments within the white groups was his 1969 article in
Foreign Affairs:

"South Africa:

Are There Silver Linings?"
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There

he discussed the development of a split within the Nationalist Party
between the verligtes (enlightened ones) and the verkramptes (narrow
or cramped ones).

The fact that the Nationalist Party was moving to

a verligte position on key issues (immigration, mixed sports, open
discussion of issues, enlightened Separate Homelands instead of
baasskap) was bringing about change in South Africa.

Economic forces

were serving as a liberalizing influence, living standards were rising
among the Africans, and the "victory" of South Africa at the World
Court gave the whites a sense of relief which permitted a freer dis
cussion of future policies and permitted the government to embark on a
new foreign policy friendlier to the African countries to the north.
A hundred Free State Afrikaner farmers, he noted, had recently taken
their tractors to aid the plowing in the African state of Lesotho, and
he quoted Professor N. J. Olivier (who served on the International
Management Committee of US-SALEP with Munger) from a speech at
Stellenbosch where he said:

"We are not monsters and I believe it

will be realized that discrimination based on colour is untenable.

•^Ibid., 5^2i Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African
Foreign Policy, 51; Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism (London,
1967)7 6k.
52
Edwin S. Munger, "South Africa: Are There Silver Linings?"
Foreign Affairs. XLVII (January, 1969). 375-86. See also the views
of Richard B. Ford, a historian at Carnegie Institute of Technology
who was a US-SALEP exchangee in 1967. in his "The Urban Trek:
Comparison of Mobility," in Heribert Adam, ed. , South Africa:
Sociological Perspectives (New York, 1971). 2^9-67.
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It will take time, but we haye seen -many changes in South Africa,
and I believe that this one will came.'

53

In a later issue of Foreign Affairs George F. Kennan, the
historian and diplomat whose views on race and foreign affairs in
different context have already been noted, expressed Judgments similar
to those of Munger.

Kennan said after a US-SALEP visit that he was

inclined to agree with those who felt that "the results of the recent
election, repudiating the right wing of the Nationalist Party and
strengthening somewhat the position of its more moderate opponents,
is the beginning of a trend in the direction of greater liberality and
maturity of official policy— a trend bound to became strengthened as
more young people come into the picture as voters."
The fact that
did not

the whites of South Africa were

not evilpeople

mean that the policy of apartheid was a desirable one. On the

contrary, people associated with US-SALEP often concluded that apartheid
was very harsh, inexcusably so, and that ultimately the aim of complete
separation could not be achieved.

Kennan, for example, stated that the

evils of apartheid were "real, ubiquitous, shocking and depressing.
, . . No merits cf theory could Justify, and no deficiencies of
execution excuse, the inequities and inhumanities which the present
system obviously produces.

Munger similarly found that the hard,

legal facts of life for the Africans did not present either a new or
^^Munger, "South Africa:

Are There Silver Linings," 386.

^George F. Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIX (January, 1971), 22k. See alsoKennan's earlier
and shorter statement of his views on South Africa in
his Democracy
and the Student Left (Boston, 1968), 181-82.
55
Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 219.
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a creditable picture.

He felt that the program of separate homelands

had not made much headway and indicated that only about one-half of the
total African population might eventually live within the enlarged
Bantustans.

nonetheless, Kennan, Munger, and others connected with US-

SALEP said -that 1he whites of South Africa faced grave problems; and
they had a right to maintain their own historical and cultural
identities.57
Finally, American action against apartheid, in the US-SALEP
view, would be not only inappropriate but foolhardy and counter
productive.

This position has been put forth by various US-SALEP

people since the organization was founded, but it was given its most
forthright expression by George F. Kennan who stated:
No changes in official South African policy will ever be
successful unless they spring in the main from the workings
of the country's own public opinion and political process.
It is inadvisable and unproductive for outsiders to relieve
the South African authorities of even the smallest degree of
their own responsibility by forcing their hand and trying to
tell them what to do. Let the friends of the various South
African peoples hold the white rulers of the country to the
recognition that to the outside the present pattern of South
African apartheid is abhorrent in aspect and unconvincing in
rationale; but beyond that let it be the task of those rulers,
who know their own situation better than any outsider can, to
find the conceivable alternatives.5°
The director of the Program, Frank Loescher, had also stated on

"^Munger, "South Africa:

Are There Silver Linings?" 379.

>JSee, for example, the letter to the editor of the New York Times
Magazine from US-SA.LEP exchangees Lorus and Margery Milne. While on
their visit they "saw a very different South Africa from the one we had
visualized. . . . The Afrikaners need help in solving their problem.
But the answer has to be one that leaves them there, in control of
their possessions." New York Times Magazine, April 2h , i960, p. 8 .
See also the views of US-SALEP visitor Hodding Carter discussed below,
p. 2U9 .
rO

7 Kennan, "Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa," 226.
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occasion the wisdom of refraining from efforts to impose the American
59
way of life on otiier pecples .

And it was Dr. Loescher who, at the

time of Sharpeville, revealed one of the links between views on civil
rights questions in the United States and views on the proper course
of policy on South Africa.

He wrote a letter to the New York Times

about the whites in South Africa he had seen in a visit just after the
Sharpeville incident, stating that there were thoughtful groups which
face the same problem in South Africa that their counterparts
in our Deep South are trying to deal with— how to bring along
the indifferent, the fearful and the hostile whites. . . .
In our rightful concern for human dignity for people of every
race, creed or national origin in South Africa we should keep
in mind our own Deep South and test a proposed course of action
by first asking whether it would help the movement for justice
in the Deep South. Does ostracising moderate leaders in the
South, South Africa or an other area of tension help or hurt
what they are trying to accomplish?60
Loescher, and others of US-SALEP like him, concluded that force was
not a proper tool for implementing race policy in the United States
or in South Africa.
It should not be doubted that the United States— South Africa
Leader Exchange Program played a role in influencing some American
thinking on South Africa both through the exchanges it sponsored and
through the published and other expressions of the exchangees.

But

it should be observed that the views put forth by such people were
largely restricted to scholarly analyses of the forces at work within
the white community and arguments against Anerican activity against
the South African government.

The exchangees seldom spoke of the

^Frank S. Loescher, "Perspective,,r in Weisenfeld, The First
Decade, 23.
^°Letter of Frank S. Loescher to the editor, New York Times.
May 26 , i960, p. 16 .
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self-interest of the United StateB in its relations with South Africa.
Instead they sought in general to promote a greater understanding of,
and sympathy for, the problems of white South Africans.
If the South African Information Service attempted to influence
journalists and mass opinion and the United States-South Africa Leader
Exchange Program brought academics to South Africa for a better view
of the country, there remained a gap in American opinion that might be
influenced in favor of South Africa.

This was a gap in American

business, military and what might be termed "establishment" (for lack
of a better word) opinion.
South Africa Foundation.

The gap was filled by the creation of the
The purpose of this organization has been

not so much to change the image abroad of South Africa's racial policies
as it has been to convince people that South Africa offers both
economic and strategic advantages to the West.

62

The aggressiveness

of the Foundation and the tenor of its approach are suggested by its
symbol and motto:

MM, which stands for Man-to-Man.

It is probably one

of the most sophisticated and well-financed operations of its kind in
the world.
The South Africa Foundation was launched at a December 1959
meeting in Johannesburg attended by twenty-five leaders of finance,

There were several other programs that took Americans to
South Africa that are not discussed here because of the small number
of people involved or because it has not been possible to perceive
any significant statements on South Africa growing from them. These
include visits sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation (which has a
world-wide travel grants program), the United States State Department
Educational and Cultural Exchange Program, the Smith-Mundt program, the
People to People program started by President Elsenhower in 1956, and
the American Field Service (which sponsors student exchanges).
62
See Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the
West (New York, 1964), 112-16, 244-46.
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commerce, industry and culture in South Africa,

Presiding at the

meeting was Sir Francis de Guingand, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal
Viscount Montgomery during World War II.

De Guingand explained to

those present that South Africa was being undermined abroad by an
organized campaign of misrepresentation, that it was time that all
public-spirited South Africans, together with those who had a stake in
South Africa, to mobilize their forces to present the real South
Africa to the world.
One of those with a stake in South Africa present at the
meeting was Charles W. Engelhard, an American industrialist who had
extensive holdings in South Africa.

He was elected as one of the

four vice-chairmen chosen by the group.

American business was thus

involved In the South Africa Foundation from its inception.

Two days

after the initial meeting of the Foundation, Engelhard left South
Africa to return to his home in New Jersey, stating that once there
he would work to "put the South African record right."

He would work

through private contacts, he told a reporter, and added, "I also have
connections in Washington, among Congressmen and Senators and I will
talk to t h e m . " ^

63

Natal Daily News, December 15, 1959*
6k

Ibid. Engelhard did have good connections. He was an
influential member of the Democratic Party and represented Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson on a number of special missions abroad, including
heading the American delegation to Zambia’s independence ceremonies.
In addition to his support of the South Africa Foundation, the Charles
Engelhard Foundation was a contributor to the United States-South
Africa Leader Exchange Program. For several critical articles on his
business ties in South Africa and his possible Influence on policy
making, see Paul Jacobs, "Charles Engelhard: Our Man in Africa,"
Ramparts, IV (November, 1966), 23-39 and "Our Man— Still in Africa,"
Africa Today, XVII (September-October, 1970), 26-29.
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The first year of the Foundation's operation was limited to
consolidating its organization and laying the groundwork for future
campaigns.

Initially, its organizers intended that the Foundation

would serve as a trust fund to finance publicity and public relations
operations on behalf of South Africa.^

It attempted to influence

mass opinion by placing promotional information in magazines and news
papers and by making material available to television.^

An example of

this type of activity in the United States was the publication of a
twenty-four page brochure entitled "This is South Africa" which was
distributed as a supplement to the New York Times of June U, 1961.
As time passed and the Foundation gained experience it found that it
was becoming an operational public relations firm itself.

It also

began to limit its activities to attempting to influence the higher
echelons of government, private enterprise, and the communications
industry.

As one of its annual reports described the Foundation, it

became a "unique organization which combines the functions of publicity,
public relations and unofficial diplomacy."^®

Although it continued

to produce a magazine, brochures, newsletters and the like, it limited
its efforts to influence mass opinion and instead concentrated on
6s
South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969. 1 (copy in
possession of author provided by the Foundation's Johannesburg
office).

66

tt
Harry Klein, Work of the South Africa Foundation Here and
Abroad," Natal Daily News. February 15, 1962. Klein was a member of
the publicity canmittee of the Foundation.
67

The advertisement does not say that it was paid for by the
South Africa FoundaUon, only that it was by South African and
American business interests. However, it seems most unlikely that
it was not the South Africa Foundation which was responsible for it.
^®South Africa Foundationj

Annual Report for 1969, 2,

opinion leaders.
The Foundation was slow in getting started in the United States
in spite of the support of Engelhard and of American industries
located in South Africa.

It opened an office in London in 1961 and

shortly thereafter one in Germany.

A part-time representative was

appointed in Paris in 1963 and a full-time office opened there in
1966.

It was not until 1968 that a permanent Foundation representa

tive, John H. Chettle, was appointed for the United States.^
Originally opening an office in New York, Chettle soon moved the
Foundation's American headquarters to Washington.
There were several reasons why the Foundation was slow in
developing its American operations.

The United Kingdom was of higher

priority because of the strong political, and economic ties it had with
South Africa.

Germany and France were also of higher priority than

the United States because it seemed that there were better possibilities
of successful links with them.

It was much more expensive to undertake

a full-time operation in the United States than in Europe.

In addition,

it took longer to build up a network of friends of the Foundation in
the United States because there were fewer initial contacts between
South Africans and Americans, despite a sizeable American investment
in South Africa.

70

Although Britain and Europe were of higher priority than the
United States, the Foundation did make some efforts beyond the New
^Interview of author with John H. Chettle and Michael Christie,
Washington, D.C., August 23, 1971.
"^Interview of author with J. de L. Sorour, Deputy Director
General of the South Africa Foundation, and Scdly Press, Information
Officer, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 1, 1972.
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York Times advertisement to influence American thinking on South
Africa w e n before Chettle was sent to New York.

Within South Africa,

steps were taken to bring about contact with influential people by
the formation of "Man-to-Man" committees made up of leaders of the
various foreign communities located there.

One of the twenty commit

tees represented the United States, and it eventually included representatives of most .American companies operating in South Africa.

71

At least as early as 1962, the Foundation began bringing Americans to
South Africa to gain first hand knowledge of the country and began
assisting other Americans who were visiting South Africa.

Although the South Africa Foundation did provide some informa
tion on its activities, it was unwilling to release the names of the
Americans who were brought to South Africa by the Foundation.

Neverthe

less, it has been possible to gain some insight into the workings of
the Foundation's visitors program from the Foundation's publications,
from Congressional materials, from newspapers, and from other sources.
The Foundation regarded the visitors program as the most successful
of its undertakings, one 'trhich yielded remarkable results and enabled
the Foundation to make many important and influential friends for
South Africa abroad.
71

Ivor Language, "S. A. Foundation Explains Its Aims," Natal
Daily News, July 29, 1965. Language was, at the time, Public Relations
Officer to the Foundation.
South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for

1969, U.
72
South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969, 2. The
first such visitor tfiat the author has been able to learn of was
Clarence B. Randall, President of Inland Steel. He became a strong
advocate of greater understanding of South Africa, end his views
appeeLred in severed prominent publications. He also became a member
of the International Management Committee of the United States-South
Africa Leader Exchange Program.
His views are discussed in the next
chapter.
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One such friend was Charles Burton Marshall, a professor at
Johns Hojkins University and a spokesman on foreign policy and military
matters in Washington.

The way in which he was selected to visit South

Africa affords a glimpse into the methods employed hy the Foundation in
locating and cultivating friends for South Africa.

At a Congressional

hearing, Marshall testified that his interest in South Africa began at
a closed meeting in a private club in Washington which had as its
focus South Africa and American policy on South Africa.

He had been

asked to comment on the paper delivered by the main speaker for the
evening, and he found it replete with unsound propositions.

Appar

ently a member of the South African Embassy who was present at the
meeting passed Marshall's name on to the Foundation; several weeks later
the Foundation cabled him an invitation to visit South Africa.
accepted after setting down several ground rules:

Marshall

he wanted no guided

tour; he should go where he wanted and talk to whom he pleased; and
he shouJd be able to see South West Africa.

These were agreed to, and

73
he went in June 1965■
While in South Africa, Marshall saw a great deal of the
country and met with many whites and non-whites, including the Prime
Minister and Cabinet ministers.

The trip had the desired effect;

Marshall returned to the United States to become a strong advocate
against sanctions and for a lessening of American criticism of South
Africa.

He told the House

Subcommittee on Africa:

Portentous talk of a bloodbath in the offing is idle. Obvious
ly the society there faces a great many difficult problems. In
^u.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United
States-South African Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19667 p. ^3^.
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the large, they are being handled with a fair amount of skill
and patience combined with ruthless energy. Time is more
likely to help than to aggravate the problems. Chivvying from
outside is unlikely to do any good. The portrayal of the
dominant group in Nazi-like terms is quite inaccurate.^
Marshall called for greater contact with South Africa, rather than
ostracism of the country, and for an end to the policy of "pinpricks":
"If we are not going to move in on this place and capture it, conquer
it, and hold it and attempt to govern it, then let us desist from the
line we are following— the line of petty annoyances."75
One famous visitor with whom the Foundation met was Robert F.
7l|rbid., U36.
75

Ibid., U51. Marshall's brother, General S. L. A. Marshall,
also appeared before the Congressional Subcommittee. General
Marshall's interest in South Africa was aroused by his brother's
interest, and he, too, was a Foundation visitor to South Africa. His
views are discussed in the next chapter. Among others from the United
States who were brought to South Africa as visitors by the Foundation,
who were assisted by the Foundation, or who met with Foundation
personnel in South Africa were the following: Generals James Doolittle,
Mark Clark, Albert Wedemeyer, and Lauris Norstad, Admiral Arthur W.
Radford, John Davenport (editor of Fortune), Allen Drury (author),
staff writers for Business Week and the Wall Street Journal, an
editorial writer for the Cincinnati Enquirer, E. C. BurBk (Professor
of Business Administration at Harvard and editor of the Harvard
Business Review), M. A. Samuels (Senior Staff Officer at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University)*
W. E. Griffith (Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology), F. H. Harbison (Professor of Economics and
International Affairs , Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Interna
tional Affairs, Princeton), Kevin Phillips (columnist and former
assistant to Attorney General John Mitchell), N. M. Stultz (Professor
in the Department of Political Science, Brown University), Harvey
Gllckman (chairman of the Department of Political Science, Haverford
College), George F. Kennan (probably while visiting with US-SALEP),
visiting Congressmen and State Department officials, four executives
of the Polaroid Corporation (who were investigating whether Polaroid
should continue operations in South Africa), and a commission from
Princeton University (who were investigating whether Princeton
should divest itself of Its portfolio of Btock in companies doing
business in South Africa). South Africa Foundation. Annual Reports
for 1969, 1970. 1971; Natal Daily News. October 2, 1967 *, Allen Drury,
A Very Strange Society (New York. 1967). 193, 3^5.
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Kennedy who went to South Africa in 1966 at the invitation of the
National Union of South African Students.

While its treatment of

Kennedy may not have been typical, it does give a little more insight
into the way the Foundation has worked.

Shortly after Kennedy’s

arrival, the Foundation sponsored a dinner for the Senator in
Pretoria and tried to impress upon him the great ethnic and political
diversity of the country.

The Foundation's directors tried to con

vince him that South Africa was entitled to the support of Western
countries because it was strongly anti-Communist.

He argied with

the directors, but when he returned to the United States he wrote
letters to thirty American business leaders making clear his opposition
to financial disengagement from South Africa. 77
The results that might be achieved by assisting visitors to
South Africa and impressing upon them the economic and strategic
significance of

South Africa can be suggested by looking into the

published views of another of the visitors with whom Foundation
members met in 1969, Ernest W. Lefever.

A Senior Staff Member of 12ie

Foreign Policy Studies Division of the Brookings Institution, Lefever
published a book on tropical Africa a year after his visit to South
Africa.

It was aititled Spear and Scepter, and in it Lefever observed

that South Africa was of greater importance to American political,
strategic, and economic interests than was all of Central Africa.
76
William van den Hauvel and Milton Gwirtzman, On His Own:
RFK. 196U-1968 (Garden City, New York, 1970), 153-51*.
77
William A, Hance, "The Case For and Against United States
Disengagement from South Africa," in William A. Hance, ed,, Southern
Africa and the United States (New York, 1968), 118.
"^Ernest W. Lefever, Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and
Politics in Tropical Africa (Washington, 1970), l£>.
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South Africa was much more advanced than tropical Africa by all
comparative indicia:
Economically South Africa is more important than tropical Africa.
U.S. private investment in the republic in 1966 was $601 million,
compared to $1.5 billion for the rest of the continent combined.
South Africa produced 95 per cent of all the gold mined in
Africa and approximately 75 per cent of that produced outside
the communist world. An industrialized state, South Africa has
a per capita GUP of $530, about three times higher than the
average for Africa. It generates more than half of Africa's
electrical power with a per capita consumption equal to that
of Western Europe. It produces ten times as much steel as all
other African countries combined.79
It would appear that the Foundation's visitors program was
quite successful.

However, the Foundation was able to accomplish even

more with a Foundation director in the United States on a full-time
basis.

The Foundation's representative, John Chettle, undertook a

wide variety of activities to improve South Africa's image in the
United States and to counteract the work of critics of South Africa.
Chettle's office produced an analysis of the Congressional
resolution to end the South African sugar quota and placed it with an
influential (unnamed) Democrat.

He appeared cn radi o and television

in various parts of the country, including the Today show and The
Advocates.

Chettle and his assistant attended meetings of the African

Studies Association to rebut critics of South Africa.

They pointed

out errors in the television documentary "Black View of South Africa"
shown on CBS in 1970 in a letter of protest to CBS President Frank
Stanton.

The letter was then placed in the Congressional Record by

Representative 0, C. Fisher of Texas and sent also to the Federal
Communications Commission.

80

The Annual Report of the Foundation

79Ibid.

80

Interview of author with John H. Chettle and Michael
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for 1969 summarized some of the other activities of the American
office as follows:
Moreover, in the first year of the Foundation's activities
in the United States, contact was made with more than 150
businessmen, including the Chairman or President of more than
30 ccmpanies, more than 30 academics, including the directors
of 5 schools of international studies and I* schools of African
Studies; the present and a former Secretary of State; the present
and a farmer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee;
members of the Executive including a Cabinet Member, the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and several
of President Nixon's advisers on the National Security Council,
half-dozen Congressmen, numerous Journalists, including the
editors or publishers of 12 newspapers or magazines; and
ambassadors, theologians, community leaders, lawyers,
foundation representatives and student leaders.
It should be clear from the foregoing that by 1969 the South
Africa Foundation was operating as a full-time lobbyist for South
African Interests in the United States, and, indeed, as a very capable
one.

The Foundation was in the advantageous position of being able

to dissociate Itself frcm many of the more outrageous aspects of the
race policies of the South African government, while at the same time
acting as a spokesman against the critics of South Africa.

It ■was

able to concentrate on the economic and strategic benefits which
South Africa offered to the United States and on showing the folly of
sanctions against South Africa.
By seeking out influential individuals, the Foundation reached
up to policy-making circles and at the same time the views of some of
those individuals trickled down to influence larger bodies of opinion.
The Foundation did in fact reach the highest level of policy makers.

Christie, Washington, B.C., August 23, 1971- Ihe letter to Stanton
and the FCC was not expected to produce any sort of action but it
could serve to harass critics.
^South Africa Foundation, Annual Report for 1969. H •
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The President of the Foundation had a long discussion about South Africa
with Presi dent Nixon and Henry Kissinger at a time when the Administra
tion was in the process of re-evaluating American policy on Southern
Africa.

The Foundation reported of the meeting that "the occasion was

taken to bring to the President's notice some pointe which have
received too little attention in the past.

It would be hard to overGo
estimate the importance to South Africa of this discussion."
Without question, the public and private groups discussed in

this chapter did enjoy some success in influencing American opinions
on South Africa.

Yet the sinister picture painted of their activities

by some of their critics was rather inaccurate.

The efforts of these

organizations came about largely in response to the high level of
criticism of South Africa in the United States and elsewhere, criticism
which often was exaggerated, shallow, and misinformed.

In many in

stances these groups did not try to induce a belief that apartheid
was a positive good; they often tried only to convince the American
observer that South Africa's problems -were complex and that outside
pressure was undesirable as a means of promoting useful change.

Those

who attempted to improve the image of Soi±h Africa felt they were
motivated by the desire simply to present the other side of the South
African story, or to improve the chances for South Africa's survival
In a hostile world,

There were limitations on their efforts.

To be effective, the views promoted by the South Africaconnected groups had to have same intrinsic plausibility and merit.
82

Ibid. It should be noted too that during the 1966 Sub
committee on Africa hearings on American policy towards South Africa,
the Foundation sent each member of the Subcommittee a booklet con
taining essays which gave arguments for American-South African
cooperation, United States-South African delations, 52b.

There was no way they could hide or avoid the many harsh realities
of apartheid.

Secondly, they could only influence one aspect of the

image creation process; that is, they were only able to add to the
information available to an individual on South Africa.

They could

do little to alter the basic value structures of the individuals and
groups -that they sought to persuade.

Nor could they control events

external to South Africa that played a role in the formation and
alteration of images of South Africa.

These factors and views of

conservative Americans will be discussed in the final chapters of
this study.

CHAPTER VI
SOUTH AFRICA'S AMERICAN FRIENDS

As the South African government and the South Africa Foundation
knew when they made selections for their visitor's programs, South
Africa's friends or potential friends in the United States were to he
found in three discernible groups.

When individual Americans came

forward to speak favorably of South Africa, they usually could be
identified as strong opponents of communism, as Southerners, or as
businessmen associated with large corporations.

The lines of distinc

tion among these groups often blurred so that there was an overlapping
of membership, particularly as to the first two categories.

These

Americans saw South Africa not as threatening the United States but
rather as being threatened.

Their favorable attitudes towards South

Africa sprang from several motives:

they felt that their enemies

were South Africa's enemies; it was in their self-interest to present
a less critical view of South Africa; or they had a generally con
servative view of life.

Prior to the 1960s American policy had

appeared sound to these people.

They felt no need to defend South

Africa until activists began to pose a serious threat to a continua
tion of good relations between South Africa and the United States.
These three groupB all agreed that American policy should be to seek
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cooperation with, not criticism of, South Africa,
A.

The Anti-Communist Ally
If some Americans viewed South Africa as a continuing invita

tion to communism in Africa, there were others who believed Just as
strongly that South Africa was the strongest, if not the only, bastion
against communism on the entire continent.

To such Americans, South

Africa was the only bright spot on a still dark continent not yet
emerged from cannibalism.

They saw South Africa's whites as the only

real friends of the United States in Africa.

South Africa's political

stability and its strategic value, both for its resources and its
position on two oceans, convinced them that South Africa was too
important as an ally of the United States to engage in what they be
lieved to be petty carping at the country's race policies.
One of the infrequent articles on South Africa that did appear
in a conservative publication prior to i960 was an essay in the July
1957 issue of American Mercury.1

The title itself, "The Untold Story

of South Africa," suggested that favorable reports on South Africa
were not appearing in the 1950s.

The mere fact that the Soviet Union

was opposed to the Nationalist government was sufficient to indicate
to the author of the article, Kent Hunter, that perhaps South Africa
was not so terrible a place as the mass media made it out to be.

■hcent Hunter, "The Untold Story of South Africa," American
Mercury. LXXXV (July, 1957), 37- American Mercury was the only
periodical the author examined which exhibited a complete reversal
of attitude towards South Africa. Until 1952 it was very critical
of South Africa, Then the magazine was purchased by Russel Maguire,
and became highly conservative; see John H. Schacht, The Journals
of Opinion and Reportage (New York, 1966), 12.

Hunter stated:

"Incitement against the governments of the free world

by Soviet agents is a story too well understood around the world to
permit failure to look at both sides of the story in South Africa."

2

The "other side" of the story was that Communists had been
responsible for rioting by Africans in East London, South Africa, in
1952, and that many members of the multi-racial Congress of Democrats
had a Communist background.

A TASS radio news broadcast concerning

the activities of the Congress was evidence to the American Mercury
writer that "Moscow was fully informed about the operational plan of
3
the South African agitators."
The "other side" of the story was also
that South Africa was liberal by comparison with the Soviet Union,

To

support this proposition the writer pointed out that Russia's ruling
class amounted to only 3.^ per cent of the population whereas in
South Africa the ruling whites constituted 18 per cent of the total
population.

Thus, the ruling class was five and one-half times

greater in ratio in South Africa than in Russia.
Hunter's article in American Mercury was primarily an attempt
to counter the existing negative image of South Africa.

This was to

be the pattern for anti-Communist conservatives writing on South
Africa into the mid-1960s.

Such Americans who wrote favorably on

South Africa tended to do so within the framework of the unfavorable
image that the critics of South Africa had been expressing throughout
the previous decade.

Many or most of the conservative writings on

South Africa singled out specific critics of South Africa or attacked

2Hunter, "The Untold Story of South Africa," k2,
3lbid., Ul.

216
the views of the ’’liberals" generally.

Often, they were not so much

pro-South Africa as they were anti-liberal.
In the 1960s conservative periodicals, including the National
Review, U.S. News and World Report, Human Events. American Mercury,
and others, began devoting more attention to South Africa.

U

The image

of South Africa as a valuable ally of the United States against
communism appeared in editorials in conservative newspapers like the
Manchester, New Hampshire, Union Leader and the St. Louis GlobeDemocrat, and in the syndicated columns of conservatives such as
Senator Barry Goldwater, John Chamberlain, Ralph de Toledano, and the
Robert S. Allen-Paul J. Scott Report.^

Some radio and television

broadcasts presented this image of South Africa.

6

Existing anti

communist organizations, including the John Birch Society, the

^Examples from each of these are cited elsewhere in this
chapter.
^For a publication which reprints excerpts from these papers
and commentators and others, see Frank S. and Elsie B. Meyer, Some
American Comments on Southern Africa (New York, 1967), 19-27; see
also Vernon McKay, "Africa and the American Right," New Republic,
March 26, 1966, pp. 13-l6.
^Vernon McKay has noted that the right-wing had a virtual
monopoly on political radio programs. Such programs concentrated on
Eastern Europe and Communist China in the 19^0s and 1950s and turned
to the cause of the whites in Southern Africa in the 1960s. Vernon
McKay, "Southern Africa and Its Implications for American Policy,"
in William A. Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United States (New
York, 1968), 20. In addition to the television programs promoted by
the South African Information Service previously discussed, the
author has found that television stations occasionally gave South
African officials the opportunity to answer critical programs or
showed pro-South African films in response to network shows hostile
to South Africa. Several shows of this nature were noted, for example,
in the Natal Dally News. October 13, 1967; and October 19, 1967 (all
citations to this newspaper are from the paper's clippings files in
Durban, South Africa).

217

American Security Council, and the Liberty Lobby, took up the cudgel
against South Africa's liberal critics, and new organizations were
formed to disseminate more widely the anti-Coannrunist image of South
Africa.
The development of the American organization that was most
prominent in expressing the anti-Communist image of South Africa, the
American-African Affairs Association, reflected well the growth of
interest in South Africa among conservatives. The Association, which
had close ties with the conservative Mational Review, first issued its
prospectus in September 19^5; however, it had its origins in the mid1950s in other Cold War issues.

The Association grew out of the

American Asian Educational Exchange, an organization originally con
cerned with Nationalist China.

With the coming to independence of

African countries in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the A.A.E.E,
included Africa in its interests and became the American Afro-Asian
Educational Exchange.
The addition of African controversies, including that of South
Africa, to the issues on which the Exchange was interested in taking
a stand proved disturbing to some of the organization's members,
especially to those affiliated with labor unions and to vice-chairman
Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.

As a result the Exchange split and

the American-African Affairs Association was created.

7

Co-chairmen of the Association at its founding were William A.
Rusher, the publisher of the National Review, and Max Yergan, the

^Eor this information on the background of the Association,
the author is indebted to Mr. William A. Rusher, whom he interviewed
in New York City on June 12, 1972.
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"black sociologist who left the Council on African Affairs because of
Q
his anti-Communist convictions.
The list of directors and preeminent
members of the Association included a number of the nation's better
known conservatives such as the novelist John Dos Passos, the educator
Russell Kirk, the author and columnist Victor Lasky, Henry Regnery,
a publisher of conservative books, and Senator James L. Buckley, to
name a few.

Many so listed in the publications of the Association

were writers or editors for the National Review.

A comparison of

several of these lists with the names of individuals who toured South
Africa as guests of the South African government or the South Africa
Foundation indicated that a number of the A.A.A.A. members had been
chosen to make tours of South Africa.
The American-African Affairs Association was modestly funded,
and its activities from its beginning resembled in method those of the
anti-South African organizations in attempting to influence public
opinion.

The Associ aiion issued a periodic newsletter entitled

Spotlight on Africa, eleven issues of which were released from 1965
through December 1968.

Like its anti-South African counterparts, the

Association printed a number of pamphlets on Africa; although the
Association tock all Africa as its concern, most of these publications
were on South Africa.

Because of the close, though unofficial, rela

tionship between the Association and the National Review, members'
O
For an essay indicating a growing favorability toward South
Africa by Yergan, see his "Communist Threat in Africa," in C. Grove
Haines, ed., Africa Today (Baltimore, 1955), 262, 269-70. Another
black anti-Communist associated with the American-African Affairs
Association was George S. Schuyler. A Director of the A.A.A.A,,
Schuyler was also a prominent figure in the John Birch Society.
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views appeared from time to time in that periodical.

Publications of

the A.A.A.A. were distributed to all members of the African Studies
Association, editorial writers of all major American newspapers,
syndicated columnists and commentators, all members of Congress and
many other government officials (including members of the diplomatic
corps), two thousand other opinion leaders, and various foreign
political and public opinion leaders.

o

As the prospectus of the organization indicated, the AssociaH cn's activities were prompted by a desire to undo the work of the
"liberals."

It said that the situation with regard to Africa was

similar to that of China and American intellectuals from the 1930s on:
The field is largely in the hands of semiprofessional "liberals."
Through various "scholarly" publications and organizations—
such as the American Committee on Africa— they repeat the same
intellectual blunders in regard to developments in Africa as
did the IPR Ilnstitute of Pacific Relations] in regard to
developments in China: emotionalism, naivete, wishful thinking,
and a Pavlovian "liberal" view of history. Through a default
in the exposition of differing points of view, another in
tellectual and political vacuum is being created which is
capable of doing as much damage as was done by the IPR.-^
The purpose of the Association was to fill that vacuum, to further
the cause of knowledge concerning Africa without regard to the "pre
vailing shibboleths."

Fate, the statement declared, had imposed an

obligation on the American people "to defend the cause of human
American-African Affairs Association, 1969 Program: Report
September 1965-December 1968 (n.p., 1969), 8 . Mr. William A. Rusher
kindly provided the author with a copy of this Program.
■^Poriions cf the Prospectus are reprinted in ibid., 1. The
complete document is reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, United States-South African Relations, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Africa, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1966, pp.
290-9^ (hereafter United States-South African Relations).

freedom everywhere against the worldwide Communist onslaught . . . .
The fact that the Association waa a response to the actions of the
critics of South Africa was further indicated hy the organization's
first publication.

It was a reprint of portions of the Carnegie

Endowment's study of Apartheid and United National Collective Measures;
this was an effort to expose what the Association's directors con
sidered to he the dangerous wrong thinking of the "liberals."
South Africa's value to the United States as an ally against
communism was brought out in a publication of the American-African
Affairs Association written by General S. L. A. Marshall.

12

Marshall

had been a guest of the South Africa Foundation on a tour of South
Africa and had testified before the House Subcommittee on Africa and
before the International Court of Justice in favor of South Africa.
In the pamphlet that he wrote for the Association he said that the
United States needed all the friends it could get.

South Africa, he

pointed out, was an especially important one because it served both
strategic and commercial purposes for the United States by virtue of
its position.

Quoting Admiral Arthur W. Radford, former Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall said that South Africa stood "at
the crossroads of the world, both economically and militarily." 13
The closing of the Suez Canal in the Arab-Israeli war of August 1967,
and the possibility of American involvement in the Middle Eastern
conflict, underscored and increased the importance of the Cape route.

^Prospectus, in United States-South African Relations, 291.
12

S. L. A. Marshall, South Africa;

1967).

13Ibld.. 11.

The Strategic View (n.p. ,
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Marshall expressed amazement at the capriciousness of the United
States government for its policy "to exorcise South Africa, to des
troy it with incantations if possible, if not, to go on to something
worse, and the failure to review, or in any way modify that policy,
despite developments in the Middle East that make manifest its
frivolousness, hypocrisy, and dangers.
South Africa also appeared to be a very desirable friend for
the United States to Anthony Harrigan, a military writer, newspaperman,
and prominent figure in the conservative, anti-Communistic American
Security Council.

In his highly laudatory book on The New Republic

(South Africa), Harrigan expressed apprehension over strife and dis
order in the southern hemisphere of the globe which posed a threat to
North America and Europe.

South Africa, he said,was important to the

United States if the West were to be "fully protected against the
ambitious proletarian aggressor states of the backward regions of the
world."'*'^

George N. Crocker, a journalist for the San Francisco

Exaroi ner who made a tour of South Africa as a guest of the South
African government, made similar observations in his newspaper.
Not only was the South African government preventing Soviet
and Chinese takeover and exploitation of the country's strategic and
economic potentials, but a continuation of white rule was also fore
stalling the growth of communism among the Africans of South Africa.
1 ■ ^

n t *

lUIbid., 2.
■^Anthony Harrigan, The New Republic; South Africa's Role
in the World (Pretoria, 19661, jl.‘ See also Harrigan*s Bed Star Over
Africa CCape Town, 1964),
^ S e e above, p. 190.
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As Thomas Molnar, a professor of French at Brooklyn College and a
director of the American-African Affairs Association, expressed it,
there was "little doubt that if the African National Congress and
fellow organizations came to power in South Africa, they would set
up a Communist-sympathizing 'neutralist* regime or an outright
Communist satellite."

17

The conservative periodical Human Events

said of Nobel prize winner Chief Albert Luthuli, leader of the
African National Congress, that his cause was "inextricably lined up
l8
with the cause of Communism."
How many American military and diplomatic leaders shared these
views as to South Afrdca's strategic value to the United States?

At

this point, it is impossible to suggest what influence such individuals
had on policy.

General Marshall said that he talked with a number of

military officers and defense officials and they agreed with him that
South Africa was important. 19

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who apparently

had a role in the decision to impose an arms embargo on South Africa,
reported that high officials in the State Department did feel that
American defense interests in South Africa outweighed the political
advantages to be gained from participation in an arms embargo.

PO

Secretary of Defense, Bobert S. McNamara, according to Schlesinger,

^Thomas Molnar, Africa:
1965), 278.

A Political Travelogue (New York,

^"Bobby's African Safari," Human Events, June 18, 1966,
p. It.
19
United States-South African Delations, 312; Marshall, South
Africa: The Strategic Tiew. 12.

20
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York, I96T),
536.
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disagreed and said defense considerations should not stand in the
way. 21
There is other evidence also that American military officials
regarded South Africa as important to American defense strategy.
Important South Africans indicated from time to time that they be
lieved that this was the case.

Die Transvaler, the newspaper of which

Prime Minister Verwoerd had been editor, stated that South Africa
never had asked the United States for aid and yet was willing to help
in the fight against communism; it went on to say:
That America in this respect has a single ally in Africa is
greatly appreciated by American military circles. One can
only hope that the truth will in time penetrate from the
Pentagon to the Capitol and the White House.22
As has been observed, the South Africa Foundation and the South African
government sought out American military leaders for their tours of
South Africa.

Still another indication of the views of the military

is the fact that despite the decision to stop allowing ships of the
American Navy to call on South African ports, some U. S, naval vessels
continued to put Into South A f r i c a . Finally, it should be observed
that some naval officers took the view that a cessation of visits to
South African ports aided United States-South African relations.
South Africa clearly did have some strategic value for the
United States.

Government officials and even publications critical

21lbid., 537.
ggDie Transvaler, November 9, 1965J translated in Thought, X,
No,
p,
Similar' vTews appeared in the same newspaper on January
30, 1967, and in Die Burner on November lU, 1967•
2%atal Daily News, February 2, 1968.
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of South Africa, such as the New York Times, asserted this.

pli

Moral

issues aside, the question then became whether South Africa's
liabilities to the United States outweighed its advantages.

A key

element in judging this was an individual's assessment of the prospects
for continued stability in South Africa.
For years, as already observed, critics of South Africa pre
dicted revolution within South Africa.

In contrast to the Americans

who saw South Africa as on the verge of a blood bath, anti-Communist
conservatives described South Africa as among the more stable countries
of the world.

Less than a year after Sharpeville, two writers in the

National Review challenged the "burning fuse" thesis and showed why
they thought conditions were less suitable for an uprising in South
Africa than in any other part of the African continent.

These were

Peter Duignan and Lewis Henry Gann, both scholars associated with the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.
Specifically attacking the expressions of Chester Bowles in
his 'Africa's Challenge to America, thqr gave the following analysis
of conditions in South Africa:
South Africa, with by far the most mature economy, the most
highly integrated industrial apparatus, and the strongest
state machinery in Africa, is further removed from a revolu
tionary situation (as opposed to sporadic rioting) than any
other part of the continent; nowhere are conditions less
suitable for a rising than in the land of Verwoerd,
The myth of a spontaneous revolt setting off other risings
in Africa is based on a misreading of history. It shows a
canplete misunderstanding of the way revolutions are made.
. . . Revolutions must be planned, they require organization
and carefully trained cadres. Before the first shot is fired,
a successful infiltration into all positions of power, whether
oli

New York Times, November 9, 1959* p. 30; United States-South
African Relations, lo6 , 111-12.
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military, administrative or economic must have been made.
The state machinery must have been fatally weakened,
either by foreign war or complete internal decay. And
none cf these conditions apply in the Union of South Africa.
The Union Government is neither weak nor seriously divided.
Its armed f crces and administration are bbth loyal and
reasonably efficient. Its economy is expanding at a rate that
would cause shrieks of admiration among fellow travelers, if
achieved anywhere east of the Iron Curtain.^5
Because there would be no revolt, American action against South Africa,
such as a boycott, would accomplish little except to "deprive NATO of

..26
one of its most vital strategic positions.
The first years of political development in the newly in
dependent African countries did little to undermine the conservative
view of South Africa's future stability.

By comparison to the dis

array to the north, South Africa's political and social order was
placid.

A writer for the John Birch Society's publication American

Opinion lauded the "steadfast Union," either taking poetic license or
ignorant of the fact that four years earlier the Union had become the
Republic:
From A to
To fallen
No longer
Hyena and

Z— betrayed Algeria
Zanzibar— a world goes down;
the lion and the unicorn,—
Jackal fighting for the crown!

Ben Bella, Nasser, Holden Roberto, slip
The leashes from their mangy curs of war;
They serve the Masters of the Shadow, so
The light recedes that once shone more and more.
25peter Duignan and Lewis Henry Gann, "White and Black in Africa,"
National Review, January 28, 19&1, P- ^8 . Duignan and Gann possessed
certain "liberal" credentials, such as membership in the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the American
Civil Liberties Union, which were atypical of the anti-Communist
conservatives. However, their views are included here because they
conformed to the conservative viewpoint, and because they appeared
in the National Review.
26rbid., U9.
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Yet brave sun-laving men, yea-saying men,
Stand proudly firm although the sky may fall:
The steadfast Union of South Africa
„
The slender gallant lance of Portugal..
Another writer for American Opinion likewise contrasted South
Africa with the rest of the "Dark Red Continent."

'Writing in 1966,

the staff writer criticized the liberal press and called attention to:
Seven coups [in Africa] in a year, at lastcount, plus afew
they didn't call coups. The Western Press, at such pains to
make the black-ruled States seem advanced and respectable,
averted its eyes from the spectacle in embarrassment.28
South Africa's stability was attributed to the Suppression of
Communism Act:

"As long as it is [effectively enforced], South Africa

will remain the chief bastion of sanity on the African continent.
Karl Marx, wrote another American Opinion contributor, was the new
witchdoctor in Africa.

■an

The instability in Africa indicated to General S. L. A.
Marshall that there would be no great washing of the spears by
Africans from north of the Limpopo in the blood of white South
Africans.

The belief in an African threat to South Africa, he

asserted, was "pure phantasmagoria," for in the previous three years
[196^-1966) twelve African governments had been shot down "like ducks
in a gallery."

31

None of the African countries, said Marshall, even

^Valeron Edweurds, "Africa," American Opinion, VIII (JulyAugust , 1965), 136.
28

"The Dark Red Continent," American Opinion, IX (July-August,

1966), U7.
29Ibid.. 58.
*^Susan L. M. Huck, "Africa; Marx is the New Witchdoctor,"
American Opinion, X (July-August, 1967), 6l-72.
"^Marshall, South Africa:

The Strategic View, 2.
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had enough force to keep its own interior tranquil, much less say
mount an attack on the strongest country in Africa; none shoved promise
of continued stability.
As the preceding discussion would suggest, those with favorable
views on South Africa often took a rather dim view of the results of
African independence.

Conservative publications frequently spoke of

black Africa in deprecating terms; indeed, they went so far as to
assert that independence was a mistake.

Writers in Human Events, a

conservative periodical, often compared the new countries of Africa
to children.

For example, the publication quoted one American news

paper (the Cincinnati Enquirer) in i960 to the effect that giving aid
32
to Africans m s like giving money to juvenile delinquents.
Other
articles in the magazine expressed the conviction that independence
had come too soon, and that even the Africans themselves longed for the
good old days of colonial rule.

One such piece was entitled "White

Mem Come Back," and stated that the "average African republic is about
as well-prepared for popular self-government as any kindergarten."^
After praising South Africa for its developnent, another writer told
her readers in Human Events that to expect the Congo to make a century
of progress in a decade was like ejqpecting a newborn infant to get up
from the cradle to pilot a space ship.

3I*

An American Opinion writer, Jack Moffitt, made similar
op

"Commentary," Human Events, October 27 > I960, p. 521.

33
Jenkin Lloyd Jones , "White Man Come Back," Human Events,
February 15 s 1964, p. 7.
34
Alice Widener, "Most of Africa is Not Beady for 'One Man,
One Vote,'" Human Events, May l4, 1966, p. 6 .
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observations.

Commenting on reports of slavery in black Africa, he

stated that these -were "more evidence that colonialism was ended so
35
that barbarism could flourish."
Tom Anderson, president and pub
lisher of Farm and Ranch publications, found his own government
responsible
for the retreat of the West from Africa and the creation of
a conglomeration of cannibal nations there who take from us
with one hand and throw spears at us with the other. South
Africa and Rhodesia, however, have stable, peaceful, pros
perous, Christian governments. There aren't even any peopleeaters there.3°
As might be expected from these anti-African comments, some of
the anti-Communist friends of South Africa were racist in their views.
Several of the more prominent members of the American-African Affairs
Association were in the forefront of the historian I. A. Newby has
called "scientific r a c i s m . O n e such individual cited by Newby was
Ernest van der Haag, a professor of social philosophy at New York
University and a director of the American-African Affairs Association.
Van der Haag, who wrote articles in defense of American segregation,
was a witness for South Africa in the South West Africa case at the
Internati cnal Court of Justice and testified favorably on South Africa
before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1966.

Two other members of

the Association, Nathaniel Weyl and Stefan T. Posscny, wore authors
3-^Jack Moffitt, "Eagle Rock," American Opinion, IX (JulyAugust , 1966), lj-6.
36

Tom Anderson, "Rhodesia," American Opinion. IX (June, 1966),

7-8.
37

I. A. Newby, Challenge to the Court; Social Scientists and
the Defense of Segregation, 195^-1966 (Baton Rouge, 1967K 173-76.
180-83.

of an important tract of scientific racism, The Geography of
38
Intellect.

In this work, Weyl and Possony indicated that they were

gravely concerned about the genetic deterioration of the human race;
that is, they feared that intellectually inferior races were re
producing at a faster rate than were intellectually superior races.
South Africa's progress seemed to be proof of this superiority and
showed the dependence of the blacks upon the more advanced whites;
they rejected the view that colonialism was the cause of poverty in
Africa for the "African Negro enjoys higher living standards in the
Union of South Africa, where the white presence is most numerous and
massive, than elsewhere.

39

Because of this, action against the

whites could only hurt the blacks of South Africa since they were
incapable of maintaining the economic progress of the country:

"There

is nothing in the slothful and insecure progress of the Negro that
suggests that he will be able to replace this elite in Africa from
his own ranks at any time in the foreseeable future.
Opponents of integration in the United States were among the
members cf the American-African Affairs Association and were prominent
in other organizations favorable to South Africa.

The John Birch

^Nathaniel Weyl and Stefan T. Possony, The Geography of
Intellect (Chicago, 1963). See also Nathaniel Weyl's volume on the
Communist movement in Southern Africa, Traitors' End (New Rochelle,
New York, 1970), 33-38.
^Weyl and Possony, The Geography of Intellect. 28h; see also
2h8-k9.

^ I b i d ., 28U-85. See also the review of this book in Human
Events. February 22, 196U, p. 8 , which argued that the '^masochistic
racial policies of the West" involved genetic catastrophe and
castigated Western policy for aiming at the subjugation or annihila
tion of the whites of South Africa.
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Society whose publication American Opinion defended South Africa
occasi cnaliy equated integration of the races with communism.

The

Citizens' Councils of America, a Southern group to be discussed
shortly, similarly fought integration.

Some of the leaders of the

American-Southern African Council, an organization created in 1966
for increasing support for the white regimes of Southern Afri ca, were
instrumental in setting up a racist-oriented society called the Racial
Studies Committee and the American Lobby, an organization designed to
offset the influence of what it termed "the ubiquitous 'civil rights'
..In

organi zations.

Apartheid was simply ignored by some of the anti-Communist
conservatives.

They did not discuss it in detail, suggesting in

passing that South Africa was just following the only sane course
available to the whites.

George S. Schuyler, a black John Bircher

and director of the American-African Affairs Association, expressed
understanding of "the refusal of the Southern African whites to
commit suicide by surrendering rule to surrounding Senegambians via
h2
One man, one vote . . . ."

Alice Widener, who wrote for Human Events,

similarly did no more than comment that if South Africa were to
follow the policies urged on it by the West it would go the way of the
Congo into chaos and steady deterioration.

1*3

Another approach taken by some strongly anti-Communist

^Undated (1968?) flyers and brochures of the American Lobby
and the Racial Studies Committee in possession of the author.
ho

George S. Schuyler, "From Africa," American Opinion, XI
(May, 1968), 55.
U3
Alice Widener, "Most of Africa is not Ready for 'One Man,
One Yote,1" 6 .

231
conservatives was to praise the wisdom of South Africa's policies
while condemning the egalitarian beliefs of the countries of the West.
Anthony Harrigan in his New Republic described South Africa as "healthy
because it has rejected the levelling philosophy of so many modern
nations.

Criticizing the liberal intelligentsia which had an

"enormous hold" on American scholarly and journalistic writing on
South Africa, Harrigan said that that levelling philosophy had led to
a spirit of civil disobedience and an outlook that was almost anarchist.
South Africa, in contrast, had avoided "the shattered nerves, the
crippling philosophy and the suicidal impulses" of the West.
Playing upon a theme similar to Harrigan's was Revilo P.
Oliver, a professor of Classics at the University of Illinois and an
associate editor of American Opinion. On several occasions Oliver
wrote favorably on South Africa, portraying it as one of the Last
Outposts of Western Civilization:
I have heard of Americans who have migrated or are now
migrating to South Africa or Australia, not as a permanent
refuge, but in the hope that they may live a little longer
and can, at least, die as men should, fighting their
enemies. Are those who despair of America wrong? I cannot
say categorically that they are, although I believe that
we still have a chance— believe perhaps with an optimism
as futile as Cicero's, that despite our churches, our
schools, our Press, and our government, there is yet left
in our nation enough moral integrity and intelligence for a
desperate and victorious effort. °
Harrigan, more hopeful, believed that South Africa could save the
1*1*

Harrigan, The New Republic. 47.
lie
Ibid., 1*8.
1*6

Revilo P. Oliver, "Cicero," American Opinion, VIII (May,
1965), 71- The author met several people such as described by Oliver
while he was in South Africa.
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West by leading it back to light and health of mind, back "into the
fruitful use of pride in vital, differentiating inequalities in man
kind."1*7
Still otha- conservatives sought to praise South Africa's
policies, but from the standpoint of the benefits such policies con
ferred upon the black South Africans.

Thomas Molnar and Russell Kirk,

each a conservative educator and member of the American-African Affairs
Association, both -wrote favorably of aspects of the apartheid program
in National Review. Molnar found desirable features in the achievement
of self-government in the Transkei. He viewed the Bantustan program
as a form of decolonization and foreign aid, although he did find many
manifestations of apartheid grotesque and irritating.

48

Apartheid, he

explained in one of his books on Southern Africa, "must not be viewed
as an anomaly in a harmonious world, but as a method— one among
several possible methods— of solving a particular problem by taking
all the concrete elements of a situation into consideration."

49

Similarly, Russell Kirk, after visiting the African College of the
North at Turfloop, said that he found much good coming from the government’s efforts to educate the Africans.

50

Finaliy, there were conservatives who were very troubled by

^Harrigan, The New Republic, 47.
48
Thomas Molnar, "First Step in the Transkei," Ifational Review,
February 25, 1964, p. 156.
^Thomas Molnar, Africa; A Political Travelogue, 142-43.
50
Russell Kirk, "The Higher Learning for the Bantu," National
Review, February 23, 1965, p. 150. See also his discussion ln_n","0ne"''
Man, One Vote' in South Africa," National Review, March 9, 1965,
p. 198.
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apartheid but who felt that, under the complex circumstances of South
Africa, few alternatives were available.

The best example <3f this out

look was an article written by William F. Buckley, editor of National
Review, written in late 1962 after he had spent several weeks in South
Africa.

Although he noted the material advancement of the Africans

under apartheid, he observed:
What Dr. Verwoerd considers to be indispensable psychological
conditioners for separate statehood— rigid discouragement of
any social intercourse between white and black— come from the
drawing boards ugly and shocking and if they are not accepted
as indispensable to the introduction of a radically new regime
which strives for beneficent and realizable ideals, they are
indefensible.51
Buckley felt that the ideals were beneficent but he had strong doubts
about the ultimate feasibility of separate development, and, as a
libertarian, he feared the excessive state regulation that would be
necessary to make it work.

B.

The Other Laager
South Africa had a second group of friends or potential

friends in the United States.

These were white Southerners who felt

a bond of sympathy with the white South Africans who were besieged
like themselves.

As with South Africans, the American news media

seemed to be very hostile to them, misrepresenting them and their
way of life.

People who knew little of their problems were telling

them how to conduct their lives, and attempting to force them to
restructure their society.

Governments all over the world were

criticizing them, undoubtedly, thought Southerners, with much
Communist encouragement.

South Africa, alone of the many countries

^William F, Buckley, Jr., "South African Fortnight,"
National Review, January 15, 1963, p. 22.
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of the earth, seemed to offer a parallel to the plight of the American
South.

It is not surprising then that white Southerners, even those

who did not support segregation in the South, tended to he favorable
to South Africa and to sympathize with its problems.
White Southerners often had a favorable image of South Africa
despite the fact that most of the major news media was critical of
apartheid.

Other than newspapers (which depended on wire services

that presented a harsh image of South Africa), the South had few
distinctively Southern publications.

Yet Southerners did develop

sympathy for South Africa even from hostile reports in the media.
For example, a very critical 1953 article in Life magazine on South
Africa prompted a man from Winter Garden, Florida, to write to the
editors of the publication:

"It is good to know that a great man

[Prime Minister Malan] and his people in another part of the world
believe as we do here in the South.

I refer to apartheid (separation

of the races).
Prior to i960, Southerners said little on South Africa.
Nevertheless, there are indications that Southerners who had some
awareness of foreign affairs did have favorable attitudes towards
South Africa.

The most thorough student of Southern views on inter

national political matters, Alfred 0. Hero, brought this out in his
excellent study of The Southerner and World Affairs. ^

Public opinion

polls, examined by Hero, which were taken in the period between World
■52

Letter of W. B, Burch from Winter Garden, Florida, to the
editor, Life, May 25, 1953, p. 18.
53
Alfred 0. Hero, Jr., The Southerner and World Affairs
(.Baton Rouge, 1965).
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War II and 1957 showed that Southerners were more inclined to support
5I4.
colonialism than were other Americans.
This in itself would in
dicate that Southerners were more likely to he favorable towards South
Africa.

The tendency was intensified after 1957 as white Southerners

became more and more sensitive to criticism of their society. 55
A study made by Hero of Southern newspapers and interviews of
Southerners in the period from 1959 to 1963 revealed that Southerners
did sympathize with South Africa.

Although Southerners were often

apathetic to foreign affairs and the interviewees were drawn from the
leadership elite, Hero did find white Southern approval of and support
for South Africa and its policies. ^

The fact that his interviews

showed this at the time of the Sharpeville tragedy, when most of the
national news media was highly critical of South Africa, is itself
revealing on the extent to which Southerners were alienated from the
rest of the country.

Hero said that he found segregationist news

papers and Southerners of like mind who knew something of events in
Africa "were identifying to a significant extent with whites in the
Congo, Angola, the Rhodesians, and especially the Republic of South
Africa."

57

The Southern sense of identity with South Africa was not,

however, limited to supporters of segregation; it extended also to
moderate Southerners who opposed racism.

5l+Ibid. , 186-87.
55rbid., 188.
•^Ibid., 188, 190, U19-20. Hero interviewed approximately
1,100 white Southerners chosen from subscription lists of some seven
national and international publications that dealt with foreign affairs.

57Ibid., U19-20.
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The reason why Southerners sympathized with South Africa was
not only because they felt that whites in both areas had the same out
look on race or shared a similar race problem— although this cer
tainly was often an important element— but also because they believed
that South Africa was threatened by the same forces threatening the
South:

liberalism, communism, the United Nations (often expressed

as "world government") and the United States government.

In this they

were much like the anti-Communist conservatives who valued South
Africa's friendship.

Indeed, many Southerners were to be found among

the anti-Communist group, and the distinctions between the two groups
were non-existent for some individuals.
The sense of being besieged by the same forces as those
threatening South Africa came out clearly in the Southern response to
Sharpeville.

The anti-pass demonstrations by blacks in South Africa

came just as civil rights "sit-in" demonstrations were beginning in
the United States.

Southerners who opposed the theory of civil

disobedience, rejecting the belief that unjust laws do not have to
be obeyed, saw parallels between the incidents in South Africa and
the demonstrations against segregation in the United States,

Bringing

out this position was David Lawrence, founder and publisher of U.S.
News and Wor Jd Report.58

Shortly after Sharpeville, Lawrence editori

alized that the "right to demonstrate" was being abused in both the
United States and South Africa.

What was, he asked,

rQ
? It mcv be open to doubt whether Lawrence should be included
with Southerners. He was born in Philadelphia in 1888 and went to
Washingtbn in 1910. Washington is, or was for many years, a Southern
city; Lawrence's views on many issues were essentially Southern and
he was sympathetic toward the South,
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the "right to danonstrate" when public officials are
challenged? Did the mob of 20,000 which "marched" on
the police station in South Africa-— containing only 25
policemen— have the right to throw stones and taunt
and threaten so that the police grew frightened and
opened fire? This was an example, not of a "peaceful
assembly" but of a mobocracy.59
One of the "indefensible" acts of lawlessness which Lawrence cited
was the burning of passes by the Africans; these were, he thought,
"identity papers required of all citizens . . . .
Southern newspapers did not give Sharpeville the prominence
that many newspapers in other parts of the country gave it.

Stories

concerning Sharpeville appearing on the front pages of other news
papers were printed in the inner pages of Southern papers.

Although

Southern newspapers relied on the same wire services as other American
papers for their stories, they indicated a somewhat different emphasis
in their headlines.^

While other papers stressed white violence and

American condemnation of the policies of South Africa, some Southern
newspapers focused on black violence.

The day after news of Sharpe

ville first broke, the Atlanta Constitution put the story on page two
under the headline:

"Africans Set Fires, Stone Firemen."

62

That same

59
David Lawrence, "The 'Right to Demonstrate,'" U.S. News and
World Report, April 11, i960, p. 128.
60...,
Ibid.
61
Some observers maintain that headlines are more important
than the content of the story itself. Gay Talese in his excellent
book on the New York Times, The Kingdom and the Power (New York, 1970),
reports that in 1915 the Times was printing much pro-German material
but the cumulative effect was very anti-German because of the subtle
control of display of the news. A British citizen employee of the
Times explained to another Times man, "let me control the headlines and
I shall not care who controls the editorials." Ibid., 205.
62
Atlanta Constitution, March 23, 1960, p. 2.
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day, the New Orleans Times-Picayune ran the story on page ten under the
heading:

"S. Africa Mohs Fired On; Negroes Burn Buildings [subhead]:

Rioters Stone Firemen in New Violence.”

The Charlotte, North

Carolina, Observer carried all of its stories on the South African
tuimoil on its inside pages until March 31, I960, when it gave front
page coverage to the mobilization of reserves in South Africa.

6h

Editorial comments on Sharpeville did appear in some prominent
Southern newspapers.

The Atlanta Constitution printed a cautious and
65
ambiguous statement about the West being on trial in South Africa.
The Miami Herald implicitly deplored violence by both whites and
blacks in South Africa, noting, however, that the criticism of South
Africa by the United States government "violated the recognized inter
national principle of non-interference in internal m a t t e r s . M o r e
direct was the New Orleans Times-Picayune which criticized the State

New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 23, I960, sec. 1, p. 10.
^Charlotte, North Carolina, Observer, March 31, I960, A 1.
Another North Carolina paper, the Raleigh News and Observer, was a
notable exception to the general response of Southerners to Sharpeville.
It featured the developments in South Africa prominently and
editorialized that the lesson of South Africa for the South was that
the South should work quickly to resolve racial difficulties. "Lessons
from South Africa," Raleigh News and Observer, March 25, I960, p. U.
However, the paper indicated a week later that its sentiment was
less noble than enlightened self-interest. It editorialized: "Events
in South Africa have intensified demands that segregation end in the
United States. Those who wish to retain limited segregation in the
end, should see to it that abuses in connection with segregation end
in all parts of the South." Raleigh News and Observa*, April 6 , i960,
p. k.
^Atlanta Constitution, April 1, i960, p. i». But the
Constitution also printed more critical editorials on the subject
which had appeared in the New York Times.
C
Miami Herald, March 29, I960.
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Department's action deploring the violence.

It asked, "Did it [the

State Department] want the policemen to surrender their authority and
their lives?"

6t

The sense of identity with South Africa came out

most clearly in the editorial of the Columbia, South Carolina, State
entitled "Resentment," which stated:
It seems to us that the Union of South Africa has a strong
point when it tells our State Department not to concern
itself with its [the Union's] domestic affairs.
There is entirely too much meddling these days, Outsiders
are trying to tell the South how to run its affairs.
And we rightfully resent the intrusion. So we can see
how the people of South Africa would resent interference
from our State Department, which the Union charges has
entered the explosive race picture there without knowing
all the facts "regarding attacks by many thousands of
Bantu (Negroes) on a small police force to whom was en
trusted the duty of maintaining law and order."
As to how much the State Department knew about South
Africa we are not aware, but we do know that the South
is all too often criticized by those who do not have
facts. -And so we sympathize with the Union of South
Africa.
The response to Sharpeville by the legislature of the most
embattled of the Southern states indicated how extreme the views of
some Southerners had become.

Instead of deploring the slaying of

sixty-nine Africans and the wounding of hundreds more, the Mississippi
state legislature passed a resolution praising the white South Africans
for their strong stand in favor of segregation.

Introduced by a

student at the state university, Phillip D. Bryant, the resolution
67
'New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 2h, i960, sec. 1, p. 16 .
The Times-Picayune conceded that there might be just grievances
against the pass system but said that this did not warrant inter
ference. The paper thought that the State Department was attempting
to curry the favor of the new African states.
^Columbia, South Carolina, State, March 25, i960, A k.
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was passed by a vote of seventy-eight to eight in the House and
forty-five to none in the state Senate.

The resolution said that mob

demonstrations and disorders had been part of an effort to overthrow
South Africa's segregation policies and that "there exists a definite
parallel between events in that country and recent disorders in the
Southern States of the United States."

It commended the South

African government for "its steadfast policy of segregation and the
staunch ddherence to their traditions in the face of overwhelming
external agitation.

„69

Copies of the resolution were sent to South

Africa, to the American Secretary of State, and to the press.
Also expressing criticism of the State Department for its
Sharpeville statement was Olin D. Johnston, United States Senator
from South Carolina.

Johnston called on the Congress to censure the

State Department for its criticism of South Africa.

He urged the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee to investigate the American govern
ment's action and to "put an end to the development of any policy
within the State Department to continue meddling in our internal
affairs by other nations.

,.70

A year or so later, the Jackson,

Mississippi, Clarion-Ledger expressed more colorfully the same fear
of a precedent for foreign intervention in American racial problems:
"If and when South Africa's hide is nailed to the U. N. barn door,
African extremists can use the same pressure tactics against Mississippi

^ General Laws of the State of Mississippi I960. Chapter 519»
House Concurrent Resolution No, 67.
70
23, I960).

Congressional Record. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., 6363 (March

2*a

and other Southern states."^"*"

Dixie's turn, the paper warned, might

come later.
It should he pointed out that the fear that American criticism
of or action against South Africa might lead to greater foreign
criticism of the United States was not peculiarly Southern, and it
probably did act as a real restraint on American policy.

The Cleveland

Plain Dealer expressed misgivings about United Nations discussions of
South Africa after Sharpeville (and, by implication, American approval
of those discussions).

It asked:

"If the U. N. can intervene in

South African racial situations, what is to prevent the Soviet Union,
or South Africa, for instance, from introducing a resolution in the
U.N. Security Council demanding condemnation of the United States
because Negroes are deprived of the right to vote in certain sections
of Alabama and Mississippi?"

72

The Christian Science Monitor likewise

stated that "in taking such a position (approving United Nations dis
cussion of apartheid] the American Government invites some searching
questions as to its own attitudes toward the racial problem in the
73
southern states,"

Writers in several other non-Southern newspapers

expressed similar sentiments.
Various members of Congress from the Deep South, in addition
to Senator Johnston, went on record in the 1960s in favor of Southern
^Quoted in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs. 2^2.
72

"The U.N. and South Africa," Cleveland Plain Dealer, April

3 , I960.
73

Christian Science Monitor, March 2k , i960, p. 18.

^See Melvin K. Whiteleather, "South Africa on Trial Before
UN," Philadelphia Bulletin, March 30, i960, p. 12; Toledo Blade,
March 2 k , i960.
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African causes or actively opposed American policy in that part of the
continent.

Senator Strom Thurmond, a South Carolinian who headed the

Dixiecrat movement in 19^8, and Representative Albert Watson, also of
South Carolina, both took part in American-Southern African Council
activities. 75

Senator James Eastland, a conservative Mississippean,
?6

maintained a correspondence with S. E. D. Brown of South Africa.
Brown was the publisher of the most conservative English language
publication in South Africa and was a contributor to the John Birch
77
Society's American Opinion.

Representative John Bell Williams, also

of Mississippi, spoke out occasionally on the importance of South
Africa to the United States, stating that it was the "only effective
pro-Western nation on the African continent."

7ft

After George M. Houser

of the American Committee on Africa and others attempted to fly into
South Africa against that government's wishes, Representative Thomas
G. Abernathy, another Mississippi Congressman, spoke against their
being allowed to use their American passports to meddle in the affairs
of another country.

79

•^American-Southern Africa Review, II (July, 1967), 1, 3.
Philip Woodyatt, "A Last Charee for South Africa," Harpers,
CCXIV (May, 1957)* 57. A legislative assistant to Senator Eastland,
Kenneth Tolliver, visited South Africa in 1967 ard. wrote a favorable
article on the country, "Traveler's Report on Southern Africa,"
Citizen, XI (July-August, 1967), U-ll.
77
E.g., S. E. D. Brown, "From Africa," American Opinion, VIII
(June, 1965), ^7-^9. An examination of old copies of the South African
Observer indicated that Brown had other correspondents and readers
in the South.
78

Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 15,6^0
(August 6, 1962).
^ Ibid., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 36,518-19 (December lU, 1967).
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Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana caused a furor in 1962 by
expressing favorable views on South Africa during a tour of Africa.
While in South Africa he announced that from what he had seen of
Africa, Africans were not ready for self-government.

South Africa, he

was quoted as saying, "seems to have the right idea with its policy
of racial separation.

„80

He later amplified these views in a long

report in which he concluded that apartheid was the only possible
Q1
policy for South Africa.
Ellender's fellow Senator from Louisiana,
Russell Lopg, spoke strongly in favor of granting South Africa a larger
sugar import quota after the House had reduced the administration's
recommended amount.

82

South Africa, he pointed out, had stood by the

United States at a time when the United States had faced a sugar
shortage.

In addition, Representatives Joe D. Waggonner and John R.

Rarick, both from Louisiana, went on record as strong supporters of
South Africa as an anti-Communist ally of the United States.
Prominent state politicians in the South who were exponents of
segregation likewise expressed sympathy for South Africa.

Governor

Lester Maddox of Georgia met with three members of the South African
Parliament touring the United States in 1968.

The South Africans were

fin
"Foot in Mouth Disease," Newsweek, December 17, 1962, p. k2.
8 au.s., Congress, Senate, Report on United States Operations
in Africa, S.Doc. 8 , 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, pp. 11(3-30"! See
also Ellender's comments criticizing the "liberals" who had criticized
him in the Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., lU,191. (June
23, 1966).

^ Congressional Record. 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 27,526 (October
20, 1965).
83Ibid., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 18,601 (July 12, 1967); 2^,079
(August 2k, 1967).
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told by Governor Maddox:

"I want you to know that the Government of

Georgia is standing with you."

8U

George Wallace declared in 1968

that if he were elected president, one of the first acts of his
administration would be to end the sanctions being enforced against
Qc

South Africa and Rhodesia.
Spokesmen for segregation in the South who did not hoJd public
office also expressed sympathy and support for South Africa.

James J.

Kilpatrick, for example, was an Oklahoma-born journalist who went to
work for the Richmond Mews Leader in 19^1.

He gained notoriety in

the mid-1950s for espousing the revival of the old states-rights
theory of state "interposition" to nullify federal laws and supreme
court decisions.

In the 1960s he became a strong advocate for South

Africa in the Richmond paper, in his nationally syndicated column, in
the Mational Review and Human Events, and as a member of the AmericanAfrican Affairs Association.

Similarly, Thomas R. Waring, editor of

the Charleston, South Carolina, News and Courier, was a defender of
Southern segregation in the 1950s who became a spokesman for South
Africa in the 1960s,
Strong too in support of the white government of South Africa
were the Southerners whose views were aired in the Citizen. The
Citizen was the publication of the Citizens' Councils of America, an
organization based in Jackson, Mississippi, which was in the forefront

^Quoted in Natal Daily News, December 3, 1968.
85rbid,, July k, 1968,
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of the organized opposition to desegregation of the South.

86

The

Citizen "began to support South Africa and Rhodesia with enthusiasm
after William J. Simmons, the Councils' administrator and editor of
Citizen,made a tour of those countries in 1966 as a guest of the South
African government.
Simmons summarized his views on South Africa in an address to
a joint meeting of the Association of Citizens' Councils of Mississippi
and the Jackson Citizens' Council.

After commenting on the growing

Southern interest in South Africa (and South African interest in the
South), Simmons told those assembled that it was increasingly clear
"that our destiny here in the South is entwined with that of South
Africa."

If South Africa succeeded, he said, the South's cause was

helped; and if it failed, the South's cause was hurt.

This was in

part because the same tactics were being used against both:

"Sanctions

have been and are being used against both Southern Africa and the
Southern states in an undisguised campaign to bring about black
rule . , . ." ^
Apartheid to Simmons was a worthwhile and successful method
of fostering racial harmony and engendering racial pride in both
black and white groups.

He found South African blacks "more settled

and stable than American Negroes," and possessing more human digniiy.
South Africa, he continued, did not have a race problem "any more

S^For a study of this organization see Neil R. McMillen, The
Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction
(Urbana, Illinois, 1971).
Qj
William J. Simmons, "Report on a Trip to Southern Africa,"
Citizen. X (July-August, 1966), U , 5.
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than we in the South had a race problem."

Wistfully, Simmons re

flected in his address on how different things would have been in the
South "if United States leaders [had] exhibited a fraction of the
wisdom, realism, and restraint shown by South African leaders, and if
the same integrity of purpose [had] permeated lower echelons of our
government . . . .
Apparently one of Simmons' colleagues on the Citizen, Robert
B. Patterson, the Executive Secretary of the Citizens' Councils, did
not believe it was too late for the United States to begin emulating
South Africa.

In reference to the United States, Patterson asked in

an editorial:

"Why Wot Separate Development?"^

Six months later he

wrote a similar editorial under the heading "Separate Development
Seen as a Solution."^
It is not surprising that strong advocates of segregation or
white supremacy were favorable towards South Africa.

But it would be

a mistake to believe that such support was limited to racial extremists
in the South.

Moderate Southerners who accepted or favored integration

in the South also often had sympathy for South Africa.

Such individ

uals, however, seldom had occasion to express their views in print.

86 Ibid., 10.
89

Ibid., 11. Simmons indicated his high regard for South
African leaders when he devoted a page "in Manorium" after the
assassination of Prime Minister Verwoerd, Citizen, XI (October, 1966},
k.
^Robert B. Patterson, "Why Not Separate Development?" Citizen,
XII (November, 1967), ^-5. Although Patterson did not specifically
mention South Africa, the reference was unmistakable, especially since
the story on the next page was on South Africa and Rhodesia.
^Robert B. Patterson, "Separate Development Seen as a Solution,
Citizen, XII (May, 1968), 16-17.
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They knew, too,that to speak out favorably on South Africa meant that
they were almost inevitably associated in other people's minds with
those who joined the Citizens' Councils and the John Birch Society.
In spite of the fact that the published expression of few
such moderate Southerners have been found, it is worthwhile to look
in depth at the views of three of these.

The individuals represent

different parts of the South and vary in degree of sophistication and
education.

Their views illustrate some of the factors involved in

image creation with regard to South Africa.

While the fact that all

three visited South Africa made them somewhat atypical, nonetheless
their opinions are indicative of the ways in which thoughtful Southern
moderates probably regarded South Africa.

The three whose views will

be discussed are Frederick Willetts, a Wilmington, North Carolina
businessman; Holding Carter, the publisher of a Greenville,
Mississippi newspaper, and Rene Williamson, a professor of political
science at Louisiana State University.

Common to their views were a

feeling of affinity with the Afrikaners, a belief that conditions for
Africans were improving under separate development programs, a dis
taste for various aspects cf apartheid policies, and a belief that the
whites of South Africa were capable of making reforms essential for
racial peace and stability in that country.
Frederick Willetts made a business trip to Johannesburg in
September 1959-

He was attending an International Congress of

Building Societies and Savings and Loan Associations, of which he was
a Council member.

Upon his return he wrote a small book on his

Journey and had it published in his home town.

In it he brought out

his admiration for the Afrikaners, whome he found to be "wonderful

2it8

people possessing many stalwart virtues . . . .

„92

They were, he

continued, "well equipped hy temperament and tradition to cope with
93
the 20th Century."
South Africa was not quite as Willetts had expected it to he.
He discovered that the reporting on South Africa with which he was
familiar had portrayed only the worst aspects of the situation there;
the reporting was too sensational. Prospects for the future were,
in his opinion, hopeful for improving race relations rather than
worsening them.

Kacial tensions, he said, were becoming less as the

African realized "the interest of the government in helping to raise
his standard of living and to improve his economic life generally."9^
For two decades the whites had "performed economic and social miracles"
for both black and white. He believed that the government was doing
everything possible to provide proper housing, medical care, and
recreational facilities for the Africans.
Willetts did not feel that the existing policy of apartheid
was suitable for South Africa's future; instead, he believed change
would be necessary.

The policy was, he believed, the result of fear

on the part of the whites.

But that fear was justified, because the

Africans had barely been brought into civilization.

They were, he

said, backward, indifferent toward work, and reluctant to make use of
the good farmland (some of the best in the country) that they had.^
92Frederick Willetts, Africa:
North Carolina, i960), 17•
93Ibid.
9k
_
Ibid., 58-59.
95Ibid.
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The second Southern moderate to he discussed was considerably
more prominent.

He is Hodding Carter, the editor and publisher of

the Greenville, Mississippi, Delta Democrat-Times. Fcr his courageous
opposition to segregation in the South through his newspaper he won
a Pulitzer Prize in 191*6.

Carter made a visit to South Africa in

1959 under the auspices of the United States-South African Leader
Exchange Program. 96

His views appeared in, among other places, an

article in the Saturday Evening Post entitled "We Never Felt More at
Home."97
The Carters felt at home in South Africa because of the strong
similarities in the histories of the South and South Africa.

The

Boers of 1900, Carter wrote, were the outnumbered Confederates of the
l860s.

The English were the Yankees, and just as in the United States

up to the time in which Carter wrote (and later) "the English-Yankees
still have most of the money in the land that the Boer-Southerners
run."

98

He found that in background, behavior, and outlook the

Afrikaners were more like Southerners than any other people in the
96
7 It should be pointed out that Carter had favorable views
of South Africa before going to South Africa. As he told the
House Subcommittee on Africa:
Two of my uncles were mining engineers in South
Africa. One fought on the side of the Boers in
the Boer War. Another one lived out his life there.
I had six first cousins born there. I have known
about South Africa, even though I have visited it
only once, ever since I could remember. I grew up
full of admiration for the Zulus as well as the others.
United States-South African Relations, 332.
^Hodding Carter, "We Never Felt More at Hame," Saturday
Evening Post, January 23, i960, p. 18.

98Ibid., U5 .
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world.

The folk similarity was, he said, all but complete:

they

both had a farm background, the Dutch Reformed Church was much like
the Presbyterian Church of the Scots-Irish who settled in the South,
thare was respect for patriarchial authority in both regions, and both
peoples had the same "strong self-identifying affection for their
beset land,"

99

Carter was very critical of some aspects of apartheid, just
as he was critical of the South.

In fact, he said South Africa was

a police state with respect to surveillance of the Africans

Never

theless, he apparently believed that apartheid was in part justified,
for he said he agreed with most white South' Africans that there should
not be an immediate end to segregation nor unrestricted suffrage' for
the

Africans.

Carter appeared before the House

in 1966 and made this point more strongly

Subcommittee on Africa

when he statedthat suffrage

for the Africans would have to be limited:
otherwise you would have more than three million people, who
have built a culture of which anyone could be proud, and who
are building an industrial society and much else besides who
I know would go down tomorrow if this Uhuru went thefull
way and the 12 million black Africans would have theright to
vote completely on racial grounds. The white man would be
run politically and other ways into the sea.101
In Carter's view, there were liberalizing forces at work in
South Africa and other signs that were encouraging for the future.
9^Ibid., I+5-U6 .
■'‘^Despite his strong denunciation of much of apartheid,
Carter's story drew letters to the editor suggesting that Carter
and like-minded Southerners should all emigrate to South Africa.
See the letters to the editor, Saturday Eyening Post. March 5> I960,
p. 6 .
1Q1Unlted States-South African Relations, 332.
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Contributing to this view was the contrast that he found between the
South and South Africa.

There was more academic freedom in South

Africa's state-supported institutions than in similar institutions in
the South.

South African newspapers were more critical of the in

equalities of the segregationist system than were their Southern
counterparts.

There were black publications as well as white publica

tions in South Africa.

Moreover, the parties in South Africa in

opposition to the government "provide[dJ, to a far greater degree than
Iwas] the case in our South, persistent opposition to immoderate race
policies."

1 OP

Indeed, he saw the possibility of apartheid being

ended by the white groups voting it out of the system.

As he told

a disbelieving Subcommittee member, Representative Benjamin Rosenthal
of New York, in the 1966 Congressional hearings:

"[M]any white South

Africans, including the Dutch, the Boers, are inclined to make con
cessions."^0^
The final Southern moderate whose views will be treated here
is Rene Williamson, a professor of political science at Louisiana
State University,

In the spring of 1969 Williamson spent two months

in South Africa as a visiting professor at the University of Natal.
As a result of his stay there he was moved to write a paper entitled
"Impressions of South Africa," which was one of the most sophisticated
discussions of South Africa by anyone with a Southern background.

lot

l0^Carter, "We Never Felt Mcr e At Home," 52.

103
United States-South African Relations, 335.
^0l|Rene Williamson, "Impressions of South Africa" (copy of
unpublished typescript in possession of author, kindly provided by
Professor Williamson). Williamson made a subsequent visit to South
Africa as a guest of the South African government.
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Like nearly all Southerners who were favorable to South
Africa, Williamson felt especially warm to the Afrikaners because
of the historical parallels between the whites of the two regions:
In many ways the Afrikano: resaubles our own white Southerners,
and that is probably why I felt a strong sense of kinship with
him despite the language difference. Like our Southerner,
the Afrikaner is an agrarian, a fundamentalist church-centered
Protestant, a race conscious individual, a victim of a lost
war and painful reconstruction, and the object of economic
inferiority. ^
But he also found attractive the peoples of other races in South
Africa, and the land itself.

The country was "a fairyland of bright

blue skies and golden sunshine . . . . " 1 0 6

Added to this was the fact

that there was "none of the sharp 'Yankee Go Home' or bitter criticism
of American policies that one finds in most other countries nowadays.
As was true with other moderate Southerners, Williamson found
that there were aspects of apartheid that he did not like.

The

security measures he pointed out had "all the earmarks of a pdlice
state"; the worst of these was the provision for ninety-day detention
of individuals without trial.

t

rift

Indeed, he did not believe that com

plete separation could ultimately be achieved because of the inter
dependence of blacks and whites in the economy.
In spite of his dissatisfaction with apartheid, Williamson
believed that limitations on the franchise, segregation, and white
leadership were politically necessary for the foreseeable future.
1Q5Ibid., 6-7.
106Ibid., 1 .
107Ibid.. 2 .
1Q8Ibid., 23.
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Echoing Carter, he stated:

"I can see no other way to avoid retro

gression into barbarism or a descent into massacres like those taking
place in Nigeria [during the civil war there between the Ibos of
secessionist Biafra and the rest of the countryJ.
jected the notion that segregation was inherently evil.

Williamson re
Segregation

was philosophically and politically acceptable if it was beneficial
to ail concerned, conducive to the common good, and not contrary to
the will of the people concerned.

The South African argument for

segregation was strengthened, in Williamson's view, by the fact that
black nationalists in the United States were making essentially the
same argument for racial separation.

The test, he said, of segregation

lay not in its concept but in its practice:
It is the implementation of segregation that determines whether
it is good or evil, and the test lies in its effects on human
welfare and happiness. There is a liberal orthodoxy that gets
in our way here, and we need to study the question with fresh
minds.
South Africa, concluded Williamson from his visit, had been at
least partially misrepresented abroad.

One of the reasons for this was

that Americans viewed black South Africans and black Americans as
though they were politically and culturally the same. This -was far
from the truth, he felt, because black Americans were culturally part
of Western civilization.

Black South Africans were, for the most part,

not, a consideration which gave Justification for a limitation of
political rights and for segregation.
Williamson, together with the other moderate Southerners
109Ibid., 25.

110Ibid.. 18-19.
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discussed here, saw certain "beneficial results from the South African
government's policies, and he expected future liberal developments
within the white groups in South Africa.

Although harsh in its imple

mentation, he observed that the pass system was preventing the further
growth of shanty towns and ghettoes.

Government officials were

working very hard to improve African agricultural techniques, and at
times were trying to aid the Africans by manipulating employment
categories to permit higher pay for them.

He found hopeful the govern

ment's "outward" policy of seeking dialogue with other African coun
tries and the growth of a verligte (enlightened) wing of the gcverxiing
Nationalist Party.

Also encouraging was the opposition of many English-

speaking South Africans to the harshness of the government's race
policies.

Such opposition stood in considerable contrast to what he

had known of segregation in the American South.

Describing a demon

stration at the University of Natal in Durban he commented:
I doubt very much that even the most liberal, progressive, and
academically distinguished universities in our South would
have gone this far when the segregation crisis was at its
height— and we had the federal government on our side!-1-11
As a desirable political development, Williamson expressed the hope
that the verligtes of the Nationalist Party would break away and join
with the United Party to bring about a more moderate race policy.
White Southerners, then, whether conservative or moderate on
race Issues in the South, tended to identify with South Africa and to
have sympathy for the plight of white South Africans.

They drew

parallels between their own background and the history of the
Afrikaners.

Although some of them disapproved of American segregation,

111Ibid., 11.
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they vere willing to accept, at least temporarily, a policy based
on segregation in South Africa.

They were much more inclined to see

progress in South Africa and hope for future political liberalization
than were other Americans.

Perhaps this was because they saw that

racial progress in the United States was being identified, rather
falsely, with symbolic victories over prejudice, and thus they were
more keenly aware of the economic focus of South African efforts at
racial progress.

Perhaps, too, they had seen h o w much white Southerners

had changed in attitude in a generation and thus saw this possible in
South Africa.

Indeed, there was an ironic inversion of C. Vann

Woodward's view of the contrast between Northern optimism and Southern
pessimism.

It was the South that saw the possibility of progress

in South Africa; it was Southerners who were optimistic far the future.

C.

The Only Real Industrial Camplejc South of Milan
The third identifiable group which had or was likely to have

favorable attitudes towards South Africa was American business.
Americans were economically involved in South Africa at least from the
time when diamonds were first dug at Kimberly and gold first dis
covered on the Witswatersrand.

South Africa was regarded favorably

by businessmen as an important trading partner for the United States
and as a place for profitable financial investment.

Moreover, they

viewed South Africa as a country possessing ‘a responsible business
community which looked to the future welfare of the country.
After World War II there was a rush to riches in South Africa

Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (New York,

I960), 19-21.
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Just as there had been earlier gold and diamond rushes.

Individual

fortuneseekers now, however, had been replaced by the polished repre
sentatives of large business and industrial concerns.

For a variety

of reasons South Africa appeared to be an excellent area for invest
ment, for expansion of existing industry, and for export marketing.
During World War II South Africa not only had been far from the
fighting fronts, but had also experienced an expansion of its industry
and economy as a result of the war.

Business Week listed some of the

reasons why South Africa looked so attractive after the war.

Because

of its annual gold output worth over $1*00,000,000, South Africa had a
strong dollar exchange position.

Local industries were available for

subcontracting and for supplying raw materials when needed.

A helpful

government, favorable to foreign investment, was more than willing to
aid American firms getting started in South Africa.
were emigrating from Britain

Skilled workers

and Europe to the country, and cheap,

unskilled labor was readily available.

In addition, the periodical

pointed out that there was a growing market for all sorts of goods
within the Union and elsewhere in southern Africa.

H'a
J

Such favorable

conditions were virtually unduplicated in any other country in the
world.

Dozens of major American firms started or expanded operations

in South Africa.
Typical of the outlook of businessmen viewing South Africa in
the immediate post-war period was a report cn "Why South Africa Rates
A-l for Export" by Raymond L. Hoadley, the financial editor of

■*"^"New U.S. Stake In South Africa," Business Week, November
29, 19^7, PP. 81-82.

Aviation magazine.
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The Union of South Africa, he wrote, was

an exporter's dream— a wealthy young country where
may purchase any product from the United States in
he sees fit— without government import or exchange
quired. The trade is unfettered by any artificial
What other markets fit this description?!!?

the importer
any amount
permits re
restraints.

In many respects, said Hoadley, South Africa was "the best country in
the world for our manufactured goods.
Another business periodical, Fortune, reported on the success
of the O'okiep Copper Company in South Africa.

This was an American

firm which took part in a United States government program in World
War II to expand production of strategic materials. 117

The company

had been able to repay its loan quickly and had continued to make sub
stantial profits after the war.

Fortune noted that a consequence of

O'okiep's experience had been to make American capital think well of
South Africa, and that American investment companies were sending
representatives to the country to examine the prospects for further
n *i O

activities in South Africa.
Business expectations were more than fulfilled.

Total Ameri

can exports to South Africa rose from $69,000,000 in 1939 to

^Raymond L. Hoadley, "Why South Africa Hates A-l for
Export," Aviation, XLIV (June, 19^7), 81-82.
115Ibid-» 01.
Ibid.
"^^"Nababeep and East O'okiep," Fortune, XXXVI (July, 19^7),

76-81.
"I"1A

Ibid., 79.
Not all businessmen who went to South Africa
were favorably impressed. Walter Kreiger, president of Chicago
Tool and Die, visited South Africa in 1956 as representative for a
number of American businessmen. His Judgment: "I wouldn't invest a
dime in Ithisl country in its present circumstances." New York
Times, July 10, 1956 ,p. U3.

$227,000,000 in 19^6, an increase of three hundred per cent. ‘*“*'9
Although rising less dramatically thereafter,

the figure for total

exports increased to $285,000,000 in 1957 and by 1965 it was at the
level of $1+38,000,000.
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More significant than the amount and value

of the goods exported to South Africa was the fact that the United
States almost always imported less from South Africa than it exported
there.

This meant that the United States maintained a favorable

balance of trade with South Africa throughout most of the period after
World War IX.

For example, in 1957 the United States imported only

$101,000,000 worth of goods and materials from South Africa; the
1965 figure was $226,000,000.'*'^'*'
The amount of direct American private investment in South
Africa also Increased considerably in the postwar period.
from $87,000,000 in 19U3 to $19*+,000,000 in 1952.

12?

It rose

By 1966 it was

more than $601,000,000 with almost 300 American businesses operating

^■^U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United
States, 1939 (Washington^ 19V0),xv; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Survey of Current Business, XXVII (March, 19^7), S 20.
120
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce,
Trade of the United States with Africa 1956-1958 (World Trade Informa
tion Service: Statistical Deports, Part 3, Wo. 59-39) (Washington,
1959), 3-^; U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
XLVII (December, 1967), S 21.
121

As Alexander Trowbridge, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Domestic and International Business, told the House Subcommittee
on Africa, the "surplus for the United States stemming from our trade
with South Africa in 19&5 furnished over 1+ percent of our global trade
surplus in 19^5 • Thus, U.S.-trade with South Africa contributes to
the favorable U.S. balance of trade position." United States-South
African Delations , 1+1+.
122

Herbert J. Cummings and Bernard Blankenheimer, Investment
in Union of South Africa: Conditions and Outlook for United States
investors (Washington, 195*0, 26.
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directly in South Africa,

123

The return on investments there through

out the postwar period has been quite high, with firms enjoying a
return of twenty-seven per cent or more.

X2h

s

By the mid-1960s annual

earnings on American investments in South Africa were over $100,000,000,
and South Africa ranked as the seventeenth largest area for American
private investment in the w o r l d . W i t h such rewards available for
American industry, it is not surprising that President Eisenhower's
Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, praised South Africa for its
"adherence to free trade principles and its firm belief in the private
enterprise system.
Throughout the century South Africa has been the most important
area in sub-Saharan Africa for both trade and investment. In spite of
the fact that same Americans looked to black Africa as a region for
growing American economic activity, South Africa held on to the
largest share of American business even after the independence of most
of the African countries.
field for business.

It continued to be the most attractive

To be sure, Sharpeville did cause seme consterna

tion in the business community.

For several years afterward there was

a net flight of capital from South Africa.

Nevertheless, it was only

■'■'^Walther Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "international
Investments of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business,
XLVII (September, 196?), 1*2.
12U

"Where There's A Beal Boom in Africa," U.S. News and World
Report, May 11, 1961*, p. 108,
125

Lederer and Cutler, "International Investments of the
United States in 1966," 1*3; United States-South African Relations, U6.
126

Sinclair Weeks, "South Africa's Contribution to Free Trade
and the Private Enterprise System," South African-American Survey,
VIII (195U-1955), 35.
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a few months after Sharpeville that a large loan was extended to
South Africa by American bankers and businessmen, and within a year
or two after the i960 tragedy a number of American firms, particularly
the large automobile manufacturers, authorized major expansion in
South Africa.
The first decade of African independence did little to change
the views of American business about the attractiveness of South
Africa as compared with other countries on the African continent.

In

contrast to the revolutions taking place in black Africa and the
socialist nature of many African countries' economies, South Africa re
mained prosperous, stable, and essentially capitalistic.
American businessmen and business publications contrasted
South Africa with the newly independent countries elsewhere on the
continent when they looked to the prospects for business activity in
South Africa.

For example, a Vice-President of the American-owned

Newmont Mining Company, Marcus Banghart, was quoted in 1962 as
commenting that South Africa "offers better promise for stability
I pQ

than untried social and political reforms in other areas.1

Making

similar observations, a journalist reported in the U.S. Mews and World
Report that South Africa was in the midst of a boom and was not facing
imminent revolution.

The economic picture was highly favorable for

investors, he said, and the standard of living was improving for all

■'■‘^New York Times, February 5, 1962, p. 35; August 18, 1963,
111,1. See also, "Chrysler, Ford and General Motors in South Africa,"
Economic Priorities Report, I (October-November, 1970), 10-11, 15.
128

Quoted in Colin Gonze, George M. Houser and Perry Sturges,
South African Crisis and United States Policy (New York, 1962), 50
(pamphlet in possession of the author).
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the raceB in South Africa.

As to the future of the country, he

stated:
South Africa’s resources remain vast. Internal unrest is
negligible. The impression you get here is of a country
that is in the midst of dynamic expansion— and rolling
along on the crest of a boom unequalled anywhere else in
the world at this time.-*-2^
Even more effusive in his praise of South Africa's accomplish
ments was John Davenport, the editor of the business publication
Fortune. The very title of his report was designed to draw the
reader's attention to the contrast between South Africa and the rest
of the continent:

"The Only Real Industrial Complex South of Milan."^30

Complaining of the "angry clouds of rhetoric" raised against South
Africa, he said that the controversy over the country's race policies
had obscured the achievements of its dynamic economy.
his readers of those achievements.

He reminded

Half of all the automobiles on the

entire African continent were registered in South Africa.

Half of the

continent's telephones were in South Africa, and half its electricity
was generated there.

With only six per cent of the total population

of Africa, he continued, South Africa created twenty-five per cent of
its industrial output.

In average income per capita South Africa led

all other African countries by a wide margin.

131

The difficulties encountered by multinational corporations
attempting to do business in the newly independent African countries
were spelled out in detail in a Business International research report
■*"^"Where There's A Real Boom in Africa," 109.
"*'3^John Davenport, "The Only Real Industrial Complex South of
Milan," Fortune, LXXIV (December, 1966), 180.

131Ibid., 181.
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entitled Prospects for Business In Developing Africa.

Business

International is a special publication which provides business firms
with up to date information on world business developments.

The 1970

report said that black Africa's "short history has been characterized
by political and economic chaos, set-backs, and disappointments, as
well as bright examples of solid progress."

133

The publication pre

dicted some movement in the 1970s away from the "ostentatious
politicking" of Africa's rulers but warned;
Despite the breakthrough to realistic economic thinking,
one cannot assume that Africa will now settle into the
business-like mold of Western industrial powers. African
business dealings are often still paralyzed by people who feel
that "if we can't do it our way, it's best not to do it at
all."^
The necessary change in attitude, the report said, would come to Africa
only slowly.
Business International listed a number of specific problems
that businessmen would have to deal with in Africa.

One of the most

important of these was the "almost universal lack of entrepreneurial
spirit among African people. "^35

concept of trade and commerce

was, it said, essentially alien to the masses of black Africa.

It

warned of the political headaches that they would have to face,
stating "day to day domestic politics will continue to hinder progress
and present multinational companies with serious problems for years

i3^Business International Corporation, Prospects for Business
in Developing Africa (Geneva, Switzerland, 1970).
133Ibid.. 3.
13^Ibid.. 6.
135lbid.. 12.
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to come.

Bribes, or their equivalents (such as hiring relatives

of politicians or paying "consulting fees" to political figures), had
to be considered as part of normal business expenses.
In contrast, a report on South Africa two years later by the
same business reporting service stated that South Africa "has a
favorable attitude toward the free enterprise system and has a record
of efficiency and honesty in its dealings."1^

It found the possi

bility of future internal or external turmoil "very unlikely."

The

report noted that despite external criticism of South Africa, more and
more foreign business firms were setting up manufacturing operations in
South Africa.

An Information Guide for Doing Business in South Africa

by the American multinational accounting firm Price, Waterhouse
similarly gave favorable comments on business prospects in South
Africa.

It stated one of the important reasons why the country was

attractive to foreign investors:
For the reason that its legislative and business structure
and the traditions of its people of European descent are
those of the western world, it follows the general business
concepts of that world and thus its economy is mainly one
of private ownership and free enterprise.
All this is not to say, however, that American business was
entirely happy with South Africa.

Investment there by American firms,

it should be pointed out, was not completely voluntary.

Concerned

about the country's trade deficits, the South African government at

136Ibid., 13.
137

Business International Corporation, Investing. Licensing
and Trading Conditions Abroad; South Africa (n.p., 1972), 2.
1ofl
Price, Waterhouse and Co., Information Guide for Doing
Business in South Africa (n.p,, 1972), 1.

various times severely limited the repatriation of capital..

With

nowhere else to go the money was reinvested in South Africa.

Local

content laws made demands on American businessmen, requiring them to
make extensive new outlays of capital within the country.

In 1962

the government began a local content program that required that by a
set date a certain percentage of each automobile sold in South Africa
be made from locally produced components.

Manufacturers were forced

then to choose between withdrawing from South Africa and expanding
their plants.

They chose the latter.

Local content requirements perhaps reflected a certain
hostility to outside investors.

But they also manifested the strong

South African desire to be self-sufficient in all areas of the
economy.

Self-sufficiency was an effort to prepare for sanctions as

well as an attempt to forestall them.

In order to encourage the

growth of South African-based business, the government was often un
willing to grant long-term permits to foreign firms for carrying on
business.

This, of course, did not please American firms which were

faced with uncertainty about whether they should expand their
activities or whether it would be more profitable in the long run to
sell their operations before their facilities became obsolete.
In addition, American business spokesmen and publications
expressed the view that the government, and the Afrikaners as a
group, let ideology or prejudice get in the way of good business.
Restrictions on African migration, job classification, and other
aspects of apartheid did not promote optimal conditions for the con
duct of business.

Indeed, the Afrikaners were portrayed frequently

as backward and unprogressive in outlook.

The English-speaking, by
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way of contrast, were seen as progressive, enlightened and good
businessmen.
Just after the 19^8 Nationalist victory, the "Business"
section of Newsweek brought out the differences between the two groups
of whites and explained what these meant for the American business
community.

The article stated:

Until two weeks ago the Union of South Africa looked to a
growing number of American businessmen and bankers like a
promising field for expanding trade and investment. Then
came the sudden election turnover. Field "Marshal Jan Smuts
and his British-oriented United Party were turned out of
office by a narrow majority. Power passed to Dr. Daniel
Malan and the ultra-isolationist, racist, and anti-British
Nationalist Party, a strong group of Boers who speak more
for the Afrikaan farmer than for finance and industry.^-39
South Africa was, it said, on the "threshold of a great boam," but
the rosy prospects had been clouded by the Nationalist victory.
This approach continued to be taken by business publications
throughout the period after 19^8.

Reporting on civil unrest in South

Africa in 1952, Business Week expressed the opinion that the source
of racial strife was to be found in the differing business outlooks
of the Afrikaners and the English-speaking:
At bottom, the struggle today is the same as it was 50 years
ago. On one side is the Afrikaans farmer who hates indus
trialization, urbanization, and political liberalism. On
the other side is the British business and professional
man who wants to promote a modern industrial society.
Editorializing same eight years later on the Sharpeville deaths,
Fortune magazine expressed virtually the same view:
■^■^"Bouth Africa: Complications in the Land of Opportunity
PIub ,11 Newsweek, June 21, 19^*8, p. 7^.
^^"South Africa Heads for Civil Violence," Business Week,
September 6 , 1952, p. 172.
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The difference between English-speaking and Afrikaans
speaking whites is better explained by the fact the latter
group is dominated by its farmers, who are relatively
isolated from world currents and who utilize Negro labor
for tasks requiring little education or skill. The
English-speaking community, on the other hand, is businessoriented. 1
Because of these different orientations of the two white groups, said
Fortune, the government was pursuing backward race and business
policies while business, i.e., primarily the English-speaking, took a
more progressive attitude.

Similarly, Business Week observed a year

later:
Organized commerce, dominated by English speaking South
Africans, is trying to head off this fate [racial chaos]
by urging the government to shelve its Bantustan projects,
to allow Africans to develop productive skills in urban
industries, to increase African purchasing power through
higher wages, and generally to adopt a more enlightened
policy.1^2
The pattern of portraying bad Afrikaners versus good Englishspeaking businessmen was modified in the 1960s as economic conditions
changed somewhat in South Africa.

Afrikaners rose to higherlevels

in businesses as more of them moved from the farms to the urban areas
ikl

"Racism vs. Business," Fortune, LXI (May, i960), 12k. See
also Michael Halpern, "The Cost of Apartheid," Fortune, LXH I
CJanuary, 1962), 1+7-U8.
iho
"Afrikaners Decide to Go It Alone— Sort Of," Business
Week, March 25, 19^1, p. 111. Especially important for the pro
gressive image of South African business has been Harry F. Oppenheimer,
As the head of dozens of South African companies, Oppenheimer pre
sided over a vast mining empire that extended to other parts of Africa
as well as South Africa. Articles in American publications stressed
his opposition to government policies; e.g., "Gold and Diamonds,"
Time, February 12, 1951, p. 8l; "Harry Oppenheimer's Industrial
Africa," Fortune, LXI (May, i960}, 152-65; and more recently, "Blacks,
Whites and Harry Oppenheimer," Forbes, June 15, 1973, pp. 38-^9.
See also, Harry Oppenheimer, "Why Apartheid Will Not Work," New
Repub lie. February 20, 1961, pp. 17-l8; and "People," Time, June 9,
1967, p. 5.
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and as Afrikaner groups proved more successful in uplifting the
volk, with the help, of course, of the Nationalist government,
Africaner "businessmen, such as Anton Rupert, who controlled one of
the largest tobacco industries in the world, and Jan Marais, who
introduced more progressive banking practices to South Africa, re
ceived some favorable treatment from the press in the United States,
particularly as they expressed opposition to apartheid.

lli3

Some statistical data is available on views of American
businessmen on South Africa.

Although not very reliable, it is at

least some indication of how American businessmen in South Africa felt
towards the government and its race policies.

The information is the

result of several surveys undertaken in 19 68 -1969 "by tiie South African
firm, Market Research Africa, Ltd.

In the July 1969 survey three

hundred questionnaires were sent out to American and Canadian business
men based in South Africa.

Only about thirty-five per cent of the

forms were returned by the respondents.

The businessmen in this poll

and in the poll taken Hie previous year indicated that if they were
South Africans they would have supported the three principal (white)
political parties in the following percentages:

litit

"Watching His Smoke," Time, December 21, 1962, p. 73;
Allen Drury, A Very Strange Society (New York, 1968), 363.
lUU

This data is drawn from Dudley Horner, United States Cor
porate Investment and Social Change in South Africa (mimeograph publication by the South African Institute of Race Relations,
Johannesburg, 1971),
and Timothy H. Smith, The American Corporation
in South Africa: An Analysis (New York, 1970), 5 (pamphlet in
possession of the author).
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Nationalist

United

Progressive

1968

355?

315?

155?

1969

315?

325?

205?

The businessmen were also asked whether South Africa's racial policies
represented "an approach that is, under the circumstances at least, an
attanpt to develop a solution."

In 1968 eighty-one per cent responded

affirmatively and in 19&9 seventy-seven per cent gave the same answer.
These polls provide some confirmation for the conclusions de
rived fran reading the published views of businessmen on South Africa.
American businessmen tended to prefer the English-speaking South
Africans to the Afrikaners, and they believed that conditions in South
Africa gave at least partial justification for apartheid.

On the

latter point it should again be pointed out that Americans who spent
any length of time in South Africa were inclined to be less critical
of its race policies than others.

John Davenport, the editor of

Fortune, observed and commented on this after his 1966 Journey to the
country.

He stated:

Living In daily contact with the realities of South Africa,
businesanen taid to be more relaxed and more open-minded
about its race problem than many critics at home, precisely
because they realize its complexity.
Some American businessmen clearly did favor apartheid; perhaps
some who were sent to represent their corporations in South Africa
were selected because of their racial views.

But this is not to sug

gest that most American businessmen thought that apartheid was the
most desirable policy.

Rather, they saw It more as a necessary evil,

1115Ibid.
lU6
Davenport, "The Only Read Industrial Complex South of
Milan," 251.
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one which got in the way of sound business practices, which was often
harsh, hut which produced benefits for blacks as well as whites and
adjusted relations between peoples of differing levels of civilization.
Typical of Uiis approach was Clarence B. Randall, a former
president of Inland Steel Corporation and author of several books on
public affairs and capitalism.

Randall visited South Africa in 1962

with the assistance of the South Africa Foundation.
observed during his visit was not to his liking.

Much that Randall

He "boiled with hot

anger" at some of the requirements of the South African government.

lliY

He declared that he could not
stomach the intrusions into personal liberty: the constant
carrying of identification cards; the requiring of passes for
both the white man and the black man when either enters territory
reserved for the other; house arrest and detention solely upon
accusation of the police; the separation of husband and wife
after years of wedded life; judicial determination of race; the
denial of nonwhites of the right to own land in freehold in an
urban area; the recent decree that requires professional
societies such as law and medicine to enforce segregation; and
the Sabotage Act,-*-^°
But he went on to say that the doctrine of apartheid had to be con
sidered in light of the population differences.

Some sort of restric

tions had to be placed on the exercise of political rights by the
Africans. As he saw it:
Only the incredibly naive can honestly believe that political
democracy— "one man, one vote"— will at once solve this complex
problem. The sober truth is that it would probably create chaos
^Clarence B. Randall, "South Africa Needs Time," Atlantic,
CCXI (May, 1963), 77. This was reprinted as "Why South Africa Needs
Time," in Reader's Digest. LXXXIII (August, 1963), 151-55- See also
Clarence B. Randall, "Do We Understand the New Africa?" in Sarah
Gertrude Millin, comp,, White Africans Are Also People (Cape Town,
1966), 79-99.

1Ufl

Randall, "South Africa Needs Time," 77.
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from which the country might never recover.

iJig
^

Apartheid also had to he weighed against the "highly creditable record
of conduct" of the white population in providing benefits for the
blacks.

The blacks had the highest per capita income for Africans on

the continent.

Some eighty per cent, he observed, of the children

were in school, with many Africans studying at the university level
or practicing in professions.
Time, said Randall, would provide solutions to the problems
of South Africa.

He felt that the Bantustan program was proving suc

cessful and would continue to move forward.

There were liberalizing

forces at work within the Dutch Reformed Church, the business community,
and the press.

Expressing the conviction that the whites of South

Africa knew they had a great responsibility and would live up to its
demand, he stated:

"At heart they are our kind of folk.

In the end,

they will do right.
Another businessman who held opinions similar to Randall's was
Stanley Shaw, editor of the Whaley-Eaton Service (a service reporting
on foreign political and economic developments affecting American
business).

Shaw had also made a trip to South Africa at about the

same time as did Randall, and he found the country "trying desperately
to improve the economic status of its so-called downtrodden."'*'^'*'
Conditions for Africans were improving, and Shaw believed that political
11+9Ibid. , 78.
15°Xbld.,

80.

■^'Stanley N. Shaw, "The Truth About South Africa," U.S. News
and World Report. November 19, 19&2, p. 115* This was evidently a
shortened version of Shaw’s business newsletter.
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advancement would accompany economic progress.
apartheid would be modified:

In time, he said,

"From separateness will come unity and

equal rights.
Randall, Davenport, Shaw and others were of the opinion that
economic forces in South Africa were working to mitigate the harshness
of apartheid and to lay the foundations for greater trust and coopera
tion among the races of the country.

Business, in their view, was

working against apartheid rather than apartheid supporting business.
Foreign trade and investment were aiding racial progress in South
Africa rather than shoring up an oppressive system.

Assistant Secre

tary of Commerce Alexander Trowbridge took this position while testi
fying to the Ifcuse Subcommittee on Africa in its 1966 hearings on
American policy on South Africa.

He asserted:

[T]he presence of U.S. business in South Africa has, in certain
limited areas, exerted a positive influence on some aspects of
racial practices in South Africa, particularly in the industrial
sphere. In many instances, U.S. firms have been in the fore
front in introducing progressive labor-management practices,
such as employing nonwhite labor at high job and skill classi
fications .53
Some American businesses operating in South Africa themselves
began putting forth the argument that they were promoting progressive
change in South Africa as liberal groups increasingly brought pressure
on them to withdraw from South Africa.

To some extent, public state

ments by these businesses were self-serving.

American corporations

had much invested in South Africa and did not wish to be forced to
divest themselves of their holdings there.

Statements about their

152m d .
~*~^-%nited States-South African Relations, H6 .
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opposition to apartheid became necessary so as to answer same of the
questions of critical shareholders and to forestall boycotts of their
products.

For example, a proposal that General Motors should withdraw

from South Africa resulted in a report on "General Motors and South
Africa" by Elliott M. Estes, Group Vice President with jurisdiction
over the Overseas Operations.

He explained to an audience at a

conference on General Motors’s performance in matters of public
interest:
The General Motors position is that its economic presence in
South Africa is our greatest contribution to progress in that
country. We believe that through the steps we are taking and
the good working conditions and facilities at General Motors
South African, we are providing an example for other employers
to accelerate the pace of progressive change, . . .
We feel that the black man would be the first to suffer from
any serious failure in the process of economic growth in South
Africa. Further, any attempt to damage the South African
economy or isolate South Africa from the rest of the world may
only produce a deeper commitment by the white population to the
perpetuation of apartheid.^55
Estes went over the steps General Motors was taking in South
Africa to improve conditions for Africans.

These included wage in

creases, Job training, medical services, and scholarships for non
white children.

The Polaroid Corporation made similar representa

tions in newspaper advertising in major American newspapers and in
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1971.
l^Elliott m . Estes," General Motors and South Africa," in
General Motors Corporation, 1972 Report on Progress in Areas of Public
Concern (Warren, Michigan, 1972), 53-59155Ibld,, 53.
J.56
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.
Business Involvement in South Africa, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Africa, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, Part 1, pp. U-5, 13. The news
paper advertisements appeared in the New York Times, Boston Globe and
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Although such statements "by business can be regarded as selfinterested rationalizations, they are nonetheless consistent with the
views of businessmen and business publications that appeared occasion
ally in the 1950s, that is, before there were strong pressures for
business withdrawal from South Africa.

Indeed, they are consistent

with what critics of South Africa had been saying for years, albeit
with a different emphasis:
compatible.

a dynamic economy and apartheid were in

Some of the businessmen who came forward on behalf of South

Africa had only negligible or no financial interests in the country.
For some businessmen, their views on South Africa were clearly a re
flection of their belief that economic well-being is a precondition of
democracy.

Clarence B. Randall, for example, argued that "no man can

be free unless he eats. "-*-57
Finally, it should be observed that there have been black
South Africans who have agreed substantially with the spokesmen for
business that American business activities in South Africa have pro
duced benefits for blacks as well as whites.

Gatsha Buthelezi, leader

of the Zulu nation, has gone on record in opposition to a discontinua
tion of the American purchases of South African sugar* as part of its
1
quota program.
Lucy Mvubelo, secretary of the National Union of
Clothing Workers, expressed pleasure at Polaroid's refusing to pull

Herald, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, and
twenty papers in the black community. For a generally favorable report
on the activities of American corporations in South Africa, see "U.S.
Raises for Blacks," Time, June U, 1973, p. 8U.
157Randall, "Bo We Understand the New Africa?" 82.
~^®Natal Bally News, September 8 , 1971.

out of South Africa.
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An African librarian in Umtata, the capital

of the Transkei, asked this author to try to encourage American in
vestment in the Transkei when he returned to the United States.
people, he said, needed jobs.

His

While American critics of South Africa

may have regarded the arguments put forth by business as unconvincing,
those who would be most affected by American economic disengagement
from South Africa found them more persuasive and were reluctant to
give up the benefits of American investment so as to ease the con
sciences of the Americans claiming to speak on their behalf.
Although the three groups and the individuals discussed in
this chapter differed in important aspects of their views, such as in
their attitudes towards Afrikaners and the Nationalist Party, they all
shared the opinion that American policy on South Africa after 1958
was misguided and unsound.

However, the criticisms of American policy

varied somewhat in emphasis.
For the anti-Communist conservatives and the more Negrophobic
Southerners, American policy on South Africa was another example of
the blundering incompetence and destructive naivete of the "liberals"
in the State Department.

The publisher Tom Anderson, writing in the

John Birch publication American Opinion, said that "the fruit flies in
our State Department" were constantly making trouble for South Africa
and Rhodesia because they were stable, prosperous and Christian.
Continuing, he contrasted American policy on Southern Africa with
policy towards other parts of the continent:

159Ibid.
^■^Anderson, "Rhodesia," 77.
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Prehensile characters a generation out of the trees tear
down our flag, stone our Embassies, and spit on our
Ambassadors as we continue to deliver billions of dollars
worth of our grandchildren's seed corn to them. As for
our real friends, such as South Africa and Rhodesia, we
spit on them. We boycott them. We give no foreign aid to
them. We even threaten— through the United Nations— to
invade them.1®1
An editorialist in the Citizen complained bitterly that American policy
was being directed against the"only remaining areas of peace and sta
bility in Africa— our own natural allies— anti-Communist South Africa
and Rhodesia."

1

Commenting on the American government's refusal to

allow the carrier Franklin U. Roosevelt to put into a South African
port, the writer said that he thought the decision was "an interesting
case history, in miniature, of the concoctions served up at the Mad
Hatter's Tea Party on the banks of the Potomoc."1^
For the more moderate Southerners and for people associated
with American business, criticism of South Africa seemed likely to
have the opposite effect from that which was desirable; that is, it
would cause the progressive whites in South Africa to lose strength
to the more conservative elements and would limit the possibilities
of fruitful communication and Interchange with the South Africans.
Thus, Hodding Carter and Clarence B. Randall both felt that South
Africa should be given time to work out its problems without outside
interference.1^

J. Irwin Miller, a prominent manufacturer, found

l6lIbid., 78.
l62"Where's the Riddle?" Citizen. XI (April, 1967), 2.
■i

Ibid.; see also ,fU.S. Carrier Caper Confuses Cape Town,"
ibid., 10-15.
l6\jnited States-South African Relations, 333; Randall, "South
Africa Needs Time," 77-78.
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the arguments for economic disengagement from South Africa like argu
ments against "financing atheism" by trading with Russia; if sanctions
were imposed against South Africa, he said, it would destroy the
possibility that trade and cultural relations might help bring about
change in South Africa.
There is no reason to belabor the point covered here and else
where in this chapter:

those with favorable views of South Africa or

who believed that South Africa's benefits to the United States out
weighed its liabilities did not feel that a hostile policy towards
South Africa served a useful purpose.

Although it is not possible to

say what influence the groups and individuals treated on here may have
had on policy formulation, one can note that their arguments seemed
more persuasive and they found greater support as the 1960s grew
older.

The

reasons for this will be taken up in the final chapter

of this study.

-^Letter of J. Irwin Miller to the editor, Christian Century,
January U, 1967, p. 18.

CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUSION

For a time in the mid-1960s it appeared that the United States
might participate in measures that had as their goal the destruction
of apartheid.

The United States did not, however, act to "bring apart

heid in South Africa to an end.

There are many reasons why it was un

willing to support United Nations sponsored sanctions or to take
unilateral measures against South Africa, hut it may he generations
before these are publicly known.

However, based on presently avail

able materials and the analysis of American views on South Africa that
has been employed in this study, it is possible to suggest some fac
tors that caused the arguments in favor of American sanctions to lose
much of their force.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s it seems clear that many
Americans were looking upon South Africa more favorably, or at least
less critically.

Numerous observers have commented on this.

South

African reporters in the United States asserted that the movement for
sanctions had lost its vitality.'*'

William A. Hance, a professor of

economic geography at Columbia University, spoke of the movement in the
past tense in 1968. In a collection of essays on American relations
with South Africa he wrote:

■^John Jordi, "The Anti-S.A. Lobbyists Lose Steam," Natal Daily
News, June 2k , 1969!(clippings file of the newspaper); Ken Owen, "Steam
Goes Out of U.S. Protests on SA Racism," Johannesburg Star, December
28, 1971» and personal interview with Ken Owen in Washington, D.C.,
August 23, 1971.
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Several years ago there was very considerable interest in the
possible application of sanctions as a way of bringing about
desired change in South Africa. Some would not agree that there
has been a reduction of this interest, but it seems clear that
the major powers have rejected sanctions as a method of forcing
change in South Africa.^
The novelist James A. Michener after a visit to South Africa concluded
that "everyone is agreed" that there should be no withdrawal of
American business from South Africa.
Bishop C. Edward Crowther, an American clergyman once expelled
from South Africa, commented on the shift in American views on South
Africa and attributed the change to the South African government's
efforts to improve its image;
A massive propaganda attempt has been more successful than
anyone could have dared to hope, presenting a benign new
image for South Africa. Suddenly, South Africa projects her
self as yearning to be understood, exuding international good
will and extended toleration. It is as if the polecat had
been a mink all along, and understandably the world is
puzzled.
Others too have asserted that the activities of the South African
government and South Africa Foundation have been responsible for a
new "climate of opinion" on South Africa.5

William A. Hance, "The Case For and Against United States
Disengagement from South Africa," in William A. fiance, ed., Southern
Africa and the United States (New York and London, 1968), 107.
James A. Michener, "The Five Warring Tribes of South Africa,"
Mew York Times Magazine, January 23, 1972, p. 56.
^C. Edward Crowther, "South Africa's New Look: A Detente
Cordiale?" American Scholar, XXXVII (Winter, 1967-68), 5^* Evidence
of the shift in views is also provided by conservative Americans who
thought South Africa was becoming too liberal. See Jim Lucier,
"Africa: Year of the Simba," American Opinion, VIII (July-August,
1965), 12; and fievilo P. Oliver, review of Anton Rupert's Progress
Through Partnership, in South African Observer, XIII (March, 19^8), 5.
^E.g., Vernon McKay, "South African Propaganda:
Media," Africa Report, XI (February, 1966), U1-I16.
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There seems to be no doubt that the pro-South Africa agencies
and organizations have contributed to more favorable views on South
Africa.

However, a lobbying group can do little more than marshall

facts and present arguments.

The soundness or persuasiveness of the

arguments turn on factors beyond the control of opinion influencing
groups.

It has already been observed that even some of the harshest

critics of South Africa doubted that sanctions could have the effect
of improving conditions for blacks in South Africa.^

Other developments

in both the United States and South Africa made the arguments for
sanctions seem still less sound.
Probably the most important single factor tending to lessen
support for sanctions against South Africa was the Viet Nam Weir.
That war has undoubtedly altered the outlook of Americans on world
affairs in many ways.

For years it was the primary foreign policy

concern of the American people and drew their attention away from other
issues.

As one critic of South Africa complained in 1966:

Che of the unwelcome side effects of the Vietnamese war has
been to drain U.S. energies to such an extent that any
attempt to launch an anti-apartheid campaign in 1966 will
probably fail if it depends largely on the United States.
Although official American sympathies are firmly on the
side of the African nations and against South Africa, Ameri
can thinking on foreign policy is completely entangled in
the jungles of Vietnam. Until the Vietnamese issue is
resolved, there is little chance of the United States
„
opening a second front in equally remote southern Africa.
As Viet Nam dragged on, Americans increasingly doubted their
claim to moral leadership in the world, and many doubted their
^See above, p. lUU.
7
Anthony A, D 1Amato, "Apartheid; Catalyst in the U.N.,1’
Christian Century. October 26, 1966, p. 1306.
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essential goodness as a people.
role in world affairs.

The war caused them to seek a smaller

It caused them to question strongly their

ability to bring a better society to a foreign country through the
use of force.

It exposed the limitations on power theretofore thought

to be virtually limitless.

Speaking on Viet Nam and many aspects of

post-World War II policies, Secretary of State William P. Rogers
told the graduating class of Colgate University in 1971 that American
idealism had been "too grandiose."

He stated:

We presumed a degree of omnipotence for good which has led
to considerable disillusionment. We found that we lacked
the power to affect bthers as we thought we might. We
often approached political problems with an excessively
moralistic and self-righteous attitude.
As American opinion turned against the war in Viet Nam, Americans
were not prepared to take actions in southern Africa that could lead
to war there for the sake of getting South Africans to adopt policies
more in line with American concepts of morality.
Indeed, Americans began to doubt that their policy of integra
tion or assimilation was the most moral policy to follow on race
relations.

There was in the mid-1960s a shift in the thrust of the

civil rights movement in the United States.

After achieving victories

for equality of treatment in the courts and in Congress, the movement
shifted from an emphasis on equal opportunities to an emphasis on
black power or black separatism.

Large masses of blacks rioted in a

number of American cities, especially in the summer of 1966, causing
millions of dollars in damage and a white backlash.

Black leaders

^William P. Rogers, "Relating Our National Idealism to Inter
national Realities," Department of State Bulletin, June 21, 1571* p.
796.
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rejected white paternalism and democratic homilies in favor of selfdetermination and a new sort of segregation.
In the mood of dismay over this turn of the civil rights
movement, commentators "began to suggest that integration had failed
in the United States.

The vice-president of the liberal Center for

the Study of Democratic Institutions, W. H. Ferry, reflected the
pessimism about the prospects for peaceful race relations when he
declared in a speech that the United States was irremediably disunited
on race.

He said that the United States had to discover "a philosophy

and machinery for the democratic government of a separated country.
An editorial in America described well the shift that took place in
the civil rights movement and the response of white Americans to the
shift:
Black nationalism became the cry, and in place of pleas for
integration came rejection of white society as a whole.
The reaction was first one of incredulity. On the right came
a counter-cry for "law and order" at any cost, even the harsh
repression, not only of violence and crime, but of dissent
and agitation, too. Some on the extreme left were driven
by desperation and a sense of guilt to "burn down America"
in quest of Justice and reprisal. Many moderates or liberals
sought to regain the old myths by redefining or abandoning
policies to which they had been committed. While integration
was all right for the South, conditions in the metropolitan
North made it impracticable in the foreseeable future. A
new-style "separate but equal" policy suddenly became
acceptable.-^
The magazine then counseled Americans to heed C. Vann Woodward's plea

H. Ferry, "Farewell to Integration," in Barry N. Schwartz
and Robert Disch, eds,, White Racism: Its History, Pathology and
IVacoice (JNew York, 1970), 505. See also "Grasping at ChaoB," Nation,
November 27, 1967, p. 5^7; and "An End to Self-Deception," America,
March l6 , 1968, pp. 3UU-U5.
10,,The Burden of American History," America, November 23, 1968,
p. 511.

that the United States abandon its childish holier-than'-thou myths.
The implications of the changing vievs of American race
relations for American perspectives on South Africa very soon became
apparent.

If race relations were bad in South Africa, they were,

as America noted, "far more bloody” in the United States.11

If the

United States was unable to cope with its own race problems, how could
it improve South African race relations?

Indeed, black Americans

were proposing a black cultural (or even geographic) separation that
shared much of the ideology of South African apartheid.

Discussing the

increase in demands in the late 1960s for black studies programs at
American universities, John Hatch, a South African "banned” for his
opposition to apartheid, expressed his surprise and shock at such
demands:
This year, my fifth in America's academic world, I have sensed
there a closer approximation to the apartheid spirit than in
any society since I was last in South Africa. . . . Some aspects
of the demands I have heard or read from black students on
American campuses could have been copied from the words or
writings of white South Africans— with the words "white" and
"black" transposed,^-2
The new black attitude towards separatism caused some Americans to
reconsider apartheid and suggest that it might have some merit, at
least in theory.

To take one example, James A. Michener spent a month

in South Africa in 1971 and wrote of his views of South Africa.

After

noting separatism of ethnic groups in Canada, Cyprus, Belgium, and
Ireland, he commented on "grand" apartheid:
One must not therefore contemptuously dismiss South Africa's

^-''Controversy Over a Bishop," America, August 19, 1967, p. 16U
^John Hatch, "Black Studies:
1969, p. 755.

The Real Issue," Ration, June 16
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effort to achieve something which many areas in the rest of the
world have tried. One must also remember that many black
leaders in the United States advocate precisely what South
Africa is recommending— that defined areas like Alabama and .
Mississippi be turned over to the blacks for their control.^
If a change in the civil rights movement in the United States
made apartheid appear to have a moral and ideological basis, develop
ments in Africa made the white fear of "swamping" appear more valid
than it had appeared in I960. The record of the first decade of
independence of the black ruled countries of Africa proved to be a
disappointment to Americans who had been optimistic about the potential
for democracy in those new states.
found disillusionment.

The hopes of i960 turned to pro

As the historian Cornelius W. de Kiewiet ob

served in 1970, "a pall of doubt has descended upon Africa."1^
Revolutions were frequent, and the typical form of government became
the military dictatorship or the one party state.

Time magazine. for

example, noted in 1966:
The Congo has been in perpetual chaos, the Sudan has been
unable to cope with the rebellion of its anti-Moslem south
against its Moslem north. Three east African nations have
had to put down military uprisings, and the governments of
eight countries have fallen before military coups. In
addition, only a handful of Africa's new countries have
maintained any resemblance of the multiparty democracy that
they inherited from their departing European c o l o n i s t s . ^
Newsweek. commenting on the tenth anniversary of the Organization of
African Unity, called it a "dismal and disillusioning decade."

l6

l^Michener, "The Five Warring Tribes of South Africa," U7 .
^Cornelius W. de Kiewiet, "The Revolution That Disappeared,"
Virginia Quarterly Review, XLYI (Spring, 1970), 202.
Great White Laager," Time, August 26, 1966, p. 25.
■^"Africa:

The 'Toothless Dog,"'Newsweek, June U, 1973, p. ^3.
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Political instability in the African states was often com
pounded by cupidity in the leaders.
accompany revolutionary rhetoric.

Meaningful reform did not
Tribalism continued in post

colonial Africa and was at times associated with racism far worse
than any that had ever appeared in South Africa.

Even publications

or individuals sympathetic to Africa began to express their misgivings
about the new states.

For example, a writer in the Mew Republic ob

served with some distress that "although most African leaders condenn
racism, immigrants have been expelled on 2k hours notice, forced to
leave friends and livelihood behind, and even the small minority of
Asians and Europeans who have become citizens of the East African
17
countries are discriminated against in employment."

The same writer

suggested that in the future leaders might use racial scapegoats to
divert mass frustrations.

The Asians became such scapegoats in

Uganda when General Amin dispossessed and/or expelled nearly all
Aslans from the country in 1972 with much violence.

When African

countries called for South Africa's exclusion from the 1968 Olympic
games because of its racial policies, even the liberal Christian
Century noted that it was unlikely members of the Ibo tribe would be
-1Q

found on the Nigerian teams or Asians on the Kenyan teams.

There

were mass tribal slaughters in Rwanda and Burundi for more than a
decade, with a death toll amounting to an estimated one hundred to

■^Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Civil Rights for Whites," New Republic,
October 2k, 196k, pp. 5-6. See also Walter Laqueur, "Reflections on
the Third World," in Irving Howe, ed., A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign
Policy (New York, 1968), 173-9k.
^"Soiiih Africa Barred from Olympics," Christian Century, May
15, 1968, p. 6k0.
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two hundred thousand systematically murdered in 1972 alone. ^

These

developments in black Africa made white South African fears of rule
by black Africans appear wfell founded.

Rupert Emerson, a noted

authority on Africa at Harvard University, commented in 1967:
[l]t is a wide open gamble what manner of governments and
societies might emerge in southern African countries if
their economies were ruined and their present regimes over
thrown by force [i.e., enforcement of sanctions] . . . .
The simplest realism demands recognition that the way in which
the black African states have conducted their affairs since
independence can inspire no abundant confidence that southern
Africa, liberated from white domination, will develop stable
democratic governments which promote d e v e l o p m e n t .^
The discouraging developments in black Africa caused Americans
to play down the importance of Africa to the United States.

They

also caused Americans to look to the more positive aspects of the
political order in South Africa.

Thus, the author of a study of the

world's outstanding newspapers observed in 1968 that despite certain
reactionary social practices, "South Africa has the freest press on
the entire African continent."

21

Time magazine observed that under

the Verwoerd government the Africans of South Africa had become "the
pp

best-paid and best-fed blacks on the continent."

Even the New

•^S t a n l e y Meisler, "Rwanda and Burundi," Atlantic, CCXXXII
(September, 1973), 6 . Meisler suggested the possibility of an American
boycott of the two countries or that the United States and others
"refuse to support all African resolutions on southern Africa in the
United Nations unless these resolutions also condemned the disaster
in Burundi and Rwanda. . . . At the least, it would expose African
hypocrisy." Ibid., 16.

20Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, 196?)» 106, 108.
21

John C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspapers of the
World (New York, 1968), lUl.
22iig0uth Africa:
1966, p. 39-

Death of the Architect," Time, September 16,
----
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Republic felt compelled to say that "this crazy system— a superstruc
ture of political and social, segregation erected on a base of economic
integration— works in the sense that there is stability and pros
perity . . . .,,23
In this new climate of opinion, Nationalist leaders began
receiving more favorable treatment in the American press.

After

Prime Minister Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966 he was succeeded by
B. J. Vorster.

During World War II, Vorster had been a leader of the

Ossewabrandwag and had been interned by Jan Smuts for his opposition
to the war.

When Vorster became Prime Minister the American press was
pK
initially hostile to another "pro-Nazi" Nationalist,
After a short

time, however, it began to treat Vorster more favorably.

Vorster

proved to be accessible to the press; he had a sense of humor and was
n6t aloof like Verwoerd.

Moreover, he seemed willing to make changes

in South Africa's policies.

Observers saw signs that Vorster was

taking steps to limit apartheid, and that this reflected a change in
the racial views of other Afrikaners.

In foreign policy, Vorster

embarked on an "outward" policy, seeking friendlier relations with
black African countries. 25
^

^"South Africa Under Its New Leader," New Republic, October
29, 1966, p. 11.
q J.

"The Security Man," Time, September 23, 19^6, pp, 3^, 37;
"What Now in South Africa?" Christian Century, September 21, 1966,
p. 1136; "South Africa: New P.M." America, September 2U, 1966, p.

.
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^See Amry Vandenbosoh, South Africa and the World: The
Foreign Policy of Apartheid (Lexington, Kentucky, 1970), 272-80;
and Gail-Maryse Cockram, Vorster's Foreign Policy (Pretoria and Cape
Town, 1970), ll6-l»6 , 1 8 7 - ^

287
Time magazine reported that Vorster had been a "considerable
surprise."

It observed that Vorster was proving far more reasonable

than his predecessors and was injecting humanity into South Africa's
heavy ideological climate.

The Afrikaans word for his style, it

said, was "billikheid— sweet reasonableness."

Time noted that Vorster

was taking steps to ease apartheid, removing new apartheid bills from
the legislative docket, receiving black trade delegates from an
African state, and holding secret trade talks with other African
delegates.

The magazine predicted no overnight scuttling of apartheid,

but did believe that Vorster had "given moderate South African whites
the first hint of encouragement in nearly two decades of Nationalist
rule."27
Going further than Time was an editorial in America, a
publication that had long been critical of South Africa.

It found

that Afrikaners were becoming less tightly knit and less racially
conscious, suggesting that apartheid was logically the next to suffer
Pfl
from the erosion of the old values of the Afrikaners, u Similarly,
Newsweek interpreted the results of the 1970 South African elections
as signifying a trend toward moderation, and it saw "a real prospect
that without abandoning the concept of white supremacy, South Africa
might begin to move toward a slight relaxation of apartheid in the
pQ
nation's economic life." 7 This view appeared to be confirmed by a

2^"A Touch of Sweet Reasonableness," Time, March 31, 1967, p. 28.
27
JIbld., 29. For similar views by an American official, see
David D. Newsom, "A Look at African Issues at the United Nations,"
Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1971, pp. 371-71*.
28

"Apartheid Next," America. August 17, 1968, p. 90.

^9"South Africa:

Relaxing a Bit,"Newsweek. May

1970, p. ^5*
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study conducted by Donald E. Pursell, an associate professor of
economics at Memphis State University.

Pursell's study of South

African wage policies from 1925 to 1968 concluded that the govern
ment's Wage Board had since 1957 been improving non-white earnings
significantly.

The author stated that the Wage Act under which the

Board operated
has ceased to support white workers and has Instead adopted
the policy of increasing non-white earnings. In its current
policy objective, the Wage Board stands to guarantee that the
non-whites receive a portion of the growth of the economy.
Seen from this point of view apartheid, or separate economic,
social, and political development, can be interpreted as far
removed from baaskap, or complete domination by whites.
All this is not to suggest that Americans suddenly decided
that they had been all wrong about apartheid or that they embraced it
as an acceptable or desirable social policy.

They continued to

criticize apartheid and to call for abandonment of the oppressive
policies of the Nationalist government.

However, now they did

acknowledge that the policy of separate development was not without
some degree of Justification and that under it some benefits had
been passed to the Africans.

There seemed to be a basis for believing

that the situation could be improved in South Africa from internal
change, that catastrophe could be averted without resort to inter
vention from the outside.

In addition, the possibility of a race

war lessened as Americans came to the realization that the expected
revolution in South Africa would be much longer in coming than had
been predicted.
^Donald E. Pursell, "South Africa Labor Policy: 'New Deal'
for Nonwhites?" Industrial Relations. X (February, 1971), ^8 .
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Vernon McKay, himself a strong opponent of apartheid, ob
served In 1968 that "instead of talking about change in three to five
years, numerous opponents of apartheid nov speak of twelve to twentyfive y e a r s A n o t h e r strong critic of South Africa, Joseph Lelyveld
of the New York Times, similarly asserted that there was "no power
inside the country or on the African continent that the whites for
the present need fear."

32

If there were to be no revolution in South

Africa, then American withdrawal might be a futile gesture; there
would be only limited benefits to the United States in its relations
with black Africa and whatever beneficial effects there were from an
American presence would be lost.

Spelling out the policy implications

of the view that there would be no revolution, William A. Hance stated:
If the evidence suggests . . . that no crisis is likely to
occur in the foreseeable future, then the United States might,
by a policy of unilateral economic disengagement, not only
reduce its own ability to influence change in South Africa
but weaken to some extent those economic forces which are
working against certain of the stated goals of apartheid.33
The implications for policy were also brought out by Jim
Hoagland who wrote a series of Pulitzer Prize (1971) winning articles
on South Africa for the Washington Post. Hoagland suggested that the

1Vernon McKay, "Southern Africa and Its Implications for
American Policy," in Hance, ed., Southern Africa and the United
States, 17. McKay also called attention to the fact that as the
realities of power have become more widely understood, numerous shifts
in attitudes toward the white redoubt [southern Africa] have occurred,
both inside and outside Africa." Ibid., 15-l6.
"^Joseph Lelyveld, "Where 78$ of the People are the 'Others,'"
New York Times Magazine, June 19, 1966, p. 28.
^Hance, "The Case For and Against United States Disengagement
from South Africa," 160.
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predictions of a successful black revolution had been dangerously
facile, and said that the prospects for such a revolution "seemed to
be growing dimmer with each passing year a3 the ni neteen seventies
began.

Qli

As a result, he felt that a coherent American policy on

South Africa could flow best from a decision that white power would
survive over at least another half-century.
native he saw was to support revolution.

The only other alter

This he was not prepared

to do, so he saw the "white power option" as the only realistic
policy.

As of the date of this study, it appears that for the

present the United States has adopted a "white power option."-5
What can be drawn from this study?

Hopefully it has shown

the wide variety of views that have been taken by Americans on South
Africa since 19^8 and how strongly these reflected the domestic con
cerns of the individuals asserting them.

Hopefully too it has shown

something of the complexity of the issue of American policy on South
Africa and the range of factors that might be taken into consideration
by a policy maker; it has attempted to place these factors in a
historical perspective.

However, a study of public views on a country

cannot show what considerations actually led to particular policy
decisions.

The reason for this is not only that each individual is

J Jim Hoagland, South Africa:
(Boston, 1972), 77-78.

Civilizations in Conflict

3^Ibid., 383.
The Nixon administration apparently decided to reduce the
criticism of South Africa to a lower level than that of the previous
two administrations in December 1969 or January 1970. See New York
Times. April 2, 1972, p. 1, and Natal Daily News, February 11, 1971.
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subject to differing influences but also because there is a fundamental
difference between members of the public and the makers of foreign
policy.

A member of the public may express a view and his statement

will be only a few more drops in the sea of words that wash over the
United States daily.

A policy maker knows that the position he takes

on an issue may influence the lives of millions and have consequences
that will be felt for

generations.

The responsibility of the policy

maker is much greater, and, if he takes his task seriously, he must
work diligently to get at the truth of a situation.

And what is the

truth about South Africa hiding in all the conflicting views that have
been presented on South Africa in this study?

The author can only

repeat what another visitor to South Africa, the novelist Allen
Drury, has said of his own book:
If it has made you as confused and uncertain as the visitor
about a most complex and difficult situation, then the effort
has been well-spent: because with uncertainty may come
humility, with humility understanding, with understanding
compassion, and with compassion that patience indispensable
if the Republic’s problems are ever to be worked out in a
” ■ ’”
^es
conscience

37Allen Drury, A Very Strange Society:
of South Africa (New York, 1968), 505.
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